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The fundamental ingredients of stochastic optimization problems are
the horizon, the payoff and the model. The horizon may be finite, [0, T ] or
infinite [0,∞) (and even random) while the objective may be terminal, UT (·)
or “running”, U0,T (·). The model, denoted by M[0,T ], amounts in choosing a
probability space and the dynamics of the controlled and uncontrolled state
processes.
For convenience, we take T <∞ and a terminal payoff UT (·) depending
exclusively on the terminal values of the state processes. We will think of a
stochastic optimization problem as a triplet P
(
M[0,T ], [0, T ] , UT (·)
)
and we
note that this triplet is chosen at initial time t = 0. The objective is then to
find the optimal polices and the maximal expected utility (value function).
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A widely used approach for finding the optimal policies is based on
the celebrated Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) which yields a “semi-
group”-type optimality property for the value function. It also allows us to
interpret the latter as the “intermediate utility” in arbitrary sub-horizons.
In Markovian models, the DPP allows us to work with the associated
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which is a fully non-linear and pos-
sibly degenerate partial differential equation. In most such models, under
strong regularity assumptions, the first order conditions in the HJB equation
are used to give the optimal policies in feedback form. Still, a general approach
in establishing uniqueness, existence and regularity of the value function as well
as a verification theorem for the candidate optimal polcies are missing, due
to lack of compactness of the set of controls, degeneracies, state and control
constraints, and others.
In general settings, the elegant duality approach is being used (in par-
ticular, in models with dynamics linear in controls) to study the dual instead
of the primal problem. The dual problem has a much richer structure and may
be easier to analyze.
Other approaches to study such problems rely on backward stochastic
differential equations (especially problems with homogeneous payoffs), numer-
ical approximations and others.
By far, the most challenging task in building accurate models to study
real world applications is selecting the correct model. This is a tantamount
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task as it is well accepted that there is always model error and model decay.
The most popular approach to deal with model uncertainty is based
on “robust optimization”, where instead of choosing a specific model, one
chooses a family G[0,T ] of possible models, together with penalty functionals
that measure the plausibility of each member of this family (see, for example,
[20], [29]). The HJB equation then characterizes a stochastic differential game.
Another approach is based on the so-called “adaptive control”, where
dynamic, “real-time” changes of the model are taken into account, by es-
sentially “re-starting” the optimization problem for the remaining horizon(s)
(see, among others, [37], [38]). This approach is quite popular in more applied
aspects of optimization and in the engineering literature. It is, also, very pop-
ular in reinforcement learning where (near) optimal control policies are learned
through adaptive interactions with the environment ([32], [58]).
These two approaches have distinct features. Robust optimization
problems amount in choosing at initial time t = 0 a triplet P
(
G[0,T ], [0, T ] , UT (·)
)
,
instead of a single P
(
M[0,T ], [0, T ] , UT (·)
)
. The problems are challenging due
to their max-min features but are, nevertheless, amenable to the aforemen-
tioned stochastic optimization solutions approaches. Among others, they give
rise to time-consistent policies across [0, T ]. On the other hand, time consis-
tency comes with a price, as no model revisions can be incorporated beyond
t = 0. In other words, the choice P
(
G[0,T ], [0, T ] , UT (·)
)
is rather rigid and
predominantly very conservative, as one tries to incorporate all the adverse
scenaria in the modeling family.
ix
Adaptive optimization is, by nature, time-inconsistent. Between revi-
sion times, time-consistency is naturally preserved since one deals with a single
(locally in time valid) model. However, there is no global time-consistency, as
sequential “real-time” model revisions occur, and the previously chosen model
is abandoned. As a result, adaptive control is, from the one hand, not con-
strained to rigid, a priori model(s) commitment but, on the other, the associate
solutions violate, by nature, the time-consistency property.
Both approaches are widely used, and have been extensively analyzed
in a plethora of interesting theroetical and applied papers.
The goal of this thesis is to introduce a new, alternative approach to
deal with model unceratinty and “real-time” model revisions and, in turn,
develop a comparative study with existing approaches in the context of various
applications in financial mathematics.
This new approach is based on the forward performance criteria which
adapt in a time-consistent way to “real-time” model revisions. The novelty
is that these revisions are genuinely “model-free” in that they occur in “real-
time”, without any modeling pre-commitment. For example, in the context of
optimal liquidation (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), there is no a priori model
for the evolution of the market impact parameter λ. It is rather assumed that
this parameter switches at predictable times, to values only observable at the
switching times. As such, the model revisions capture the evolving reality and
allow for considerable flexibility.
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This forward approach thus incorporates “real-time” model revisions
and is, therefore, close to adaptive optimization. On the other hand, it pro-
duces, by construction, time-consistent policies and is, thus, close to the clas-
sical optimization with model(s) pre-commitment. In other words, it can be
thought as a hybrid approach that accommodates dynamic model changes
while preserving time-consistency.
We apply the forward approach with “real-time” model revisions in four
distinct problems: portfolio management in discrete and continuous settings
(binomial and lognormal, respectively), indifference valuation in lognormal
models and optimal liquidation in the continuous time Almgren-Chriss model.
We produce closed form solutions and characterize the optimal policies and
optimal criteria. As the analysis shows, one needs to solve various sequential
“inverse” optimal investment problems with random coefficients, correspond-
ing to model revisions in real-time.
We develop a comparative study with the classical settings. A main
novelty is the introduction of two performance metrics which measure the
discrepancies between the actual performance, and the projected or the true
optimal performances under the various criteria and behavior. We study these
metrics for various scenaria, related to favorable and non-favorable market
changes, and compare their performance. These metrics resemble the notion of
“regret”, which is now considered in a more dynamic and “real-time” manner.
Among others, we show that the regret of the forward decision maker is always
zero, independently of the upcoming model changes.
xi
In what follows, we describe each application separately. For each ap-
plication, we introduce the model, the forward and classical criteria, construct
the corresponding solutions and policies, and compare them in detail.
xii
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Chapter 1
Real-time model adaptation and investment
behavior: the binomial case
1.1 Introduction
Classical stochastic optimization relies heavily on a pre-specified model
(or a family of models) chosen at initial time, say t = 0. In turn, the solution
is constructed with the full model (or a family of models) commitment for the
entire optimization horizon [0, T ] or [0,∞) . The main tool for this construction
is the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP), which yields the value function
and the optimal policies via a backward-in-time recursive algorithm.
A direct consequence of this backward construction is that for each
optimization period (discrete or infinitesimally small in continuous time) this
a priori model commitment is fully embedded in both the value function and
the optimal policies. Indeed, in discrete models, the solution is constructed
from the last time step to the one before it and, then, recursively backwards till
the initial time. In continuous time Markovian models, the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation is a backward parabolic partial differential equation
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with a given terminal condition. Finally, in non-Markovian models, the value
function process is constructed via backward stochastic differential equations,
also reflecting the backward nature of the construction.
In practice, however, it is quite unrealistic to pre-commit to a model
setting, especially if the horizon is long. Model revision is very often inevitable
when the controller is interacting in real-time with the controlled system. In-
deed, more accurate information about the underlying model typically becomes
available while the controller exercises the control policies, and such informa-
tion should be, thus, incorporated and exploited in upcoming times.
As a result, an important question arises, namely, how to incorporate
this new information in a meaningful and tractable way. By far, the most
popular approach is to work, from the beginning, with richer models aiming
at incorporating most of the plausible future events and/or to involve criteria
that minimize the effects of using the wrong model. Such methods involve
robust criteria, models with many factors, hidden variables, linear or non-
linear filtering and others. Still, however, all these choices for the involved
model setting are done at the very beginning. For example, one needs to
pre-commit to a stochastic process on which filtering is being carried out.
Another equally imperative consideration when real-time model changes
occur is whether, in the “information-adjusted” optimization problem, time-
consistency must be preserved. In some settings, like for example, in mean-
variance optimization, time-consistency is inherently absent due to the path
dependent target. In the majority of the stochastic optimization problems,
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however, time-consistency follows directly from the DPP. As a matter of fact,
time-consistency is the most important direct consequence of the DPP.
How does then one incorporate real-time model changes? Should time-
consistency be a requirement for the new setting or not? Or shall one just
“restart” the model, using the current value of the state processes, optimize
in the remaining horizon and maintain the same terminal criterion that was
chosen form the beginning? Clearly, one cannot in general achieve both real-
time model revision and preservation of time-consistency under the original
objective. What is then more important for real-time decision making? Shall
one optimize the original criterion and violate the time-consistency, or preserve
the time-consistency and revise the criterion?
Herein, the aim is not to defend one behavior in relation to the other.
Rather, the aim is to initiate a comparative study among possible optimization
behavior under real-time model revision with or without adaptation of the
optimization criterion. This comparison is first cast in an investment problem
with a single stock, represented by a simple yet rich enough binomial model.
It is then extended to the Merton’ s optimal investment problem setting in the
next chapter. The “model knowledge” is revealed in real-time in the sense that,
at the beginning of each decision making period, the investors only knows the
one-period ahead conditional distribution of the stock return under the true
physical measure. Such model assumption is in direct contrast with the typical
classical formulation, where a full model (or a family of full models) needs to
be specified at t = 0. We also note that we do not incorporate any other
3
model component to describe how the stock return parameters would change,
but solely require that these parameters are observable only at the time they
change.
We consider four types of investors, and will refer to them as the “oblivi-
ous” investor, the “stubborn” investor, the “robust” investor and the “forward”
investor.
i) Oblivious investor : he is ignorant of any future model changes. He
perceives that the market environment over the investment horizon will not
change and will remain as prescribed by the original (at t = 0) binomial model.
He solves the optimization problem at t = 0 and applies the associated optimal
policy for the entire horizon. Clearly, there will be a mismatch between the
parameters entering in the calculation of the optimal feedback policy and the
new, updated market parameters at later periods. Naturally, time-consistency
is preserved but this is virtual since the involved market input is not accurate.
Such type of investment behavior might correspond to the group of investors
in the market who are less efficient in acquiring updated market information.
ii) Stubborn investor : she is able to observe the intermediate model
change but chooses to optimize under the original criterion. Obviously, time-
inconsistency occurs in this case, and the optimal investment performance
before and after the model switching can be quite different. Such stubborn be-
havior is actually the most common way to incorporate model changes within
the field of adaptive control, and represents the type of investors who revise
their model very frequently in practice.
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iii) Robust investor : she works under the classical robust control paradi-
gm, where at t = 0 a family of possible models over the investment horizon is
chosen. It is assumed that this family contains the true underlying (unknown)
physical probability measure. However, like the oblivious investor, the robust
investor, although already taking into account at t = 0 all possible scenarios
of future model changes, does not revise this family of models once investment
is initiated. The robust investor might give excessive weight to the worst
case scenario even if the actual market model parameters turn out to be very
distinct from the worst scenario.
iv) Forward investor : like the stubborn investor, she takes into account
the model change at the intermediate time. However, contrary to the stubborn
investor, she chooses to revise the terminal criterion for the remaining horizon
in order to maintain the intertemporal consistency of the value function and
the optimal policies. As a result, she is forced to revise the terminal criterion
for the new shorter horizon according to a (predictable) forward performance
process.
Comparisons among the four different types of investment behavior
demonstrate their respective response to model changes. For instance, the
stubborn behavior solely focuses on the optimization problem over the re-
maining horizon and can lead to increased or decreased ultimate performance,
depending on the revealed new parameters. On the other hand, the forward
behavior, regardless of the underlying (unknown) true model, preserves the
same average performance when evaluated across times. This stability can be
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actually connected to regret, an important concept in real-time/on-line learn-
ing and optimization. Indeed, when assessed in retrospect, it is shown that
the forward behavior has achieved zero regret with respect to the true model
over the entire investment horizon. Due to the flexibility and the forward in
time recursive construction of the optimization criteria, the forward approach
allows dynamically revising the terminal criterion in real-time to minimize the
regret. In contrast, zero regret is typically not attainable under the other three
types of investment behavior.
1.2 Classical and forward views
Before getting into the comparative study on the four types of invest-
ment behavior, we would first present a very informal discussion of the clas-
sical and forward views for solving an optimal investment problem in a two-
period binomial model. The classical backward reasoning underlies the first
three types of investment behavior introduced above, whereas the forward op-
timization view gives rise to the forward behavior. The main purpose of this
discussion is to highlight the model commitment issue that is ubiquitous in
classical formulation through a motivation example, while at the same time,
advocating the flexibility of the forward optimization approach in terms of
model specification. Such model flexibility is one (and probably the most im-
portant one) property of the forward approach that distinguishes it from the
classical approach.
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We consider a market with a riskless asset whose interest rate is zero,
and a risky asset whose return is modeled by the random variables R1, R2 at
t = T1 and t = T2. We denote by (Ω,F) the measurable space that supports
R1, R2, and (Ft)t=0,T1,T2 the filtration that represents the information available
at the corresponding times. The investor would rebalance her portfolio at two
times t = 0 and t = T1, starting with initial wealth x ∈ R at t = 0. The
investment strategies satisfy the usual self-financing condition, and lead to the
wealth equations
XT1 = X0 + pi1(R1 − 1), and XT2 = XT1 + pi2(R2 − 1), (1.1)
with X0 = x.
We first consider the optimal investment problem for the backward
investor with a terminal utility U(x), set at t = 0 for the end of the horizon
t = T2. To better expose the idea and avoid unnecessary complexity, we assume
that all possible values of the returns are known at time t = 0, and denote by
Ru1 , Rd1 the two values of the random return R1, and Ruu2 , Rud2 , Rdu2 , and Rdd2
the four possible values for R2. At t = 0, the backward investor perceives the
stock return dynamics under the measure P̂, namely, P̂(R1 = Ru1) = p1,
P̂(R2 = Ruu2 |R1 = Ru1) = pˆuu2 ,
and
P̂(R2 = Rdu2 |R1 = Rd1) = pˆdu2 .
We also assume that the standard no-arbitrage condition satisfies, i.e., 0 <
p1, pˆ
uu
2 , pˆ
du
2 < 1, 0 < Rd1, Rud2 , Rdd2 < 1 < Ru1 , Ruu2 , Rdu2 .
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The optimal investment problem the backward investor intends to solve
at t = 0 is
V̂0(x) = sup
pi1,pi2
EP̂ [U(XT2)|X0 = x] ,
where the expectation is taken under the (t = 0) perceived measure P̂. To
solve such problem based on the classical view, the backward investor first
solves
V̂T1(x) = esssup
pi2
EP̂
[
U(XT2)
∣∣∣XT1 = x, FT1] ∈ FT1 . (1.2)
Expanding the conditional expectation at the right hand side of above equation
yields
EP̂ [U(XT2)|XT1 = x, FT1 ]
=
(
U(x+ pi2(Ruu2 − 1))p̂uu2 + U(x+ pi2(Rud2 − 1))(1− p̂uu2 )
)
1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
U(x+ pi2(Rdu2 − 1))p̂du2 + U(x+ pi2(Rdd2 − 1))(1− p̂du2 )
)
1{R1=Rd1}.
Hence, if R1 = Ru1 is realized at t = T1, the investor with the current wealth
XT1 = x would follow the policy (if it exists)
p̂i∗2,Ru1 (x) ∈ argmax
pi2∈ARu1 (x)
(
U(x+ pi2(Ruu2 − 1))p̂uu2 + U(x+ pi2(Rud2 − 1))(1− p̂uu2 )
)
,
with ARu1 (x) being the admissible set for an investor with arbitrary wealth
x at t = T1, under the market condition that R1 = Ru1 . Similar argument
associated to the market condition R1 = Rd1 yields the optimizer p̂i∗2,Rd1(x), and
we hence arrive at the optimal strategy at t = T1 for an investor with wealth
XT1 = x
p̂i∗2(x) = p̂i∗2,Ru1 (x)1{R1=Ru1 } + p̂i
∗
2,Rd1
(x)1{R1=Rd1} ∈ FT1 . (1.3)
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Plugging the optimal control p̂i∗2(x) into the optimization problem (1.2), we
obtain the value function at t = T1 as
V̂T1(x) = V̂T1,Ru1 (x)1{R1=Ru1 } + V̂T1,Rd1(x)1{R1=Rd1} ∈ FT1 ,
where the deterministic function
V̂T1,Ru1 (x) := U
(
x+ p̂i∗2,Ru1 (x)(R
uu
2 − 1)
)
p̂uu2 +U
(
x+ p̂i∗2,Ru1 (x)(R
ud
2 − 1)
)
(1−p̂uu2 ),
and
V̂T1,Rd1(x) := U
(
x+ p̂i∗2,Rd1(x)(R
du
2 − 1)
)
p̂du2 +U
(
x+ p̂i∗2,Rd1(x)(R
dd
2 − 1)
)
(1−p̂du2 ).
Note that both the optimal control p̂i∗2(x) and the value function V̂T1(x) depend
on the time t = 0 specified model dynamics for the second period, i.e., p̂uu2 ,
p̂du2 , Ruu2 , Rud2 , Rdu2 and Rdd2 , in addition to the realization of the random return
R1 at t = T1.
Now having found the value function V̂T1(x), the backward induction
procedure implies that
V̂0(x) = sup
pi1
EP̂
[
V̂T1(XT1)
∣∣∣X0 = x]
= sup
pi1
EP̂
[
V̂T1(x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x]
= sup
pi1
((
V̂T1,Ru1 (x+ pi1(R
u
1 − 1))
)
p1 +
(
V̂T1,Rd1(x+ pi1(R
d
1 − 1))
)
(1− p1)
)
.
(1.4)
Suppose there exists an maximizer p̂i∗1(x) to equation (1.4) that is admissible
for any initial wealth X0 = x, then the value function V̂0(x) can be calculated
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by plugging p̂i∗1(x) into (1.4). Note that V̂T1,Ru1 (·) and V̂T1,Rd1(·) are present
in the optimization problem (1.4), and they were computed earlier under the
optimization problem (1.2). In turn, the optimal control p̂i∗1(x) and the value
function V̂0(x) would inevitably depend on the second period model dynamics
under the t = 0 perceived measure P̂, in addition to the first period model itself.
We refer to this feature of the backward approach as model commitment.
We now turn to the forward approach in the same binomial setting,
except that at time t = 0, we do not require any knowledge about the model
characteristics of the second period stock return. Indeed, we follow the recent
work in [3] on predictable forward performance processes. It is assumed that
both the possible values and the probability distribution for R2 ∈ FT2 are only
known at t = T1. In other words, the values of return Ruu2 , Rud2 , Rdu2 and
Rdd2 are FT1-measurable random variables, and p2 = EP[1{R2=Ru2 }|FT1 ], with
Ru2 := Ruu2 1{R1=Ru1 } + R
du
2 1{R1=Rd1}, denotes the conditional probability of the
second period stock return going up under the true underlying measure P.
Different from the classical setting, however, in the forward setting,
the forward investor only needs to know the model characteristics of the first
period return in order to make investment decision at t = 0. Specifically,
at time t = 0, she is aware of Ru1 and Rd1, and p1 under the true measure
P. In addition, she chooses an initial (deterministic) utility function U0(x),
and looks for a deterministic utility UT1(x) at t = T1, such that the following
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intertemporal consistency property
U0(x) = sup
pi1
EP
[
UT1 (XT1)
∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.5)
for each initial wealth X0 = x holds. This is the inverse of the classical optimal
investment problem discussed earlier, and the existence and uniqueness of its
solution for completely monotonic cases have been extensively studied in [3].
If the inverse problem (1.5) indeed has a solution, one can readily see that
the optimal allocation pi∗1(·) (with its resulting optimal wealth X∗T1) and the
utility function UT1(·) depend exclusively on the first period model which is
accurately known at t = 0, when problem (1.5) is solved. This is in direct
contrast with the previous classical setting where we have shown that model
commitment in [0, T2] is inevitable.
To solve the second period forward problem, we look for a random
utility function UT2(· ;ω) ∈ FT1 , with the analogous intertemporal consistency
property to hold
UT1 (x) = esssup
pi2
EP
[
UT2(XT2)
∣∣∣X∗T1 = x,FT1] , a.s.. (1.6)
Here, X∗T1 = x is the optimal wealth at t = T1 obtained by following the
optimal allocation pi∗1(·) over [0, T1]. Notice that at t = T1, the conditional
probability p2 under the true measure P is known, and the same holds for the
possible values Ruu2 , Rud2 , Rdu2 and Rdd2 of the random return R2. Condition
(1.6) implies that given FT1 , on the set {R1 = Ru1} ∈ FT1 , we look for a
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(deterministic) utility function UT2,Ru1 (·), such that
UT1(x) = sup
pi2
(
UT2,Ru1
(
x+ pi2(Ruu2 − 1)
)
p2 + UT2,Ru1
(
x+ pi2(Rud2 − 1)
)
(1− p2)
)
,
(1.7)
with p2, Ruu2 and Rud2 now being known as constants, conditional on FT1 .
This is an optimization problem similar to the first period problem (1.5), and
the existence and uniqueness results from [3] readily apply. If such solution
UT2,Ru1 (·) exists, then it would depend on the second period model character-
istics as shown in the optimization problem (1.7), as well as the first period
model through the presence of UT1(·). A similar argument can be made to
obtain UT2,Rd1(·) on the set {R1 = Rd1} ∈ FT1 by solving an analogous inverse
optimization problem as (1.7). The predictable forward utility is hence given
by
UT2(x) = UT2,Ru1 (x)1{R1=Ru1 } + UT2,Rd1(x)1{R1=Rd1} ∈ FT1 .
It is now easy to see that both the forward utility UT2(·) and the optimal
allocation pi∗2(·) (with its resulting optimal wealth X∗T2) depend on the model
for the first and second periods under the true measure P, whereas UT1(·) and
and the optimal allocation pi∗1(·) (with its resulting optimal wealth X∗T1) only
depend on the true model for the first period. The intuition behind such model
flexibility is the compatibility between the sequential model revision and the
utility process construction, both of which proceed forward in real-time.
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1.3 Investment behavior in discrete time
In the previous section, we provided the (informal) discussion of the
model commitment issue arising in the classical backward optimization paradigm,
as well as how the forward approach can allow for model flexibility. This dis-
tinction between the two approaches has fundamental effects, one of which is
on the performance measurement of the associated investment strategies. In
this section, we introduce two metrics to quantitatively examine the perfor-
mance for various investors following the backward approach (i.e., the oblivious
investor, the stubborn investor and the robust investor), and for the investor
adopting the forward approach. One of the observations is that, by adaptively
revising the terminal criterion and seeking consistent investment behavior, the
forward approach produces rather stable actual performance even under ex-
treme unforeseen changes in the model. This stability is however not achievable
for any of the investors within the backward approach paradigm.
1.3.1 Model setup and the two metrics
We work under the two-period binomial framework introduced in pre-
vious section. For completeness, we recall that (Ω,F ,P) is the probability
space that supports the random variables R1, R2, and that the filtration
(Ft)t=0,T1,T2 represents the information available at the corresponding times.
We denote by E the (conditional) expectation operator under the physical
measure P. The evolution of the stock return over the first period is modeled
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by P(R1 = Ru1) = p1, and by
P (R2 = Ruu2 |R1 = Ru1) = puu2 and P
(
R2 = Rud2 |R1 = Ru1
)
= 1−puu2 , (1.8)
and
P
(
R2 = Rdu2 |R1 = Rd1
)
= pdu2 and P
(
R2 = Rdd2 |R1 = Rd1
)
= 1−pdu2 , (1.9)
for the second period. Let pu2 := puu2 1{R1=Ru1 } + p
du
2 1{R1=Rd1} ∈ FT1 be the
conditional probability of the second period stock return going up under the
true model P. The standard non-arbitrage assumption further implies that
0 < p1, puu2 , pdu2 < 1, and that 0 < Rd1, Rud2 , Rdd2 < 1 < Ru1 , Ruu2 , Rdu2 .
Notice that in reality, the underlying physical measure P is typically
not fully known at t = 0. For a reasonable comparative study among different
investors, we assume that they share the same amount of the initial knowl-
edge about the underlying model. Specifically, all the investors are aware of
the possible values for the stock returns R1, R2, and in addition, the true
probability parameter p1 at t = 0. The true parameters puu2 and pdu2 , however,
only reveal to all the investors at t = T1, conditional on FT1 . For instance,
if R1 = Ru1 has occurred over the first period, then the investors would know
the model (1.8) at t = T1. It is worth noting that by our assumption, the
true parameters puu2 and pdu2 are not known to any of the investors at time
t = 0. Such assumption corresponds to the investment practice where the
prediction power of any model typically decays as time moves into the future,
and instead, more accurate model knowledge is actually updated in real-time.
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The wealth equation under self-financing policies is given by (1.1) as
in the previous section. For the three investors under the classical backward
framework (i.e., the oblivious, the stubborn and the robust investors), we as-
sume that they have exponential utility U(x) = −e−γx, γ > 0. The forward
investor, on the other hand, takes a predictable forward criterion UFT2(x) ∈ FT1
that would be constructed in the sequel. To quantitatively compare the invest-
ment performance of the four types of investors in the true market (governed
by the measure P), we introduce two metrics as follows. For a generic type of
investor, we define her actual performance under the true measure P as
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
UT2
(
X
p̂i∗1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2
) ∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.10)
where UT2(·) is the terminal utility, and p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2 are the investment policies
derived under the associated type of investment behavior. The terminal wealth
X
p̂i∗1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2 follows from the wealth equation (1.1), when the policies p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2 are
applied at the two rebalancing times t = 0, t = T1, respectively. Another
quantity of interest is the t = 0 targeted average performance denoted by
V Targeted0 (x) for a generic type of investor who starts with initial wealth X0 = x.
This value function measures the t = 0 perceived optimal performance under
various investment behavior, and hence, it is in general not achievable. The
discrepancy between the two quantities
m0,T2(x) := V Actual0 (x)− V Targeted0 (x)
is the first metric we introduce to measure the stability of investment perfor-
mance under both the backward and forward framework. The second metric
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is the discrepancy
M0,T2(x) := V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x),
where
V True0 (x) := sup
pi1,pi2
E
[
UT2(X
pi1,pi2
T2 )
∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.11)
is the t = 0 true optimal performance, given the correct model P for the entire
horizon [0, T2]. We notice that V True0 (x) is also not achievable in reality, as
it is computed in hindsight with the full knowledge of the underlying model.
The metric M0,T2(x) is directly motivated in spirit by the fundamental concept
of regret from the online learning/optimization research field (see, e.g. [55]).
Intuitively, it measures how much regret the investor undergoes for not having
taken the genuine optimal policies under the true measure P, which is not
known at t = 0. It is expected that a stable investment process produce as
minimal regret as possible, under various market conditions (i.e., correspond-
ing to different P).
Before we start discussing in detail the four types investment behav-
ior, it is worth noting that many arguments would relate to the solution of a
single-period binomial model investment problem under exponential type of
utility/value functions. We hence consider such problem separately and ana-
lyze the existence and uniqueness of the optimal policy. Let Ru, Rd denote the
two possible values of the stock return with 0 < Rd < 1 < Ru, and 0 < p < 1
denote the probability of the event {R = Ru}. Then, under an exponential
type of terminal utility U(x) = −e−γx, γ > 0, the optimization problem is to
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solve
V0(x) = sup
pi
(
−e−γ(x+pi(Ru−1))p− e−γ(x+pi(Rd−1))(1− p)
)
, (1.12)
for each initial wealth x ∈ R. Direct computation yields the unique maximizer
pi∗(x) = − 1
γ(Ru −Rd) ln
(
1−Rd
Ru − 1
1− p
p
)
,
for all x ∈ R, following from the first order condition and the second order
condition for global concavity.
1.3.2 Oblivious investor (model non-adaptive/goal persistent)
We first consider the oblivious investor who is also known as the model
non-adaptive/goal persistent investor. As discussed earlier, the backward ap-
proach requires a full model (or a family of full models, see section 2.4 for the
robust investor) for both periods ahead. We refer to this model as the perceived
model under the perceived measure P̂, a measure that may not necessarily co-
incide with the genuine physical measure P. The oblivious investor holds onto
such perceived model P̂ specified at t = 0 for the entire horizon [0, T2] without
revising the model at t = T1 (i.e. non-adaptive), and pre-commits to the t = 0
specified terminal utility function U(x) = −e−γx (i.e. goal persistent). The
time t = 0 model he adopts under the perceived measure P̂ is given by
P̂(R1 = Ru1) = p1, P̂(R1 = Rd1) = 1− p1,
for the first period, and
P̂ (R2 = Ruu2 |R1 = Ru1) = pˆuu2 , P̂
(
R2 = Rud2 |R1 = Ru1
)
= 1− pˆuu2 ,
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and
P̂
(
R2 = Rdu2 |R1 = Rd1
)
= pˆdu2 , P̂
(
R2 = Rdd2 |R1 = Rd1
)
= 1− pˆdu2 ,
for the second period. We also denote by pˆu2 := pˆuu2 1{R1=Ru1 } + pˆ
du
2 1{R1=Rd1} ∈
FT1 the conditional probability for the second period return going up under
P̂. The parameters 0 < pˆuu2 , pˆdu2 < 1 are known at time t = 0 to the obliv-
ious investor, who would solve the stochastic optimization problem at t = 0
under the perceived measure P̂. Different from the stubborn and the forward
investors, he would follow the t = 0 optimal policies p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2 all the way through
the two periods, being oblivious (i.e. non-adaptive) to the accurate knowledge
for the second period at t = T1.
We now solve the classical optimization problem under the perceived
measure P̂ for the oblivious investor with the exponential utility U(x) = −e−γx.
At t = T1, given any wealth XT1 = x ∈ R, equation (1.2) yields the optimiza-
tion problem
sup
pi2∈R
(
−e−γ(x+pi2(Ruu2 −1))pˆuu2 − e−γ(x+pi2(R
ud
2 −1))(1− pˆuu2 )
)
, if R1(ω) = Ru1 ,
and
sup
pi2∈R
(
−e−γ(x+pi2(Rdu2 −1))pˆdu2 − e−γ(x+pi2(R
dd
2 −1))(1− pˆdu2 )
)
, if R1(ω) = Rd1.
According to (1.12), the unique optimal policy at t = T1 is given by
p̂i∗2 = −
1
γ(Ruu2 −Rud2 )
ln
(
1−Rud2
Ruu2 − 1
1− pˆuu2
pˆuu2
)
1{R1=Ru1 }
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− 1
γ(Rdu2 −Rdd2 )
ln
(
1−Rdd2
Rdu2 − 1
1− pˆdu2
pˆdu2
)
1{R1=Rd1}
= − 1
γ(Ru2 −Rd2)
ln
(
q2
1− q2
1− pˆu2
pˆu2
)
∈ FT1 , (1.13)
whereRu2 := Ruu2 1{R1=Ru1 }+R
du
2 1{R1=Rd1} ∈ FT1 , Rd2 := Rud2 1{R1=Ru1 }+Rdd2 1{R1=Rd1} ∈
FT1 and the risk neutral probability
q2 := qu21{R1=Ru1 } + q
d
21{R1=Rd1}
= 1−R
ud
2
Ruu2 −Rud2
1{R1=Ru1 } +
1−Rdd2
Rdu2 −Rdd2
1{R1=Rd1}.
The optimal value function at t = T1 under perceived measure P̂ is hence given
by
V̂T1(x) =
−e−γx
pˆuu2
(
1−Rud2
Ruu2 − 1
1− pˆuu2
pˆuu2
) Ruu2 −1
Ruu2 −R
ud
2 + (1− pˆuu2 )
(
1−Rud2
Ruu2 − 1
1− pˆuu2
pˆuu2
) Rud2 −1
Ruu2 −R
ud
2
1{R1=Ru1 }
−e−γx
pˆdu2
(
1−Rdd2
Rdu2 − 1
1− pˆdu2
pˆdu2
) Rdu2 −1
Rdu2 −R
dd
2 + (1− pˆdu2 )
(
1−Rdd2
Rdu2 − 1
1− pˆdu2
pˆdu2
) Rdd2 −1
Rdu2 −R
dd
2
1{R1=Rd1}
= −e−γx
(
pˆu2
q2
)q2 (1− pˆu2
1− q2
)1−q2
∈ FT1 . (1.14)
By backward induction, we now need to solve the optimization problem (1.4)
under the perceived measure P̂, once we have computed V̂T1(x) from (1.14).
Indeed, according to (1.12), the unique optimal policy at t = 0 is
p̂i∗1 = −
1
γ(Ru1 −Rd1)
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× ln
 q1
p1
1− p1
1− q1
(
pˆdu2
qd2
)qd2 ( qu2
pˆuu2
)qu2 (1− pˆdu2
1− qd2
)1−qd2 ( 1− qu2
1− pˆuu2
)1−qu2 , (1.15)
where q1 := 1−R
d
1
Ru1−Rd1
is the risk neutral probability for the first period.
The oblivious investor would follow p̂i∗1 over the first period and then p̂i∗2
for the second period, both in the underlying market whose genuine dynamics
are described by the true measure P. Since both policies p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2 are admissible
in the genuine market, the oblivious investor, starting from X0 = x, achieves
terminal wealth
X
p̂i∗1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2 = x+ p̂i
∗
1(R1 − 1) + p̂i∗2(R2 − 1),
and hence, his actual t = 0 average performance under the physical measure
P is given by V Actual0 (x), x ∈ R, as in (1.10). On the other hand, under the
t = 0 perceived measure P̂, the targeted optimal performance of the oblivious
investor is
V Targeted0 (x) = EP̂
[
U
(
X
p̂i∗1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2
) ∣∣∣X0 = x] .
The value function V True(x) is defined as in (1.11), given the full knowledge
of the measure P. We are now ready to provide the following quantitative
comparison result for the oblivious investor under the two introduced metrics.
Proposition 1.3.1. For any probability parameters puu2 , pdu2 under P (see
(1.8), 1.9), the regret of the oblivious investor is always nonpositive, i.e.,
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x) ≤ 0.
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The discrepancy
m0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V Targeted0 (x) < 0,
if
• puu2 > pˆuu2 , when
qu2
1−qu2
1−pˆuu2
pˆuu2
> 1;
• puu2 < pˆuu2 , when
qu2
1−qu2
1−pˆuu2
pˆuu2
< 1;
• pdu2 > pˆdu2 , when
qd2
1−qd2
1−pˆdu2
pˆdu2
> 1;
• pdu2 < pˆdu2 , when
qd2
1−qd2
1−pˆdu2
pˆdu2
< 1.
Respectively, m0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x) − V Targeted0 (x) > 0, if the above inequality
in each regime is reversed.
Proof. We first compute the optimal strategy pi∗1, pi∗2 and the associated value
function V True0 (x), given the true model P for both periods. The computation
is essentially the same as for solving the problem under the perceived model
P̂, and we hence only present the corresponding optimal controls and value
functions under P. The unique optimal policy at t = T1 is
pi∗2 = −
1
γ(Ru2 −Rd2)
ln
(
q2
1− q2
1− pu2
pu2
)
∈ FT1 . (1.16)
It follows that the value function at t = T1 under the true model P is
VT1(x) = −e−γx
(
pu2
q2
)q2 (1− pu2
1− q2
)1−q2
∈ FT1 . (1.17)
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In turn,
pi∗1 = −
1
γ(Ru1 −Rd1)
× ln
 q1
p1
1− p1
1− q1
(
pdu2
qd2
)qd2 ( qu2
puu2
)qu2 (1− pdu2
1− qd2
)1−qd2 ( 1− qu2
1− puu2
)1−qu2 , (1.18)
Therefore, for each x ∈ R,
V True0 (x) = E
[
U(Xpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
T2 )
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γ(pi∗1(R1−1)+pi∗2(R2−1))
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γpi
∗
1(R1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] ,
where the conditional expectation
E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] = (e−γpi∗2(Ruu2 −1)puu2 + e−γpi∗2(Rud2 −1)(1− pud2 ))1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
e−γpi
∗
2(Rdu2 −1)pdu2 + e−γpi
∗
2(Rdd2 −1)(1− pdu2 )
)
1{R1=Rd1}
is indeed minimized by the unique minimizer pi∗2 given in (1.16), according
to (1.12). On the other hand, the t = 0 actual performance of the oblivious
behavior under p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2 is
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
U(X p̂i
∗
1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2 )
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γ(p̂i∗1(R1−1)+p̂i∗2(R2−1))
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] ,
with the conditional expectation
E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] ≥ E[e−γpi∗2(R2−1)∣∣∣FT1 ].
As the consequence,
V Actual0 (x) = −e−γx
(
p1e
−γp̂i∗1(Ru1−1)E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]1{R1=Ru1 }
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+(1− p1)e−γp̂i∗1(Rd1−1)E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]1{R1=Rd1}
)
≤ −e−γx
(
p1e
−γp̂i∗1(Ru1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]1{R1=Ru1 }
+(1− p1)e−γp̂i∗1(Rd1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]1{R1=Rd1}
)
≤ −e−γx
(
p1e
−γpi∗1(Ru1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]1{R1=Ru1 }
+(1− p1)e−γpi∗1(Rd1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]1{R1=Rd1}
)
= V True0 (x),
where the last inequality follows, since pi∗1 from (1.18) is indeed the unique
minimizer according to (1.12). Next, we compute the targeted optimal perfor-
mance under P̂
V Targeted0 (x) = EP̂
[
U(X p̂i
∗
1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2 )
]
= −e−γxEP̂
[
e−γ(p̂i∗1(R1−1)+p̂i∗2(R2−1))
]
= −e−γxEP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] ,
where the conditional expectation is
EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] = (e−γp̂i∗2(Ruu2 −1)p̂uu2 + e−γp̂i∗2(Rud2 −1)(1− p̂uu2 ))1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rdu2 −1)p̂du2 + e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rdd2 −1)(1− pˆdu2 )
)
1{R1=Rd1}.
To compare V Targeted0 (x) with V Actual0 (x), we notice that over the first period,
the same control p̂i∗1 and the same probability 0 < p1 < 1 would be ap-
plied in the computation of the two value functions. It hence follows that
if EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] < E [e−γp̂i∗2(R2−1)∣∣∣FT1], for all ω ∈ Ω, then V Actual0 (x) <
V Targeted0 (x), and vice versa. We next look at the case when
qu2
1−qu2
1−pˆuu2
pˆuu2
> 1.
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Direct computation based on (1.13) yields −γp̂i∗2(Ruu2 − 1) > −γp̂i∗2(Rud2 − 1),
and hence,
e−γp̂i
∗
2(Ruu2 −1)pˆuu2 +e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rud2 −1)(1−pˆuu2 ) < e−γp̂i
∗
2(Ruu2 −1)puu2 +e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rud2 −1)(1−puu2 ),
if pˆuu2 < puu2 < 1. Similarly, the case
qd2
1−qd2
1−pˆdu2
pˆdu2
> 1 gives rise to −γp̂i∗2(Rdu2 −
1) > −γp̂i∗2(Rdd2 − 1), and consequently,
e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rdu2 −1)pˆdu2 +e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rdd2 −1)(1− pˆdu2 ) < e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rdu2 −1)pdu2 +e−γp̂i
∗
2(Rdd2 −1)(1−pdu2 ),
if pˆdu2 < pdu2 < 1. The above results further lead to EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] <
E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1], and hence m0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x) − V Targeted0 (x) < 0. The
other two cases in the proposition can be similarly derived.
The conclusions in Proposition 1.3.1 are rather intuitive regarding the
assessment of performance under both metrics. The regret metric M0,T2(x) is
nonpositive for all x ∈ R, due to the fact that the oblivious investor made his
decision fully based on the perceived measure P̂ rather than the true measure
P, while his performance is evaluated in the true market under the measure P.
The comparison between V Actual0 (x) and V
Targeted
0 (x) for the first metric
m0,T2(x), on the other hand, is more subtle. For fixed risk neutral probabili-
ties, when the perceived probabilities pˆuu2 , pˆdu2 are sufficiently higher than the
true probabilities puu2 , pdu2 , corresponding to the second and fourth cases in the
proposition, the targeted performance is higher than the actual performance,
as the oblivious investor overestimates the return of the market. However,
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when the perceived probabilities are significantly lower than the true proba-
bilities, the targeted performance is also higher than the actual performance,
corresponding to the first and third cases in the proposition. In these scenarios,
one can notice that p̂i∗2 given by (1.13) is negative with a large absolute value,
indicating substantial withdrawal from the investment in the stock. Failing to
exploit the actually favorable investment opportunity over the second period
in the market, the oblivious investor’s actual performance is indeed worse than
his t = 0 target.
1.3.3 Stubborn investor (model adaptive/goal persistent)
Like the oblivious investor, the stubborn investor also needs to specify
the perceived measure for the entire horizon [0, T2] at t = 0, in order to compute
the first period optimal strategy. For comparison purposes, we assume that
the same perceived measure P̂ is adopted by the stubborn investor at t = 0
and her terminal utility is also U(x) = −e−γx, x ∈ R, for γ > 0. However,
different from the oblivious investor, she is “model adaptive” in the sense that
she reconsiders the optimization problem for the remaining horizon at t = T1,
as soon as she learns the accurate model for the second period at t = T1.
Therefore, conditional on FT1 , the stubborn investor solves the optimization
problem
VT1(x) = esssup
pi2
E [U(XT1 + pi2(R2 − 1))|XT1 = x,FT1 ] ,
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under the true measure P, and obtains the optimal control pi∗2 given by (1.16).
The terminal wealth is hence represented by X p̂i
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
T2 = x+ p̂i∗1(R1−1)+pi∗2(R2−
1), with p̂i∗1 being derived at t = 0 under the perceived measure P̂ as in (1.15).
We have the following result on the performance of the stubborn investor under
the two metrics.
Proposition 1.3.2. For any probability parameters puu2 , pdu2 under P (see
(1.8), 1.9), the regret of the stubborn investor is always nonpositive, i.e.,
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x) ≤ 0.
The discrepancy
m0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V Targeted0 (x) < 0,
if puu2 ∈ (pˆuu2 , qu2 ] or puu2 ∈ [qu2 , pˆuu2 ), and if pdu2 ∈ (pˆdu2 , qd2 ] or pdu2 ∈ [qd2 , pˆdu2 ).
Proof. Working as in the proof of Proposition 1.3.1, we obtain that the t = 0
true optimal performance under measure P is
V True0 (x) = E
[
U(Xpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
T2 )
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γpi
∗
1(R1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] ,
whereas the t = 0 actual average performance of the stubborn investor is
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
U(X p̂i
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
T2 )
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] .
According to (1.12), pi∗1 from (1.18) is the unique minimizer of the quantity
min
pi1
E
[
e−γpi1(R1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] ,
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given the second period optimizer pi∗2 from (1.16). It hence leads to that
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x) − V True0 (x) ≤ 0 under the genuine probability measure
P. To examine the metric m0,T2(x), we notice that the t = 0 value function
under the perceived measure P̂ remains as
V Targeted0 (x) = EP̂
[
UT2(X
p̂i∗1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T )
]
= −e−γxEP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] .
Recall that over the first period, the probability measures P̂ and P share the
same model parameter p1, and the same policy p̂i∗1 is used. Hence, in order to
compare V Targeted0 (x) and V Actual0 (x), if suffices to compare EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]
and E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]. Substituting the corresponding optimal policies p̂i∗2,
pi∗2 into the two conditional expectations, respectively, we obtain
EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] =
(
pˆuu2
qu2
)qu2 (1− pˆuu2
1− qu2
)1−qu2
1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
pˆdu2
qd2
)qd2 (1− pˆdu2
1− qd2
)1−qd2
1{R1=Rd1},
and
E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] =
(
puu2
qu2
)qu2 (1− puu2
1− qu2
)1−qu2
1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
pdu2
qd2
)qd2 (1− pdu2
1− qd2
)1−qd2
1{R1=Rd1}.
Therefore, we need to examine the monotonicity of the functions f(p; qu2 ) :=
pq
u
2 (1 − p)1−qu2 and f(p; qd2) := pqd2 (1 − p)1−qd2 for 0 < p < 1, under fixed risk
neutral probabilities 0 < pu2 , pd2 < 1. Clearly, these functions have maximum
values attained at qu2 , qd2 , respectively. We therefore easily conclude that if
puu2 ∈ (pˆuu2 , qu2 ] or puu2 ∈ [qu2 , pˆuu2 ), and if pdu2 ∈ (pˆdu2 , qd2 ] or pdu2 ∈ [qd2 , pˆdu2 ),
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then EP̂
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] < E [e−γpi∗2(R2−1)∣∣∣FT1], which leads to m0,T2(x) <
0. Analogously, m0,T2(x) > 0 if the second period stock return probabilities
puu2 , p
du
2 under the true model P stay outside the above regimes.
Proposition 1.3.2 provides an intuitively correct comparison between
the targeted performance and the actual performance. It shows that if the
genuine market condition for the future period [T1, T2], compared to the t = 0
perceived market condition for [T1, T2], deviates substantially from the risk
neutral case , then proper reaction by immediately taking into account such
unanticipated deviation can lead to better overall performance than initially
targeted. On the other hand, if the true market condition turns out to be close
to the risk neutral case than initially expected, then even direct response to
this correct knowledge at time t = T1 can not enable the stubborn investor to
achieve the targeted performance under the measure P̂.
1.3.4 Robust investor (model robust/goal persistent)
In the context of optimization under model ambiguity, different formu-
lations and solutions have been proposed within the paradigm of backward
approach, among which the readers can find the seminal works including the
(backward) robust approach in [29] and the multiple priors formulation in
[20]. A more unified discussion in the dynamic setting is provided in [40]. The
robust control approach takes into account a family of possible models and
typically leads to conservative investment behavior for an ambiguity averse in-
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vestor. This attitude is reflected in the underlying mathematical formulation
that solves a maxmin problem; an optimal control law is sought to mainly re-
spond the worst scenario that the decision maker can ever possibly encounter
from the (presumed malevolent) nature. As a consequence, the robust ap-
proach provides an insurance on the investor’s performance against the most
unfavorable market condition by not exploring other investment opportuni-
ties that may also possibly occur. In particular, if the true market condition
turns out not to be so adverse, or even favorable for investment, then the
conservative behavior implied by the robust approach may, in retrospect, in-
duce large losses. The regret concept we introduced earlier turns out to be
an appropriate metric to gauge the loss of the investor being too conservative
when facing model uncertainty. Indeed, under the current two-period bino-
mial model setting, we show that the well documented non-participation effect
could occur for the second period if the ambiguity set of the investor is large
enough. Such conservative behavior leads to zero allocation in the risky asset.
Although the robust approach protects the investor from potentially harmful
market scenarios in this way, it can in turn cause more regret in hindsight if
the genuine market opportunity turns out to be actually favorable for more
active investment behavior.
As before, we focus on the representative two-period binomial model
with uncertainty on the second period stock return probabilities, with only
the first period probability revealed to the robust investor at t = 0. Different
from how the other investors respond to model uncertainty, the robust investor
29
would impose a family of probabilities for the second period stock return going
up, conditional on the first period return going up or down. We denote the
assocaited ambiguity sets as pˆuu2 ∈ [εu, 1−εu] and pˆdu2 ∈ [εd, 1−εd], respectively.
We emphasize that not only the second period stock return probabilities can
be conditioned on the first period return movement, but also the ambiguity
sets may be dependent on the outcome of the first period stock return. The
latter captures adaptive learning incorporated into the robust framework (see,
e.g. [7], or [21]). As time evolves, the ambiguity sets may shrink ([7]) or
expand depending on the nature of the signal and the underlying quantity to
learn ([21]), while if learning is not applied, the ambiguity sets would remain
constant bandwidth across different periods. Although adaptive learning can
be included in the robust control framework, we note that this seemingly
online attribute of such model-based learning does not change the backward
reasoning nature of the robust approach. Still, the issue of model commitment
prevails even with such kind of learning, as decision made for today is still
contingent on the t = 0 prescribed reaction rule to the future stock returns
through the model-based learning. In fact, one can soon recognize that the
learning rule is actually part of the model state dynamics, and that it has
been taken into account by the backward induction method in discrete time
to generate time-consistent optimal strategy.
To avoid the unnecessary complexity due to the model-based learning
that does not genuinely change the backward reasoning nature, we formulate
the robust control problem in its original form without the component of learn-
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ing. The t = 0 problem to solve is the maxmin problem under the exponential
utility U(x) = −e−γx,
V Targeted0 (x) = sup inf
pi1,pi2 Q∈Q
EQ
[
UT2(X
pi1,pi2
T2 )|X0 = x
]
, (1.19)
where the family of possible measures Q is defined as
Q :=
{
Q : Q(R2 = Ruu2 |R1 = Ru1) = pˆuu2 , Q(R2 = Rdu2 |R1 = Rd1) = pˆdu2 ,
with pˆuu2 ∈ [εu, 1− εu], pˆdu2 ∈ [εd, 1− εd], and Q(A) = P(A), ∀A ∈ FT1
}
.
In the above formulation, we assume 0 < εu, εd < 12 to be constants known
at t = 0. Note that such assumption complies with the model commitment
discussed earlier, which requires the pre-specification of one or a family of
possible models for the future stock returns at t = 0.
To solve problem (1.19), we first solve
V TargetedT1 (XT1) = esssup essinf
pi2 Q∈Q
EQ
[
−e−γ(XT1+pi2(R2−1))
∣∣∣XT1 , FT1] (1.20)
= max
pi2
min
εu≤pˆuu2 ≤1−εu
εd≤pˆdu2 ≤1−εd
(− exp (−γ (XT1 + pi2(Ruu2 − 1))) pˆuu2
− exp
(
−γ
(
XT1 + pi2(Rud2 − 1)
))
(1− pˆuu2 )
)
1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
− exp
(
−γ
(
XT1 + pi2(Rdu2 − 1)
))
pˆdu2
− exp
(
−γ
(
XT1 + pi2(Rdd2 − 1)
))
(1− pˆdu2 )
)
1{R1=Rd1}
.
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The above maxmin problem can be separately considered on the sets {R1 =
Ru1} and {R1 = Rd1}; for instance, the problem conditional on {R1 = Ru1} is
to solve
max
pi2
min
εu≤pˆuu2 ≤1−εu
f(pi2, pˆuu2 ) := maxpi2 minεu≤pˆuu2 ≤1−εu
(
−exp (−γ (XT1 + pi2(Ruu2 − 1))) pˆuu2
− exp
(
−γ
(
XT1 + pi2(Rud2 − 1)
))
(1− pˆuu2 )
)
,
with the function f(pi2, pˆuu2 ) clearly being a convex-concave function, and con-
ditions for applying the Minmax theorem can be easily verified (see e.g. [41]).
Hence, we turn to solve
min
εu≤pˆuu2 ≤1−εu
max
pi2
(
− exp
(
− γ (XT1 + pi2(Ruu2 − 1))
)
pˆuu2
− exp
(
−γ
(
XT1 + pi2(Rud2 − 1)
))
(1− pˆuu2 )
)
. (1.21)
For any fixed pˆuu2 ∈ [εu, 1− εu], according to (1.12), the unique maximizer p̂i∗2
on the set {R1 = Ru1} is given by
p̂i∗21{R1=Ru1 } = −
1
γ(Ruu2 −Rud2 )
ln
(
1−Rud2
Ruu2 − 1
1− pˆuu2
pˆuu2
)
. (1.22)
Similar argument on the set {R1 = Rd1} yields
p̂i∗21{R1=Rd1} = −
1
γ(Rdu2 −Rdd2 )
ln
(
1−Rdd2
Rdu2 − 1
1− pˆdu2
pˆdu2
)
, (1.23)
for any fixed pˆdu2 ∈ [εd, 1 − εd]. It remains to solve the outer minimization
problem in (1.21) after we substitute (1.22) into the objective function to be
minimized. Direct computation leads to the minimization problem
min
εu≤pˆuu2 ≤1−εu
−e−γx
( qu2
1− qu2
1− pˆuu2
pˆuu2
)1−qu2
pˆuu2 +
(
qu2
1− qu2
1− pˆuu2
pˆuu2
)−qu2
(1− pˆuu2 )

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with XT1 = x ∈ R, whose minimizer is
pˆuu∗2 =

1− εu, if qu2 ≥ 1− εu;
εu, if qu2 ≤ εu;
qu2 , if εu < qu2 < 1− εu.
Accordingly, from (1.22), we can conclude that, conditional on {R1 = Ru1},
• if 0 < qu2 < εu, then pˆuu∗2 = εu and
p̂i∗21{R1=Ru1 } = −
1
γ(Ruu2 −Rud2 )
ln
(
1−Rud2
Ruu2 − 1
1− εu
εu
)
> 0,
i.e., the robust investor would long the risky asset during the second
period;
• if 0 < 1− εu < qu2 , then pˆuu∗2 = 1− εu and
p̂i∗21{R1=Ru1 } = −
1
γ(Ruu2 −Rud2 )
ln
(
1−Rud2
Ruu2 − 1
εu
1− εu
)
< 0,
i.e., the robust investor would short the risky asset during the second
period;
• if εu ≤ qu2 ≤ 1− εu, then pˆuu∗2 = qu2 and
p̂i∗21{R1=Ru1 } = 0,
i.e., the robust investor would hold zero position in the risky asset during
the second period.
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Similar conclusions hold on the set {R1 = Rd1}. The above results
derived under the robust control framework have rather intuitive interpreta-
tions. Indeed, the first two scenarios correspond to a not too large ambiguity
set (bounded from above or below by the risk neutral probability), and hence
the investor would be relatively confident about what action to take. When all
the perceived probabilities for the stock return going up over the second period
exceed the risk neutral probability, the investor should long the risky asset.
On the other hand, if the investor perceives the probability of future return
going up to be definitely lower than the risk neutral probability, she should
short the risky asset. In the third scenario where the ambiguity set is too
large (containing the risk neutral probability), the ambiguity averse investor
has not accumulated sufficient information to make investment decisions and,
hence, the non-participation effect occurs. Such conservative behavior under
robust control framework has been well documented in both theoretical and
empirical studies (see e.g. [17], [13]).
When the ambiguity set is large enough to induce the non-participation
behavior over the second period, the value function V TargetedT1 (·) coincides with
the terminal exponential utility, since all wealth would be put into the riskless
asset with zero interest rate for the second period. Accordingly,
V Targeted0 (x) = maxpi1 EP
[
V TargetedT1 (XT1)
∣∣∣X0 = x]
= max
pi1
EP
[
−e−γ(x+pi1(R1−1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] ,
where we have applied the fact Q(A) = P(A), for any Q ∈ Q and any A ∈ FT1 .
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Direct computation then gives the first period optimal policy
p̂i∗1 = −
1
γ(Ru1 −Rd1)
ln
(
1−Rd1
Ru1 − 1
1− p1
p1
)
, (1.24)
as well as the t = 0 targeted value function
V Targeted0 (x) = −e−γx
( q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)1−q1
p1 +
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)−q1
(1− p1)

= −e−γx
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)−q1 1− p1
1− q1 . (1.25)
The non-participation effect guarantees that the robust investor can
still do relatively well even under the worst scenario, but typically at the cost
of giving up the opportunity to exploit possibly beneficial market conditions.
In the next proposition, we quantitatively measure the loss in terms of regret
after showing that the regret for the robust investor is also nonpositive. Our
result demonstrates that the conservative behavior under the robust control
approach can produce more regret if the reality turns out to be further from
the worst scenario.
Proposition 1.3.3. For any probability parameters puu2 , pdu2 under P (see (1.8),
(1.9)), that satisfy puu2 ∈ [εu, 1− εu], pdu2 ∈ [εd, 1− εd], the regret of the robust
investor is nonpositive, i.e.,
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, if qu2 ∈ [εu, 1 − εu] and qd2 ∈ [εd, 1 − εd], then there exists a
function C : [εu, 1− εu]× [εd, 1− εd] 7→ R+, such that the discrepancy
M0,T2(x) = m0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x)
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= V Targeted0 (x)− V True0 (x) = (1− C(puu2 , pdu2 ))V Actual0 (x),
for all initial wealth x ∈ R, with
min
εu≤puu2 ≤1−εu
εd≤pdu2 ≤1−εd
C(puu2 , pdu2 )→ 0, as εu, εd → 0. (1.26)
Proof. The regret of the robust investor being nonpositive follows easily from
the fact that the optimal robust controls p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2 are in general only admissible
controls, rather than the genuine optimal controls that yield the value function
V True0 (x). Indeed, let pi∗1 and pi∗2 be the optimal controls of the classical stochas-
tic optimization problem in hindsight under the exponential utility, with the
full knowledge of the true measure P given. Then clearly,
V True0 (x) = E
[
−e−γ(x+pi∗1(R1−1)+pi∗2(R2−1))
]
≥ E
[
−e−γ(x+p̂i∗1(R1−1)+p̂i∗2(R2−1))
]
= V Actual0 (x),
for all x ∈ R, since both strategies (pi∗1, pi∗2) and (p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2) are evaluated under
the same true measure P, with the former being the optimizer under P. To
quantify the loss in regret, we notice that under the additional assumption
εu ≤ qu2 ≤ 1− εu and εd ≤ qd2 ≤ 1− εd, the optimal robust controls p̂i∗1 is given
by (1.24) while p̂i∗2 = 0. It hence yields that
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
−e−γ(x+p̂i∗1(R1−1)+0(R2−1))
]
= V Targeted0 (x),
for any x ∈ R. On the other hand,
V True0 (x) = E
[
−e−γ(x+pi∗1(R1−1)+pi∗2(R2−1))
]
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= E
[
−e−γ(x+pi∗1(R1−1))E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] .
According to (1.12), we have
E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] = minpi2 E
[
e−γpi2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]
=
( qu2
1− qu2
1− puu2
puu2
)1−qu2
puu2 +
(
qu2
1− qu2
1− puu2
puu2
)−qu2
(1− puu2 )
1{R1=Ru1 }
+
( qd2
1− qd2
1− pdu2
pdu2
)1−qd2
pdu2 +
(
qd2
1− qd2
1− pdu2
pdu2
)−qd2
(1− pdu2 )
1{R1=Rd1}.
Let
Au :=
( qu2
1− qu2
1− puu2
puu2
)1−qu2
puu2 +
(
qu2
1− qu2
1− puu2
puu2
)−qu2
(1− puu2 )
 , (1.27)
and
Ad :=
( qd2
1− qd2
1− pdu2
pdu2
)1−qd2
pdu2 +
(
qd2
1− qd2
1− pdu2
pdu2
)−qd2
(1− pdu2 )
 . (1.28)
It then follows that
V True0 (x) = maxpi1
[
−e−γ(x+pi1(Ru1−1))Aup1 − e−γ(x+pi1(Rd1−1))Ad(1− p1)
]
.
Again, by (1.12), we obtain
pi∗1 = −
1
γ(Ru1 −Rd1)
ln
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
Ad
Au
)
, (1.29)
and
V True0 (x) = −e−γx
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)−q1 1− p1
1− q1
(
Ad
Au
)−q1
Ad. (1.30)
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Now recalling V Targeted0 (x) as in (1.25), we then have
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x)
= V Targeted0 (x)− V True0 (x) = (1− C(puu2 , pdu2 ))V Actual0 (x), (1.31)
with the function C(puu2 , pdu2 ) given by
C(puu2 , pdu2 ) = C(puu2 , pdu2 ; qu2 , qd2) =
(
Ad
Au
)−q1
Ad.
Note that V Actual0 (x) does not depend on the second period true probability
parameters puu2 , pdu2 , nor the ambiguity sets parameters εu, εd. It is therefore
sufficient to analyze the single quantity C(puu2 , pdu2 ) to determine when the
robust investor would experience the most regret. Direct computation shows
C(puu2 , pdu2 ) =(
1− puu2
)q1(1−qu2 )(
puu2
)q1qu2 (1− pdu2 )(1−q1)(1−qd2) (pdu2 )(1−q1)qd2 C1(qu2 , qd2), (1.32)
where C1(qu2 , qd2) is some known constant that depends only on the fixed risk
neutral probabilities qu2 , qd2 . Minimization of C(puu2 , pdu2 ) over the ambiguity
sets yields
arg min
εu≤puu2 ≤1−εu
εd≤pdu2 ≤1−εd
C(puu2 , pdu2 ) =

1− εu, 1− εd, if 0 < qu2 < 12 , 0 < qd2 < 12 ,
εu, εd, if 12 < q
u
2 < 1, 12 < q
d
2 < 1,
1− εu, εd, if 0 < qu2 < 12 , 12 < qd2 < 1,
εu, 1− εd, if 12 < qu2 < 1, 0 < qd2 < 12 .
In all of these cases, it is easy to verify that as εu, εd → 0,
min
εu≤puu2 ≤1−εu
εd≤pdu2 ≤1−εd
C(puu2 , pdu2 )→ 0,
38
and hence, according to (1.31), the regret of the robust investor approaches
its largest negative value V Actual0 (x), as εu, εd → 0.
In the proof of Proposition 1.3.3, we can actually see that the largest
negative regret occurs if reality is most distinct from the worst scenario that
the robust control approach originally intended to tackle. Notice that the
distinctiveness between reality and the worst scenario is characterized by the
Euclidean distance between their associated probability parameters, or equiv-
alently the distance between the vectors (puu2 , pdu2 ) and (qu2 , qd2), in the current
finite-dimensional parametric binomial model setting. Indeed, the minimizer
of the quantity C(puu2 , pdu2 ) will be always attained at one of the boundaries of
the ambiguity set that is furthest from the risk neutral probability. It hence
implies that if reality turns out to be the most favorable scenario (i.e., fur-
thest from the risk neutral probabilities), then the robust investor would feel
most regretful for her non-participation in the stock market during the second
period, an intuitive result that complies with most investors’ investment psy-
chology. It might be interesting to study in more general settings when the
robust control approach can induce the most regret, under some appropriate
distance metric (e.g., Wasserstein distance) on the infinite-dimensional space
of measures.
When non-participation behavior occurs, the robust investor should
typically experience more regret than the stubborn investor in the same back-
ward paradigm, as a consequence of the excessive weight put on the worst
scenario by the robust control approach. Another interesting observation from
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Proposition 1.3.3 is that more regret would be induced for a non-participating
robust investor who is less confident in the second period stock return pro-
file (corresponding to larger ambiguity sets, as εu, εd → 0). Hence, it might
be recommended that the investors take some actions rather than completely
withdraw from investing in the risky asset when there is too much ambiguity,
if the investment goal is to have less regret in hindsight.
1.3.5 Forward investor (model adaptive/goal consistent)
The forward investor, unlike any of the backward investors, does not
pre-commit at t = 0 to a perceived measure (or a family of perceived mea-
sures) for the entire horizon [0, T2]. Rather, at t = 0, he starts with some
admissible initial performance, and solves for the optimal policy p̂i∗1 based only
on the probablity model over the first period under the genuine measure P.
At the begining of the second period, however, a consistent terminal criterion,
denoted by UFT2(·), together with the corresponding optimal polciy p̂i∗2 would
be determined based on the genuine sub-model (1.8) or (1.9) under P, which
is fully knwon to the forward investor at t = T1. For reasonable compara-
tive analysis, we choose the initial performance to be the targeted optimal
value function at t = 0 under the same perceived measure P̂ of the oblivious
and stubborn investors, i.e., UF0 (x) = V
Targeted
0 (x), but we emphasize that in
general, the forward approach can be applied to a much larger class of ini-
tial performances (see [3] for more details). Such flexibility for initial datum
accounts for both subjective optimistic and pessimistic views (corresponding
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to different perceived measures P̂) at initial time t = 0. The strength of the
forward approach, as depicted in the sequel, is the ability to deliver the per-
formance that is on the average consistent with the initial view, even if reality
turns out to be rather different from the subjective belief in the beginning.
Time-consistency of performance process in dynamic setting has been
studied in the context of model ambiguity. For example, in the work of [40],
the nature is allowed to choose any probability model from a family but un-
der certain cost. Their result shows that the (backward) dynamic variational
performance process is time-consistent if and only if the cost functions satisfy
the so called no-gain condition and Bayes Rule is applied for model update.
In other words, a decision maker in their context is dynamically consistent if
and only if she has a way to impose (hypothetical) costs on the nature’s choice
of probability measures such that (she thinks that) the nature is also dynami-
cally consistent. Our formulation under the forward approach differs in several
aspects. First of all, consistency of model choice of the nature is essential to
the time-consistency of the decision making process in the classical backward
framework, as demonstrated in the Dynamic Programming Principle, for in-
stance. In the current two-period binomial model setting, model consistency
amounts to claiming that if the nature has chosen the true measure P over
[0, T2], then the model for the second period is the conditional probability
P|FT1 . However, the decision maker/investor in our setting knows for sure
that she would experience time-inconsistency at t = T1, since her subjective
belief P̂ (or a family of subjective beliefs of her) would in general differ from the
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true conditional probability measure over the second period. Such inconsis-
tency is unavoidable and is due to the discrepancy between the investor’s view
and the nature’s true consistent behavior. The forward investor, on the other
hand, does not assume any subjective or objective cost on the nature’s choice,
but adaptively revises her goal and beliefs forward in real-time, knowing that
such model inconsistency is due to the other backward investors’ initial limited
knowledge. This also gives rise to the second difference between the forward
approach and the existing backward methods; namely, the forward investor
only needs to react in real-time to the single model that is actually chosen
by the nature, whereas the existing robust control framework takes into ac-
count a priori a family of possible measures that can be selected by the nature
and neglects the subsequent interactions between the decision maker and the
nature. In this sense, we can view the classical backward approach as being
proactive to model ambiguity while the forward approach has a clear reactive
perspective in real-time. Lastly, Bayes formula typically serves as the funda-
mental update rule in the classical backward framework, which leads to the
time-consistent decision making process by augmenting the state space with a
belief state. Being one of the model-based learning rules, it however does not
genuinely resolve the model commitment issue inherent in the backward frame-
work (see the discussion in section 2.3). In contrast, the learning mechanism
that is compatible with the forward approach can be rather general; in par-
ticular, unlike the Bayesian update, it is not necessary to prescribe at t = 0
how to learn the second period model under the forward framework. Such
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flexibility makes it possible for us to resort to other sophisticated model-free
learning mechanisms for which analytic update rules may not be available (e.g.
deep learning). Also, as pointed out in [19], the classical backward framework,
with or without model-based learning, cannot successfully incorporate both
time-consistent planning and surprising events, a fact in accordance with the
backward model commitment issue bought up earlier. The forward approach,
relieved from the pre-commitment to the future model or learning rule, can
capture the unforeseen “surprises” into the revised decision making criterion
in real-time and, still, generate consistent performance process.
The forward performance process theory is rather general. Here, we
choose to work with a specific family known as the predictable forward per-
formance processes introduced in [3]. Starting from UF0 (x) = V
Targeted
0 (x), the
forward investor seeks a criterion UFT1(·) ∈ F0 that is consistent with UF0 (x) in
the sense
V Targeted0 (x) = sup
pi1
E
[
UFT1
(
Xpi1T1
) ∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.33)
with Xpi1T1 = x+ pi1(R1 − 1). Notice that in the above formulation (1.33), only
the knowledge of first period stock return distribution P(R1 = Ru1) = p1 is
needed, and recall that it is known to all investors at t = 0, including the
forward investor. This gives the fundamental difference in decision making
between the forward investor and the other three investors who adopts the
backward approach. To solve the forward problem (1.33), since the t = 0
targeted performance has the form V Targeted0 (x) = −e−γxA, for some known
constant A > 0, we look for UFT1(·) in the similar form UFT1(x) = −e−γxB, for
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some B > 0 to be determined. Equation (1.33) gives that
V Targeted0 (x) = maxpi1
(
p1U
F
T1(x+ pi1(R
u
1 − 1)) + (1− p1)UFT1(x+ pi1(Rd1 − 1))
)
,
(1.34)
whose maximizer is unique and is given by
p̂i∗1 = −
1
γ(Ru1 −Rd1)
ln
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)
. (1.35)
Upon substituting the maximizer (1.35) into the equation (1.33), we obtain
B =
A p11−p1
1−q1
q1
p1e1−q1 + (1− p1)e−q1 ∈ F0,
and hence the consistent criterion UFT1(·). Then, at t = T1, the genuine sub-
model (1.8) or (1.9) for the second period stock return is fully available (con-
ditional on the first period stock return), and the goal is to find a UFT2(·) ∈ FT1
such that
UFT1(x) = esssup
pi2
E
[
UFT2(x+ pi2(R2 − 1))
∣∣∣XT1 = x, FT1] , a.s.. (1.36)
Assuming such terminal criterion has the form UFT2(x) = −e−γxC, for some
random variable C ∈ FT1 that is almost surely positive under the true measure
P, we have
−e−γxB = max
pi2
( (
−e−γ(x+pi2(Ruu2 −1))puu2 − e−γ(x+pi2(R
ud
2 −1))(1− puu2 )
)
C1{R1=Ru1 }
+
(
−e−γ(x+pi2(Rdu2 −1))pdu2 − e−γ(x+pi2(R
dd
2 −1))(1− pdu2 )
)
C1{R1=Rd1}
)
. (1.37)
As before, we determine the unique optimal policy for the second period as
p̂i∗2 = −
1
γ(Ru2 −Rd2)
ln
(
q2
1− q2
1− pu2
pu2
)
, (1.38)
44
and the random quantity C ∈ FT1 is determined after we substitute the optimal
policy p̂i∗2 back to (1.36),
C =
B
pu2
1−pu2
1−q2
q2
e1−q2pu2 + e−q2(1− pu2)
∈ FT1 .
We recall that here pu2 and q2 are the genuine physical probability and the risk
neutral probability for the second period stock return defined as before by
pu2 = puu2 1{R1=Ru1 } + p
du
2 1{R1=Rd1},
q2 = qu21{R1=Ru1 } + q
d
21{R1=Rd1},
respectively.
From above real-time construction of the forward criteria UF0 (·), UFT1(·),
UFT2(·), we can see how the gradually acquired knowledge of the true underlying
model P enters into the forward optimization problem. Indeed, as shown next,
the appropriate real-time modification of the optimization criteria results in
both the two metrics M0,T2(x) and m0,T2(x) being identically zero, regardless
of the true measure P.
Proposition 1.3.4. For any probability parameters puu2 , pdu2 under P (see
(1.8), (1.9)), the regret of the forward investor is identically zero, i.e.,
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x) = 0.
Moreover, the discrepancy
m0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V Targeted0 (x) = 0.
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Proof. We start by computing the t = 0 actual average performance under the
true measure P for the forward investor. We have
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
UFT2(X
p̂i∗1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2 )
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γ(p̂i∗1(R1−1)+p̂i∗2(R2−1))C
]
= −e−γxE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)CE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]] .
Recall that the random variable C ∈ FT1 is determined such that the equa-
tion (1.37) is satisfied by the unique optimizer (1.38). We hence have B =
CE
[
e−γp˜i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] from (1.37). Using that B ∈ F0, we get
V Actual0 (x) = −e−γxE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)
]
B = −e−γxA = V Targeted0 (x),
where the second equality follows because p̂i∗1 is the unique optimizer to the
equation (1.34). This concludes that m0,T2(x) = 0, for any puu2 , pdu2 under
P. We now consider the t = 0 optimal performance under the true model, in
hindsight, for the forward investor with terminal utility UFT2(x). Notice that
we are essentially solving the classical backward problem under UFT2(x) with
full knowledge of the true measure P. It follows that
VT1(x) = esssup
pi2
E
[
UFT2(x+ pi2(R2 − 1))
∣∣∣XT1 = x, FT1]
= −e−γxC essinf
pi2
E
[
e−γpi2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] = −e−γxB,
where we used that C ∈ FT1 satisfies (cf. (1.37))
C essinf
pi2
E
[
e−γpi2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1] = C E [e−γp̂i∗2(R2−1)∣∣∣FT1] = B.
By backward induction,
V True0 (x) = sup
pi1
E
[
VT1(x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x]
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= −e−γxB inf
pi1
E
[
e−γpi1(R1−1)
]
= −e−γxA,
where we used that B ∈ F0 satisfies (cf. (1.34))
B inf
pi1
E
[
e−γpi1(R1−1)
]
= B E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)
]
= A.
We hence obtain that M0,T2(x) = 0, for any puu2 , pdu2 under P.
1.4 Comparison of regret for various types of investors
In previous sections, we examined four types of possible investment be-
havior under model uncertainty, from the perspective of the metric M0,T2(x)
that characterizes the regret in hindsight, and the metric m0,T2(x) that char-
acterizes the discrepancy from the targeted performance. It was shown that
all three investors adopting the backward approach, the oblivious, stubborn
and robust investors, endure negative regret in general, while the forward in-
vestor always achieves zero regret regardless of the true underlying measure
P. It is thus interesting to quantify and compare the negative regret for the
three backward investors. Intuitively, each of the three investment types has
its relative strength facing different realities and, hence, the regret of one type
of investor can dominate or stay underneath the regret of the others. For
instance, we expect the stubborn investor to experience less regret in most
scenarios of reality, since he has taken into account the new model when it is
available at t = T1. On the other hand, the robust investor should be able
to benefit from the conservative non-participation strategy if reality coincides
with the worst scenario. In this section, we provide detailed analysis on the
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magnitude of regret for the three types of investors belonging to the classical
backward paradigm.
We first recall that the value function V True0 (x) for the three backward
investors in the regret metric M0,T2(x) does not change. It is the true optimal
performance in hindsight, computed under the terminal utility U(x) = −e−γx
and the true measure P,
V True0 (x) = sup
pi1,pi2
E
[
U(Xpi1,pi2T2 )
∣∣∣X0 = x] ,
for any initial wealth x ∈ R. From (1.30), we recall that
V True0 (x) = −e−γx
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)−q1 1− p1
1− q1
(
Ad
Au
)−q1
Ad,
with Au, Ad given in (1.27) and (1.28), respectively. The model parameters p1,
q1, qu2 and qd2 in Au, Ad are fixed and known to all backward investors at t = 0,
while puu2 , pdu2 are generic probability parameters for the second period stock
return under the true measure P. The value function V True0 (x) hence would
solely depend on puu2 and pdu2 that correspond to different realities. Following
from (1.32), we obtain that for fixed initial wealth x ∈ R,
V True0 (x) = O
((
1− puu2
)q1(1−qu2 )(
puu2
)q1qu2 (1− pdu2 )(1−q1)(1−qd2) (pdu2 )(1−q1)qd2) .
(1.39)
We next quantify the term V Actual0 (x) in the regret metric for the oblivious,
stubborn and robust investors. According to Proposition 1.3.3, it is easy to see
that for the robust investor who favors non-participation in the second period
(corresponding to the case with large ambiguity sets), the regret is given by
M0,T2(x) = V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x)
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= −e−γx
(
q1
1− q1
1− p1
p1
)−q1 1− p1
1− q1 − V
True
0 (x) = O(1),
where O(1) denotes a constant, as puu2 , pdu2 goes to 0 or 1. For the oblivious
investor, we have
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
U(X p̂i
∗
1 ,p̂i
∗
2
T2 )
∣∣∣X0 = x] ,
where the expectation is taken under the true measure P. Applying now the
(perceived) optimal policies p̂i∗1, p̂i∗2, given by (1.15) and (1.13), under the true
measure P yields
V Actual0 (x) = −e−γxE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)E
[
e−γp̂i
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]]
= −e−γx
(
p1
q1
)q1 (1− p1)1−q1
(1− q1)−q1
(
pˆuu2
qu2
)q1qu2 ( pˆdu2
qd2
)(1−q1)qd2 (1− pˆdu2
1− qd2
)q1qd2−q1−qd2
×
(
1− qu2
1− pˆuu2
)q1qu2−q1 ( q1
1− q1
1− pˆdu2
1− qd2
qu2 − pˆuu2
pˆuu2 (1− pˆuu2 )
)
puu2
+
(
qd2 − pˆdu2
(1− qd2)pˆdu2
)
pdu2 +
(
q1
1− q1
1− pˆdu2
1− qd2
1− qu2
1− pˆuu2
+ 1
).
Noticing that the last term in the above expression is a strictly positive quan-
tity independent of puu2 , pdu2 , we obtain V Actual0 (x) = O(1), which yields that
the regret of the oblivious investor is also of order O(1) as the robust investor.
We now turn to the stubborn behavior whose actual average perfor-
mance is given by
V Actual0 (x) = E
[
U(X p̂i
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
T2 )
∣∣∣X0 = x] ,
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where, again, the expectation is taken under the true measure P and p̂i∗1 is
obtained under the perceived measure P̂, while pi∗2 is the optimal control (1.16)
revised under the true sub-models (1.8), (1.9) at t = T1. Further computation
then gives
V Actual0 (x) = −e−γxE
[
e−γp̂i
∗
1(R1−1)E
[
e−γpi
∗
2(R2−1)
∣∣∣FT1]]
= −e−γx(1− p1)
(
p1
q1
)q1 (qd2)(q1−1)qd2
(pˆdu2 )q1q
d
2
(
pˆuu2
qu2
)q1qu2 (1− qd2)(q1−1)(1−qd2)
(1− pˆdu)q1(1−qd2)
×
(
1− pˆuu2
1− qu2
)q1(1−qu2 ) q1
1− q1
(puu2 )q
u
2 (1− puu2 )1−qu2
(pˆuu2 )q
u
2 (1− pˆuu2 )1−qu2
+ (pdu2 )q
d
2 (1− pdu2 )1−q
d
2
.
Denote Z1 := (puu2 )
qu2 (1− puu2 )1−q
u
2 and Z2 :=
(
pdu2
)qd2 (1− pdu2 )1−qd2 . Then, for
any fixed initial wealth x ∈ R, the regret for stubborn investor is of order
V Actual0 (x)− V True0 (x) = O
(
(puu2 )
qu2 (1− puu2 )1−q
u
2 +
(
pdu2
)qd2 (1− pdu2 )1−qd2)
−O
((
1− puu2
)q1(1−qu2 )(
puu2
)q1qu2 (1− pdu2 )(1−q1)(1−qd2) (pdu2 )(1−q1)qd2)
= O (Z1 + Z2)−O
(
Zq11 Z
1−q1
2
)
= O (Z1 + Z2) ,
where we have used the fact that the (lower) limit of the quantity
Z1 + Z2
Zq11 Z
1−q1
2
=
(
Z1
Z2
)1−q1
+
(
Z2
Z1
)q1
approaches infinity if Z1 6= O(Z2), and approaches a positive constant if
Z1 = O(Z2), as Z1, Z2 → 0, both leading to O (Z1 + Z2) − O
(
Zq11 Z
1−q1
2
)
=
O (Z1 + Z2). Table 1.1 summarizes the regret comparison results for different
investment behavior types.
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Table 1.1: Regret Comparison of Different Investment Behavior
Investment Behavior Sign/Magnitude of Regret
Oblivious Nonpositive O(1)−O
(
Zq11 Z
1−q1
2
)
= O(1)
Stubborn Nonpositive O (Z1 + Z2)−O
(
Zq11 Z
1−q1
2
)
= O (Z1 + Z2)
Robust Nonpositive O(1)−O
(
Zq11 Z
1−q1
2
)
= O(1)
Forward Zero Zero
Z1 := (puu2 )
qu2 (1− puu2 )1−q
u
2 and Z2 :=
(
pdu2
)qd2 (1− pdu2 )1−qd2
We now can see that the stubborn behavior generally induces less regret
compared to the oblivious and robust behavior, especially when the reality
of the future turns out to be extreme. This is when Z1 and Z2 are close
to zero, corresponding to extremely good future market conditions (i.e., puu2 ,
pdu2 close to 1), or extremely adverse conditions (i.e., puu2 , pdu2 close to 0), or
the combination of the two (e.g., puu2 close to 1, but pdu2 close to 0). The
stubborn investor would unsurprisingly benefit from these extreme scenarios,
thanks to prompt reaction to the new model knowledge at t = T1. Hence, she
experiences less regret in retrospect when facing extreme cases. On the other
hand, depending on the interlinked connections between puu2 , pdu2 and the rest
of model parameters, the stubborn behavior may cause less or more regret than
the oblivious and robust behavior in moderate scenarios. In particular, if the
genuine probabilities puu2 , pdu2 for the second period stock return are close to
the risk neutral probabilities, then the worst scenario indeed happens, and less
regret would be induced if the investor follows the robust behavior (see Figure
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1.1). This is another interesting observation, which suggests that, in moderate
scenarios, incorporating the true knowledge “half way through” the decision
making process becomes less important than being initially conservative and
cautious when facing model ambiguity.
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Figure 1.1: Regret comparison of various types of investment behavior (initial
wealth x = 0). Model parameters: p1 = 12 , q1 =
1
500 , q
u
2 = 45 , q
d
2 = 45 , pˆ
uu
2 =
1
100 , and pˆ
du
2 = 1100 . The absolute regret of oblivious and robust investors
generally dominate that of the stubborn investor. Nevertheless, the stubborn
behavior can induce more regret than the robust behavior, especially when the
true probabilities for the second period stock return puu2 , pdu2 are close to the
risk neutral probabilities qu2 , qd2 .
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1.5 A unified discussion
Under the setting of model ambiguity and real-time learning, we dis-
cussed various types of investors in previous sections. The stubborn investor
and the forward investor take the advantage of the progressively revealed
knowledge of the underlying model in real-time, and produce their respec-
tive optimal strategies accordingly over each period. The other two types of
investors, the oblivious and the robust investor, neglect the further acquisition
of new (unexpected) knowledge about the true model after t = 0. In this sense,
we may not view the associated strategies as solutions to the real-time opti-
mal investment problem, although they can still be considered as alternative
solutions when an investor faces model ambiguity.
In this section, we will provide a unified analysis of the real-time opti-
mal investment problems under general criteria UT1(·) ∈ FT1 and UT2(·) ∈ FT2 .
The measurability condition for the criteria imposed here is flexible enough to
incorporate most investment behavior including the stubborn and forward be-
havior. Indeed, UT1(·) = VT1( · ; P̂) and UT2(·) = U(·) in the stubborn case,
where U(·) is a classical (deterministic) terminal utility function specified at
t = 0, and VT1( · ; P̂) is the associated value function under U(·) and the (t = 0)
perceived measure P̂. In the forward behavior setting, UT1(·) = UFT1(·) and
UT2(·) = UFT2(·), with UFT1(·) and UFT2(·) being the predictable forward perfor-
mance at t = T1 and t = T2, respectively. Herein, the two forward criteria
are restricted to be predictable, but in general, forward performance process
(in discrete time or continuous time) needs not to be necessarily predictable a
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priori. Our unified framework includes the general forward processes as well
as other (state-dependent or independent) performance criteria derived based
on possible approaches under model uncertainty.
We next introduce the decision making process under the generic cri-
teria UT1(·) ∈ FT1 and UT2(·) ∈ FT2 set for the first period and the second
in the current binomial model setting. To emphasize the real-time feature of
the decision making process, we assume as before that the genuine underlying
measure P is only known to the investor/decision maker progressively. Pre-
cisely, only one-period ahead probability under P would be revealed at each
decision making time, conditional on the information up to that time (see
(1.8), (1.9)). Under this assumption, the first period policy selected is any
admissible pi∗1 that optimizes (assuming it exists)
sup
pi1
E
[
UT1
(
Xpi1T1
) ∣∣∣X0 = x] = sup
pi1
E
[
UT1 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.40)
where the probability over the first period under P is sufficient and used for
the computation of the above expectations. The second period decision mak-
ing process yields, similarly, the optimal admissible policy pi∗2 that maximizes
(assuming it exists)
esssup
pi2
E
[
UT2
(
X
pi∗1 ,pi2
T2
) ∣∣∣Xpi∗1T1 , FT1]
= esssup
pi2
E
[
UT2
(
X
pi∗1
T1 + pi2(R2 − 1)
) ∣∣∣Xpi∗1T1 , FT1] . (1.41)
Here, Xpi
∗
1
T1 ∈ FT1 is the wealth at t = T1 obtained by following the optimal
control pi∗1 in (1.40), and the one-period ahead conditional probability under
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the true measure P, given FT1 , is applied for the computation of the above
conditional expectations.
The criteria UT1(·) ∈ FT1 and UT2(·) ∈ FT2 that produce the optimal
policies pi∗1 and pi∗2, respectively, in general have no intertemporal connections
a priori, as the investor/decision maker can have arbitrary (short-term) ob-
jectives based on her own preference and personal view of the future market
at each time. However, as we will show in the next theorem, in order to
achieve zero regret, the criterion UT1(·) has to satisfy certain consistency con-
dition with its successor UT2(·), a condition we refer to as forward consistency.
Before stating the precise result, we first introduce the following stochastic
optimization problem in hindsight at t = T2. In retrospect at t = T2, the
underlying measure P is assumed to be fully known to the investor, and the
problem is to solve
sup
pi1,pi2
E
[
UT2(X
pi1,pi2
T2 )
]
= sup
pi1,pi2
E [UT2 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1) + pi2(R2 − 1))] , (1.42)
where the expectation is computed under the true measure P on [0, T2]. We
note that in general UT2(·) ∈ FT2 . Assuming that problem (1.42) can be solved
via backward induction, we can then define the value function (in hindsight)
at t = T1 as
VT1(x) = esssup
pi2
E
[
UT2 (XT1 + pi2(R2 − 1))
∣∣∣XT1 = x, FT1] , a.s., (1.43)
and, in general, VT1(x) ∈ FT1 , for all admissible x. The value function at t = 0
(in hindsight) is
V0(x) = sup
pi1
E
[
VT1 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.44)
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and backward induction gives that V0(x) is the optimal value of the problem
(1.42).
Theorem 1.5.1 (Forward consistency). The criteria pair (UT1 , UT2) together
with the corresponding optimal controls pi∗1, pi∗2 obtained in real-time by (1.40)
and (1.41), respectively, generate zero (total) regret if and only if pi∗1 is also
the maximizer of the first period problem in hindsight, i.e.,
pi∗1(x) ∈ argmax
pi1
E
[
VT1 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] , (1.45)
for any admissible initial wealth x. In particular, the (not necessarily pre-
dictable) forward performance criteria pair
(
UFT1 , U
F
T2
)
yields zero regret.
Proof. (=⇒) Assume that the pair (UT1 , UT2) and the optimal controls pi∗1, pi∗2
generate zero regret; that is, by definition of the regret, the t = 0 genuine
value function in hindsight coincides with the actual average performance,
V0(x) = E [UT2 (x+ pi∗1(R1 − 1) + pi∗2(R2 − 1))] .
We note that pi∗1 is not necessarily the optimizer to the hindsight problem (1.44)
a priori. For example, within the forward behavior setting we considered in
section 2.5, pi∗1 is solely determined by the first period model under P, together
with the admissible initial criterion UF0 (·). However, in general, the optimizer
of the hindsight problem (1.44) depends not only on the first period model,
but also on VT1(·) which in turn depends on the second period conditional
model. It follows from the assumption of zero regret that
V0(x) = E [UT2 (x+ pi∗1(R1 − 1) + pi∗2(R2 − 1))]
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= E
[
E
[
UT2
(
X
pi∗1
T1 + pi
∗
2(R2 − 1)
) ∣∣∣Xpi∗1T1 , FT1]]
= E
[
VT1
(
X
pi∗1
T1
)]
= E [VT1 (x+ pi∗1(R1 − 1))] ≤ V0(x),
where we used the fact that pi∗2 is the optimizer for both the real-time problem
(1.41) and the hindsight problem (1.43)1, while pi∗1 from the real-time problem
(1.40) is in general only one admissible policy for the first period hindsight
problem. We hence conclude that pi∗1 is the maximizer to the hindsight problem
sup
pi1
E
[
VT1 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] .
(⇐=) Suppose the criteria pair (UT1 , UT2) is determined such that the first
period optimal control pi∗1 which solves the real-time problem (1.40) also solves
the hindsight problem (1.45). It is then straightforward to see that the ac-
tual average performance by following such pi∗1 from (1.40) and pi∗2 from (1.41)
satisfies
E [UT2 (x+ pi∗1(R1 − 1) + pi∗2(R2 − 1))]
= E
[
E
[
UT2
(
X
pi∗1
T1 + pi
∗
2(R2 − 1)
) ∣∣∣Xpi∗1T1 , FT1]]
= E
[
VT1
(
X
pi∗1
T1
)]
= V0(x),
where, again, we used that pi∗2 is the optimizer for both the real-time problem
(1.41) and the hindsight problem (1.43), as well as the assumption that pi∗1 also
1When solving the last period problem in real-time or in hindsight, the available knowl-
edge of the probability model for the decision maker is identical and correct. In other words,
the regret of the last period is always zero by problem formulation.
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maximizes the hindsight problem (1.45). This completes the proof of showing
zero regret under the forward consistency condition (1.45).
It remains to show that the general (not necessarily predictable) for-
ward performance criteria pair
(
UFT1 , U
F
T2
)
achieves the forward consistency,
and hence generates zero regret. Indeed, by the definition of forward perfor-
mance processes, UFT1 and UFT2 are directly connected through the equation
UFT1 (XT1) = esssup
pi2
E
[
UFT2 (XT1 + pi2(R2 − 1))
∣∣∣FT1] , a.s.. (1.46)
It therefore yields, by the uniqueness of the (essential) supremum, UFT1 (XT1) =
VT1 (XT1) a.s., with XT1 = x + pi1(R1 − 1) for any admissible control pi1 over
the first period. A direct consequence is that any pi∗1 that solves the real-
time problem (1.40) under UFT1 also solves the hindsight problem (1.45), i.e.,
the forward consistency condition (1.45) holds. We hence conclude that the
generic forward criteria pair
(
UFT1 , U
F
T
)
generates zero total regret.
Theorem 1.5.1 basically states that the decision maker can achieve zero
regret if and only if the past decision made at t = 0 for the first period
remains valid when viewed in hindsight under the full model knowledge, an
intuitive result that is almost self-explanatory. Obviously, to have such forward
consistency, certain connection between the intermediate criterion UT1 and its
successor UT2 has to be established. An interesting fact, however, is that such
connection does not to need to be as strong as the classical definition for
the froward performance process as given in (1.46). The reason is, although
forward consistency requires that pi∗1 optimizes both the real-time problem
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(1.40) and the hindsight problem (1.44), it does not necessarily require the
same optimal value for the two problems, in order to have zero regret. In
other words, it may be true that for some admissible x,
sup
pi1
E
[
UT1 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] 6= sup
pi1
E
[
VT1 (x+ pi1(R1 − 1))
∣∣∣X0 = x] ,
but zero regret still holds for all admissible x. On the other hand, since
the definition of the forward performance process (1.46) is certainly stronger
than the forward consistency (1.45), the forward criteria pair
(
UFT1 , U
F
T2
)
gen-
erates zero regret, regardless of the underlying measure P, with the special
case of predictable forward performance process already discussed separately
in Proposition 1.3.4.
It is easy to see that the unified framework in Theorem 1.5.1 can ac-
count for both the stubborn behavior and the forward behavior described in
previous sections. It nails down the fundamental reason, i.e., the violation
of forward consistency, that causes the classical (backward) adaptive control
approach to generally yield non-zero regret (see Proposition 1.3.2 for more
details). It also addresses why the other decision making behavior, the for-
ward behavior, can eliminate any regret induced by model knowledge that is
revealed in real-time. This theorem can also incorporate classical stochastic
optimization problems when model knowledge is fully available at t = 0, i.e.,
the scenario when decision is made under the known unknowns instead of the
unknown unknowns. There, the regret is clearly always zero, and the forward
consistency is certainly satisfied as soon as one recognizes that the criteria pair
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(UT1(·), UT2(·)) coincides with (VT1(· ;P), U(·)), where VT1(· ;P) is the classical
value function under the known true measure P and the terminal utility U(·).
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Chapter 2
Real-time model adaptation and investment
behavior: the Merton case
2.1 Introduction
As disucssed in the previous chapter, model commitment is ubiquitous
in the classical stochastic optimization framework, and therefore, excludes the
flexibility of allowing dynamic model revision, a concept by nature incom-
patible with any preassigned commitment at t = 0. However, from practi-
cal point of view, model revision is inevitable as one may obtain updated
information that leads to more accurate estimates of the underlying model.
Such new knowledge accumulated in real-time should be exploited to solve the
control problem at hand. In other scenarios, the environment itself may be
non-stationary and has changed after some time, making it necessary for the
decision maker to closely track the environment in order to make better deci-
sions. No consensus, however, has been reached regarding the best approach to
handle the dynamic (unanticipated) model changes in control theory and prac-
tice. Adaptive control methodology is probably the main tool in theory and
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practice to address this problem (see, e.g., [38], [12]). It basically at each time
re-solves the control problem for remaining horizon, given the updated esti-
mates of the parameters in the model dynamics. It is clearly time-inconsistent
and could induce fluctuations in the performance of the decision maker as time
enfolds. The same idea is employed for more practical applications of control
theory; for instance, in reinforcement learning (RL) field, the learning agent
would typically re-adapt to the changed environment through continuing inter-
action, while fixing the original t = 0 optimization objective. This behavior in
turn leads to volatile performance, as a steep decrease of learning performance
usually occurs in such non-stationary learning contxt (see, e.g., [16]).
In this work, we aim to compare two control approaches arising under
the circumstance of real-time model revision in a “Merton type” investment
setting. The first one is rooted in the adaptive control paradigm, which we call
the “stubborn” method in view of the fixed terminal criterion regardless of any
changes to the market environment. The advantage of this method is clearly
the preservation of the original goal, which motivates the name “stubborn”, as
well as the adaptation to progressively realized market conditions in real-time.
However, it violates the time-consistency that is not only fundamental to the
sound definition of classical optimality, but also crucial to have a non-volatile
overall performance. The second approach we consider is the forward perfor-
mance approach. This methodology, by relaxing the stringent commitment to
a fixed terminal criterion (and/or a fixed terminal horizon), introduces greater
flexibility to control problems under real-time model revision. Intertemporal
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consistency is guaranteed directly due to the construction of the forward per-
formance process. Moreover, when evaluated in retrospect, the performance
of the forward investor would maintain unchanged on average even after the
unanticipated change of the market environment, yielding less variability for
the actual performance. Whether sticking to a fixed terminal criterion leads to
different degree of model choice flexibility (specifically for the long-term), and
distinguishes the two fundamentally different optimization approaches. Nev-
ertheless, the stubborn and forward methods are comparable in some aspects,
and it is one of the goals of this work to conduct a comprehensive compar-
ison analysis. As the forward performance process theory is rather general,
we choose to work with a specific family, namely the zero volatility forward
performance process. In addition to the comparisons, we also seek to reconcile
the two approaches in the last section. Precisely, we would construct a forward
“bridge” process to preserve both the original t = 0 objective and intertem-
poral consistency in a real-time model revision setting. As we shall see, this
in general could only be possible if we go beyond the zero volatility forward
processes, and introduce a none-zero volatility to the performance process.
2.2 Classical approach
In this section we consider the classical adaptive control approach,
which is “stubborn” to a fixed t = 0 optimization objective under real-time
model revision. For simplicity, we focus on the Merton’s optimal investment
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problem in a single stock market over a fixed horizon [0, T ], assuming that
interest rate is zero. The stock price under the genuine but unknown physical
measure P is modeled by
dSt = St(µtdt+ σtdWt),
with S0 > 0. The process Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a standard Brownian motion
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P), with the filtration Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
satisfying the usual conditions. The coefficients µt, σt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , are Ft-
adapted processes, and assumed for simplicity to be
µt = µ1{0≤t≤τ1} + µ11{0<τ1≤T},
and
σt = σ1{0≤t≤τ1} + σ11{0<τ1≤T},
with µ, σ ∈ F0 and µ1, σ1 ∈ Fτ1 . It is assumed that σ, σ1 > 0 almost surely
under the true measure P. We further define the Sharpe ratio as λ = µ
σ
for
[0, τ1] and λ1 = µ1σ1 for (τ1, T ]. The model parameters for the stock price hence
only change at t = τ1 ∈ F0, with 0 < τ1 < T . It is worth noting that, different
form most other works, we do not specify another (hyper-) model at t = 0 to
describe how those parameters may actually change in the future. In other
words, the investor is unaware of the full model under the true measure P at
t = 0, and new parameters can only be observed at the model revision time
t = τ1.
We next formulate the knowledge of the stubborn investor under her
subjective belief at t = 0. Knowing that the market parameters would certainly
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shift at t = τ1 (e.g., due to scheduled announcement in the market or self-
planned market condition reassessment, etc), but unclear about the genuine
switching dynamics in advance, the investor at t = 0 is assumed for simplicity
to perceive the model parameters for the whole horizon as piecewise constants
M[0,τ1] = {µ, σ, λ} and M̂(τ1,T ] = {µ̂, σ̂, λ̂}, with σ̂ > 0 and λ̂ = µ̂σ̂ . Precisely,
the stock price under her perceived measure P̂ is given by
dŜt = Ŝt(µ̂tdt+ σ̂tdŴt),
with Ŝ0 = S0, where Ŵt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a standard Brownian motion on a
filtered probability space (Ω̂, F̂ , P̂), with the filtration F̂t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , satisfying
the usual conditions and F̂0 = F0. The coefficients under her perceived model
are hence assumed to be correct only over the first sub-horizon [0, τ1], and differ
from the truth in the remaining horizon (τ1, T ]. This assumption complies with
most prediction mechanism in investment practice whose prediction power
typically decays as time moves into the far future.
It is important to note that the very reason for the investor to have a
model for the whole horizon at t = 0 is clearly due to the backward model
commitment of the classical approach discussed in previous chapter. This
feature of the classical approach inevitably and undesirably forces the investor
at t = 0 to commit to a probably vague model for probably remote future time
period (τ1, T ]. We stress, however, that such t = 0 perceived model under the
measure P̂ is introduced only for the purpose of computing the optimal policy
over the first sub-horizon [0, τ1]. Once arriving at the intermediate time t = τ1,
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M[0,τ1] = {µ, σ, λ} ∈ F0 M̂(τ1,T ] = {µ̂, σ̂, λ̂} ∈ F0
UT
T0
| |At t = 0:
τ1
|
|
0
|
τ1
|
T
At t = τ1:
UT
M1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1
Figure 2.1: Classical approach with model revision.
the investor has a chance to review the model for the remaining horizon (τ1, T ]
and obtains the revised (true) model parametersM1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1 .
She is then able to take corresponding actions under the revised model, but the
terminal objective is not allowed to change, i.e., the terminal utility function
is fixed to be a F0-measurable function UT : R+ → R, a strictly increasing
and strictly concave function satisfying Inada’s conditions limx↓0 U ′T (x) = ∞
and limx↑∞ U ′T (x) = 0. The inverse marginal of the terminal utility is defined
as usual I : R+ → R+, with I(x) = (U ′T )(−1)(x). The problem setting is
summarized in Figure 2.2.
The investor at t = 0 would then solve a classical optimal control
problem with the backward induction argument, under the perceived model.
In particular, for τ1 < t ≤ T , the wealth process under the standard self-
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financing condition has the dynamics given by
dX̂s = µ̂pisds+ σ̂pisdŴs,
for t ≤ s ≤ T , with X̂t = x. The set of admissible strategies under the
perceived model is defined as
Â[0,T ] =
{
pi : self-financing with pit ∈ F̂t and EP̂
[ ∫ T
0
pi2t dt
]
<∞
}
.
To solve the t = 0 problem following the backward induction, let the value
function over the sub-horizon (τ1, T ] be defined as
V̂ (x, t; λ̂) = sup
pi
EP̂
[
UT (X̂T )|X̂t = x
]
,
where the expectation is taken under the (τ1, T ] marginal probability measure
of P̂ associated to the perceived model M̂(τ1,T ]. It is then well known that the
function V̂ (x, t; λ̂) is the strictly increasing and strictly concave solution (in
the spatial variable) to the HJB equation (see, e.g., [35])
V̂t − λ̂
2
2
V̂ 2x
V̂xx
= 0, (2.1)
with terminal condition V̂ (x, T ) = UT (x). The optimal portfolio process is
given by
p̂i∗(X̂∗t , t) = −
λ̂
σ̂
V̂x(X̂∗t , t)
V̂xx(X̂∗t , t)
,
for τ1 < t ≤ T . It is also convenient to define the local absolute risk tolerance
function r̂(x, t) = − V̂x(x,t)
V̂xx(x,t)
to write the optimal portfolio process as
p̂i∗(X̂∗t , t) =
λ̂
σ̂
r̂(X̂∗t , t).
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We now consider the following transformation that is essential for the analyt-
ical representation of the above quantities
V̂x
(
Ĥ(x, t), t
)
= exp
(
− x− 12 λ̂
2(T − t)
)
. (2.2)
It is then well known (see [33]) that the function Ĥ(x, t) is the solution to the
classical backward heat equation
Ĥt +
λ̂2
2 Ĥxx = 0, (2.3)
for τ1 < t ≤ T , with terminal condition Ĥ(x, T ) = I(e−x). The local absolute
risk tolerance function can then be rewritten as r̂(x, t) = Ĥx(Ĥ(−1)(x, t), t),
and the optimal portfolio process as well as the optimal wealth process are
p̂i∗t =
λ̂
σ̂
Ĥx
(
Ĥ(−1)(x, τ1) + λ̂2(t− τ1) + λ̂(Ŵt − Ŵτ1), t
)
, (2.4)
and
X̂∗t = Ĥ
(
Ĥ(−1)(x, τ1) + λ̂2(t− τ1) + λ̂(Ŵt − Ŵτ1), t
)
, X̂∗τ1 = x, (2.5)
for τ1 < t ≤ T , respectively.
The backward induction reasoning implies, knowing that the value func-
tion V̂
(
Xτ1 , τ1; λ̂
)
is the best achievable performance over (τ1, T ] under the
perceived measure P̂ starting from any admissible wealth level Xτ1 at t = τ1,
the investor would take it as the “short-term” objective and solve the opti-
mization problem for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1 as following
V̂ (x, t;λ, λ̂) = sup
pi
EP̂
[
V̂
(
X̂τ1 , τ1; λ̂
)
|X̂t = x
]
, (2.6)
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where the expectation is taken under the [0, τ1] marginal of P̂ associated to the
accurate modelM[0,τ1]. To solve this first sub-horizon problem, we can derive
a similar HJB equation as (2.1), i.e., for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1,
V̂t − λ
2
2
V̂ 2x
V̂xx
= 0, (2.7)
with terminal condition being V̂ (x, τ1) = V̂
(
x, τ1; λ̂
)
, for all admissible x. If a
strictly increasing and strictly concave classical solution (in the state variable)
can be found, we can derive the optimal portfolio as
p̂i∗(X̂∗t , t) = −
λ
σ
V̂x(X̂∗t , t)
V̂xx(X̂∗t , t)
, (2.8)
where X̂∗t , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, is the corresponding optimal wealth process over the
first sub-horizon.
The above existing results correspond to the t = 0 classical Merton’s
problem without any unanticipated model parameter changes. However, the
true model indeed changes at t = τ1 as we have formulated under the phys-
ical measure P, and such change cannot be captured by the investor’s t = 0
subjective belief under P̂. The investor would hence only follow the opti-
mal feedback policy (2.8) derived under the t = 0 perceived measure P̂ up
to time t = τ1 in the true market governed by the physical measure P.
Then at the interface t = τ1 of the two investment sub-horizons, the investor
would recognize that the true realized model for the second sub-horizon is
M1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1 . It is reasonable for her to reconsider the decision
by taking into account this (unanticipated) new knowledge about the market,
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i.e., under the adaptive control framework, she would solve the (conditional)
optimal control problem over (τ1, T ]
V (x, t;λ1) = esssup
pi
E
[
UT (XT )
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x] ∈ Fτ1 , a.s., (2.9)
where the conditional expectation is taken under the true measure P. The
terminal utility is not changed, since in this section we focus on the “stubborn”
behavior. Conditional on Fτ1 , the problem (2.9) is still a Merton’s problem for
a shorter horizon. Standard argument therefore yields that the random value
function V (x, t;λ1) is the strictly increasing and strictly concave solution (in
the spatial variable) to the HJB equation with random coefficient
Vt − λ
2
1
2
V 2x
Vxx
= 0, a.s., (2.10)
for τ1 < t ≤ T with terminal condition V (x, T ;λ1) = UT (x), a.s. under P.
The solution to equation (2.10) as well as the associated optimal portfolio
process and optimal wealth process are analogous to their previous counter-
parts (2.1), (2.4) and (2.5). Indeed, such problem is known as the adaptive
control problem, for which two phases are typically involved, the optimization
phase and adaptation phase (see, e.g., [12]). In the optimization phase, the
control problem with the unknown model parameters is solved and the asso-
ciated optimal strategy is obtained. Then one would complete the adaptation
phase by substituting the estimated model parameters into the optimal strat-
egy at each model reassessment time. We now illustrate the details in the
following example under a terminal power utility.
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2.2.1 Classical approach: the power utility case
Consider the power utility UT (x) = 1γx
γ, with 0 < γ < 1. Then the
strictly increasing and strictly concave solution to the HJB equation (2.1)
associated to the second sub-horizon model M̂(τ1,T ] is
V̂ (x, t; λ̂) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
λ̂2γ
2(γ − 1)(t− T )
)
,
for all (x, t) ∈ [0,∞) × (τ1, T ]. By backward induction, the value function
corresponding to the first sub-horizon model M[0,τ1] is the strictly increasing
and strictly concave solution to HJB equation (2.7)
V̂ (x, t;λ, λ̂) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λ2(t− τ1) + λ̂2(τ1 − T )
))
,
for all (x, t) ∈ [0,∞)×[0, τ1]. We stress that since the investor would eventually
realize at t = τ1 that the model for the second sub-horizon is M1(τ1,T ] rather
than M̂(τ1,T ], the time t = 0 perceived optimal portfolio process would only
be followed up to t = τ1 in the true market under the physical measure P.
This process is given by p̂i∗t = λσ(1−γ)X
∗
t , for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, according to (2.8), and
the resulting optimal wealth process under the true measure P is the unique
strong solution to the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dX∗t =
λ2
1− γX
∗
t dt+
λ
1− γX
∗
t dWt, (2.11)
with X∗0 = x > 0, and 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1. The solution is given by
X∗t = xexp
((1− 2γ)λ2
2(1− γ)2 t+
λ
1− γWt
)
,
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for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1. We also compute the value function process along this genuine
wealth process for later discussion
V̂ (X∗t , t;λ, λ̂) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
γλ2
1− γ t+ (λ̂
2 − λ2)τ1 − λ̂2T
)
+ λγ1− γWt
)
,
(2.12)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1. At time t = τ1, knowing that the true realized model for
the second sub-horizon is M1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1 , the investor solves the
(conditional) HJB equation (2.10) and obtains the solution
V (x, t;λ1) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
λ21γ
2(γ − 1)(t− T )
)
∈ Fτ1 ,
for τ1 < t ≤ T . The optimal portfolio process is given by pi∗t = λ1σ1(1−γ)X∗t for
τ1 < t ≤ T . The SDE for the optimal wealth process under the true measure
P now becomes
dX∗t =
λ21
1− γX
∗
t dt+
λ1
1− γX
∗
t dWt, (2.13)
with X∗τ1 = xexp
(
(1−2γ)λ2
2(1−γ)2 τ1 +
λ
1−γWτ1
)
. Conditional on Fτ1 , this is an SDE
with (conditionally) independent initial condition, and the solution yields
X∗t = xexp
(
1− 2γ
2(1− γ)2
(
(λ2 − λ21)τ1 + λ21t
)
+ λ− λ11− γ Wτ1 +
λ1
1− γWt
)
,
(2.14)
for τ1 < t ≤ T . The value function process over (τ1, T ] at the optimum hence
can be computed as
V (X∗t , t;λ1) =
xγ
γ
exp
 γ
2(1− γ)2
(
(1− 2γ)(λ2 − λ21)τ1 − (γ − 1)λ21T − γλ21t
)
+ γ(λ− λ1)1− γ Wτ1 +
γλ1
1− γWt
. (2.15)
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Finally, we note that the above solutions corresponding to the t = 0 and t = τ1
optimization problems can also be recovered through the transformation (2.2).
For example, at t = 0, it yields the function
Ĥ(x, t) = exp
(
x
1− γ +
λ̂2
2(1− γ)2 (T − t)
)
,
for τ1 < t ≤ T . Then, the t = 0 perceived optimal portfolio and wealth
processes follow from the analytic representations (2.4), (2.5).
2.3 Forward approach
At the intermediate model revision time t = τ1, the classical adap-
tive control method basically lets the stubborn investor forget what she has
achieved during [0, τ1], and restart solving a stochastic optimization problem
for the remaining horizon, given the market informationM1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈
Fτ1 and the achieved optimal wealth X∗τ1 . It is clearly time-inconsistent over
the whole horizon [0, T ], and it simply puts together two optimization problems
without establishing any intertemporal connection. The forward approach, on
the other hand, is based on the forward performance process theory which is
built to maintain time-consistency and to achieve less volatile optimal perfor-
mance along the time. At t = 0, the forward investor has the same correct
view as the stubborn investor about the market for the first sub-horizon, i.e.,
M[0,τ1] = {µ, σ, λ} ∈ F0, and also at t = τ1, she has the same correct view
for the second sub-horizon M1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1 . The main difference
is that the forward investor is allowed to choose a revised terminal utility at
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t = τ1, based on her correct view of the market for the remaining sub-horizon,
so that certain intertemporal consistency can be preserved across the first and
second sub-horizons. We will see that although both investors have access to
the same true information, the extra flexibility to the forward investor for not
being “stubborn” will give rise to consistent investment behavior and more
stable performance processes. Another flexibility of the forward approach is
that it allows to start with a family of admissible initial utility, corresponding
to different initial views about the market (e.g., optimistic or pessimistic), but
in this work we choose the initial utility to be V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), the initial value
function of the t = 0 problem of the stubborn investor based on her t = 0
belief P̂, in order to have a comparable analysis between the two types of
investment behavior. By choosing V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), the forward investor intends
to achieve the same level of performance as the stubborn investor at t = 0,
but different from the stubborn investor, she can maintain the same level of
performance even at later times through the preservation of optimality and
time-consistency under model revision. In terms of model specification, the
forward investor enjoys a third flexibility that allows her to only commit to a
model for the current sub-horizon in real-time, i.e., a model only for [0, τ1] at
t = 0 and a model for (τ1, T ] once at t = τ1. There is hence no model commit-
ment issue present in the forward framework, and the impact of a misspecified
model for remote future is minimal1. A summary of the model revision under
1The inaccurate model M̂(τ1,T ] = {µ̂, σ̂, λ̂} still affects the forward solution through the
initial condition V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂). However, such long-term model is not necessary to specify in
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M[0,τ1] = {µ, σ, λ} ∈ F0
UF0 ∈ F0
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Figure 2.2: Forward approach with model revision.
the forward approach is given in Figure 2.3.
At t = 0, the forward investor starts with UF0 (x) = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), and
the true model for the first sub-horizon M[0,τ1] = {µ, σ, λ} ∈ F0. The goal
is to construct a forward performance process UFt (x), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, such that
UFt (X∗t ), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, is a martingale along the forward optimal wealth process
X∗, and UFt (Xt), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, is a supermartingale along any admissible
wealth process. In this section, we would concentrate on a specific family
of forward processes, namely the zero volatility forward performance process,
which may be seen as the closet analogue of the classical counterpart. In the
next section, the non-zero volatility forward processes will be discussed for the
general, as we remind the reader that a generic forward process does not need to start from
V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂). This choice is only for comparable analysis in the current work.
76
reconciliation of the two approaches. Similar to the classical scenario, for the
first sub-horizon problem, the zero volatility forward process satisfies the same
HJB equation (2.1), but with an initial condition UF0 (x) = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), which
in turn makes it an ill-posed problem. Existing result about zero volatility
forward processes (see [45]) shows that if the function u(x, t) is a strictly
increasing and strictly concave solution (in the spatial variable) to the fully
nonlinear partial differential equation (PDE)
ut − 12
u2x
uxx
= 0, (2.16)
with u(x, 0) = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), then the process UFt (x) = u(x, λ2t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, is
a forward performance process over the first sub-horizon [0, τ1]. By virtue of
the transformation
ux(h(x, t), t) = e−x+
t
2 , (2.17)
it is known that the function h : R× [0,∞)→ R+ is the strictly increasing in
x solution to the ill-posed heat equation
ht +
1
2hxx = 0, (2.18)
with initial condition defined through h(x, 0) = I
V̂
(e−x), where I
V̂
: R+ → R+,
with I
V̂
(x) = (V̂x)(−1)(x, 0;λ, λ̂) being the inverse marginal of the initial value
function V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂). The optimal portfolio and wealth processes under the
forward performance process can then be represented by
pi∗t =
λ
σ
hx
(
h(−1)(X∗t , λ2t), λ2t
)
, (2.19)
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and
X∗t = h
(
h(−1)(x, 0) + λ2t+ λWt, λ2t
)
, X∗0 = x, (2.20)
respectively, for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1. Notice the difference between (2.4), (2.5) and
(2.19), (2.20) are twofold, i.e., the Ĥ(x, t) function for the classical problem
is constructed with a normalization time T implicitly embedded, and no time
rescaling is involved in the classical optimal portfolio and wealth processes.
The forward problem over the first sub-horizon [0, τ1] would be com-
pletely solved once the function h(x, t) is found. At t = τ1, the forward investor
has access to the true model for the remaining horizonM1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈
Fτ1 . Given this new information and her optimal wealth X∗τ1 obtained by fol-
lowing the forward optimal strategy over sub-horizon [0, τ1], she would seek a
terminal criterion UFT (x) at t = τ1 in order to achieve intertemporal consis-
tency. Recall that by committing to the initial condition UF0 (x) = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂),
the forward investor at t = 0 has indirectly committed to the terminal utility
UT (x) and the initial subjective belief P̂ of the stubborn investor. From this
perspective, the forward investor can be seen as revising her original invest-
ment objective, UT (x) that she implicitly shares with the stubborn investor at
t = 0, after receiving real-time updated information from the market at t = τ1.
Such revised objective would be a terminal utility UFT (x) that is determined
through
UFτ1
(
X∗τ1
)
= esssup
pi
E
[
UFT (XT )
∣∣∣Fτ1], a.s., (2.21)
for any X∗τ1 ∈ Fτ1 , yielding from the forward optimal strategy pi∗t , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1,
given by (2.19) and all admissible X∗0 = x. Conditional on Fτ1 , the question
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boils down to looking for a forward performance process UFt (x), τ1 < t ≤ T ,
with initial condition UFτ1(x), such that UFt (X∗t ), τ1 < t ≤ T , is a martingale
along the forward optimal wealth process and that UFt (Xt), τ1 < t ≤ T , is
a supermartingale along any admissible wealth process. It can be similarly
shown as for the first sub-horizon problem that
UFt (x) = u
(
x, (λ2 − λ21)τ1 + λ21t
)
,
τ1 < t ≤ T , is a forward performance process where the function u(x, t) is the
strictly increasing and strictly concave solution to PDE (2.16)2. We conclude
this section by revisiting the power utility scenario under the forward approach.
2.3.1 Forward approach: the power utility case
Recall that the value function for the stubborn investor over the first
sub-horizon [0, τ1], given the full perceived model M[0,τ1], M̂(τ1,T ] and the
terminal utility UT (x) = x
γ
γ
, for 0 < γ < 1, is
V̂ (x, t;λ, λ̂) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λ2(t− τ1) + λ̂2(τ1 − T )
))
,
2Unlike the existing results as in [45], where a forward performance process can be
constructed by UFt (x) = u(x,
∫ t
0 λ
2
sds) for the whole horizon [0, T ] with time-varying λs,
0 ≤ s ≤ T , we instead construct it locally forward in real-time, since at t = 0, we only have
the knowledge of the true model up to t = τ1. Nevertheless, due to the forward recursive
nature of the forward performance process, the two constructions coincide as expected.
This is not valid though for classical stochastic optimization problems because of model
commitment.
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for all (x, t) ∈ [0,∞)× [0, τ1]. Hence, the forward investor takes
UF0 (x) = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
(λ̂2 − λ2)τ1 − λ̂2T
))
as the initial condition. The function u(x, t) therefore solves the PDE (2.16)
with initial condition u(x, 0) = UF0 (x). A strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave solution (in spatial variable) is given by
u(x, t) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
t+ (λ̂2 − λ2)τ1 − λ̂2T
))
.
The zero volatility (or the time-monotone) forward performance process is
UFt (x) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λ2t+ (λ̂2 − λ2)τ1 − λ̂2T
))
, (2.22)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, and
UFt (x) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λ21t+ (λ̂2 − λ21)τ1 − λ̂2T
))
, (2.23)
for τ1 < t ≤ T . We also notice that the function h(x, t) defined by (2.17) is
h(x, t) = exp
(
− x
γ − 1 −
1
2(γ − 1)2
(
t+ γ(λ̂2 − λ2)τ1 − γλ̂2T
))
,
which is clearly a strictly positive solution to the ill-posed heat equation (2.18).
The forward optimal portfolio process and optimal wealth process over the first
sub-horizon [0, τ1] in turn are
pi∗t = −
λ
σ(γ − 1)X
∗
t ,
X∗t = xexp
(
−(2γ − 1)λ
2
2(γ − 1)2 t−
λ
γ − 1Wt
)
, X∗0 = x,
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respectively. The forward performance along the optimal wealth process over
[0, τ1] can be computed as
UFt (X∗t ) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
(
γλ2
γ − 1t+ (λ̂
2 − λ2)τ1 − λ̂2T
)
+ λγ1− γWt
)
,
and hence it coincides pointwise in (t, ω) with its counterpart (2.12) derived
under the classical approach. We can see that based on the zero volatility for-
ward performance process that starts from V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), the forward investor
achieves exactly the same optimal portfolio, optimal wealth and optimal per-
formance processes as the stubborn investor over the first sub-horizon [0, τ1].
For the second sub-horizon (τ1, T ], the construction of the optimal portfolio
and wealth process is still through the function h(x, t). Indeed, as shown in
[45], the optimal wealth process under the zero volatility forward performance
process UFt (x), for τ1 < t ≤ T , is given by
X∗t = h
(
h(−1)(x, 0) +
∫ t
0
λ2sds+
∫ t
0
λsdWs,
∫ t
0
λ2sds
)
= xexp
(
(1− 2γ)
2(γ − 1)2
(
λ21t+ (λ2 − λ21)τ1
)
− λ− λ1
γ − 1 Wτ1 −
λ1
γ − 1Wt
)
, (2.24)
where λs := λ1{0≤s≤τ1}+λ11{τ1<s≤T}. The corresponding forward performance
along the optimal wealth is therefore
UFt (X∗t ) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)2
(
− γλ21t+
(
γλ21 + (1− 2γ)λ2 + (γ − 1)λ̂2
)
τ1
+(1− γ)λ̂T
)
− γ(λ− λ1)
γ − 1 Wτ1 −
γλ1
γ − 1Wt
)
,
for τ1 < t ≤ T . Several observations then follow after we obtain the above
explicit expressions. First, due to the choice of the predictable modelM1(τ1,T ] =
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{µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1 over (τ1, T ], the terminal utility UFT (x) implied form the
zero volatility forward performance process (2.23) is actually Fτ1-measurable.
Hence, the forward investor is indeed aware of the consistent revised objective
at t = τ1 based on the updated information about the market; in other words,
the zero volatility forward performance leads to a predictable forward utility
UFT (x) ∈ Fτ1 . However, it is clear that UFT (x) is different from UT (x), showing
that the zero volatility forward family cannot reconcile with the stubborn
approach. Second, for sub-horizon (τ1, T ], the forward performance along the
optimum UFt (X∗t ) does not coincide with the t = 0 (perceived) optimal value
along the optimum V̂ (X∗t , t; λ̂), τ1 < t ≤ T , neither would it agree with the
t = τ1 (genuine) optimal value along the optimum V (X∗t , t;λ1), τ1 < t ≤ T ,
given by (2.15). Nevertheless, conditional on Fτ1 , due to the fact λ1 ∈ Fτ1 , it
is straightforward to show that
E
[
UFt (X∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ1] = V̂ (X∗τ1 , τ1;λ, λ̂) , a.s.,
for τ1 < t ≤ T . On the other hand,
E
[
UFt (X∗t )
]
= E
[
E
[
UFt (X∗t )
∣∣∣Fτ1]] = E [UFτ1 (X∗τ1 , τ1;λ, λ̂)] = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂),
(2.25)
for τ1 < t ≤ T , following from the construction of the forward performance
process. We now can conclude that whether assessed at t = 0 or at t = τ1,
the forward investor in the second sub-horizon (τ1, T ] performs equally well on
average under the genuine model P as the stubborn investor under the t = 0
perceived model P̂. This is one of the stability properties we observed for the
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forward approach, which is mainly due to the selection of the t = 0 classical
value function as the initial condition as well as the consistent construction of
the performance process afterwards. Such stability is obviously not achievable
in general by the time-inconsistent stubborn approach, as one can compute
its time t = τ1 average performance, which typically holds that with positive
probability under P,
E
[
V (X∗t , t;λ1)
∣∣∣Fτ1] 6= V̂ (X∗τ1 , τ1;λ, λ̂) ,
for τ1 < t ≤ T , where V (X∗t , t;λ1) is the genuine performance along optimum
of the stubborn approach under P over the second sub-horizon (i.e., (2.15)).
Similar inequality
E [V (X∗t , t;λ1)] 6= V̂
(
x, 0;λ, λ̂
)
,
for τ1 < t ≤ T , holds as well for the t = 0 average performance comparison.
Indeed, to compute explicitly the above (conditional) expectations, we need
to know the exact probability correlation between λ1 ∈ Fτ1 and the Brownian
motion Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , under the genuine physical measure P. In the special
case where the model parameter is independent of the underlying Brownian
motion, we can compute the t = 0 actual performance of the stubborn investor
under power utility as
E
[(
X∗T
γ
)γ]
= E
[
E
[(
X∗T
γ
)γ ∣∣∣∣λ1
]]
= E
[
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
(
λ2τ1 + λ21(T − τ1)
))]
, (2.26)
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where X∗T is the genuinely achieved terminal wealth (2.14) by the stubborn
investor. Indeed, the equality (2.26) follows from the fact that
E
[(
X∗T
γ
)γ ∣∣∣∣λ1
]
= E
[
xγ
γ
exp
(
(1− 2γ)γ
2(1− γ)2
(
(λ2 − λ21)τ1 + λ21T
)
+ (λ− λ1)γ1− γ Wτ1 +
λ1γ
1− γWT
) ∣∣∣∣λ1
]
= x
γ
γ
exp
(
(1− 2γ)γ
2(1− γ)2
(
(λ2 − λ21)τ1 + λ21T
))
×E
[
exp
(
λγ
1− γWτ1
)
E
[
exp
(
λ1γ
1− γ (WT −Wτ1)
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ1 , λ1
] ∣∣∣∣λ1
]
= x
γ
γ
exp
(
(1− 2γ)γ
2(1− γ)2
(
(λ2 − λ21)τ1 + λ21T
))
exp
(
γ2
2(1− γ)2
(
λ2τ1 + λ21(T − τ1)
))
= x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
(
λ2τ1 + λ21(T − τ1)
))
, (2.27)
by the independence of λ1 ∈ Fτ1 and the Brownian motion Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Now if we recall that the targeted time t = 0 performance under the perceived
model P̂ is given by
V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
(
λ2τ1 + λ̂2(T − τ1
))
, (2.28)
then a comparison between (2.26) and (2.28) yields the intuitive conclusion:
the stubborn investor should perform better than originally perceived (at
t = 0), if λ1 ∈ Fτ1 has a high probability outweighing its counterpart λ̂
over the same sub-horizon (τ1, T ], corresponding to a higher Sharpe ratio, or
if the model correction from the inaccurate λ̂ to the true parameter λ1 hap-
pens earlier, corresponding to a smaller τ1. We also stress that the difference
between (2.27) and (2.28) is actually the first metric m[0,T ](x) we introduced
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in previous chapter to gauge the discrepancy between the actual and targeted
investment performance, given the realization of the parameter λ1 in the cur-
rent Merton’s case. The above observation clearly extends to the comparison
between (2.27) and (2.28), when each λ1(ω), for ω ∈ Ω, is considered rather
than on the average.
2.4 Regret of investment behavior
We have introduced two different types of investment behavior based
on the classical and the forward approaches, in face of the same model change
at t = τ1. By following their respective optimal strategies, the two appraoches
typically generate different terminal wealth, denoted by XS,∗T and X
F,∗
T at
t = T , in the true underlying market. It is hence reasonable to review the
performance according to a suitable baseline in retrospect at t = T . Moti-
vated by the important concept regret in online learning/optimization liter-
ature (see, e.g., [55]), we introduce the similar performance regret as in the
previous chapter to examine the two types of investment behavior under real-
time (unanticipated) model changes.
Definition 2.4.1 (Performance Regret). Suppose that M1(τ1,T ] is the set of
realized model parameters over (τ1, T ], and let UAT (·), XA,∗T be the terminal
utility and the corresponding terminal wealth, respectively, associated to the
investment behavior of type A in the true market. The performance regret
(PR) of behavior type A is defined as the discrepancy between the expected
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utility of the genuine terminal wealth XA,∗T and that of the optimal terminal
wealth in hindsight3, given the knowledge of M1(τ1,T ], i.e.,
M[0,T ](x) = E
[
UAT
(
XA,∗T
) ∣∣∣M1(τ1,T ]]− esssup
pi
E
[
UAT (XpiT )
∣∣∣M1(τ1,T ]] , a.s.,(2.29)
with XA,∗0 = Xpi0 = x, for every x that is admissible.
In the above definition, the two conditional expectations in (2.29) are
taken with respect to the true underlying physical measure P, assumed to be
completely known at t = T in retrospect. The performance regret M[0,T ](x) is
in general a random variable, as it obviously depends on the realized model
parameters M1(τ1,T ] whose distribution are governed by P (e.g., the stochas-
tic factors model). Nonetheless, we would next show that for the forward
behavior, the performance regret M[0,T ](x) is zero ω-almost surely, for each
admissible x. This demonstrates the path-wise robustness in terms of zero
regret for the forward behavior, a property that is typically not attainable for
other types of investment behavior within the classical (backward) stochastic
optimization paradigm.
Recall that the forward approach yields the consistent terminal utility
given by
UFT (x) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)(λ
2
1 − λ̂2)(T − τ1)
)
, (2.30)
3Alternatively, this can be interpreted as the discrepancy between the t = 0 performance
of two type A investors (i.e., the mortal and the genie), with one being an expert (i.e.,
the genie) who has the accurate knowledge about what parameters would be realized over
(τ1, T ] at t = 0.
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according to (2.23). Similar to (2.25), it can be further shown that for any
realized λ1 ∈ Fτ1 ,
E
[
UFT
(
XF,∗T
) ∣∣∣λ1] = E [E [UFT (XF,∗T ) ∣∣∣Fτ1] ∣∣∣λ1] = E [UFτ1 (XF,∗τ1 ) ∣∣∣λ1]
= E
[
UFτ1
(
XF,∗τ1
)]
= V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂), (2.31)
where we have resorted to the fact that the first sub-horizon forward process
along optimum UFt (X
F,∗
t ), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, is constructed independently of λ1 ∈
Fτ1 . To compute the performance regret for the forward behavior, we only need
to solve the classical backward stochastic optimization problem under UFT (·)
in hindsight at t = T , knowing that the true realized parameters areM1(τ1,T ] =
{µ1, σ1, λ1}. To make the hindsight problem tractable, we assume, given any
realized model parametersM(τ1,T ], the underlying log-normal dynamics remain
valid over [0, T ]. This could include the case, for example, when the model
parameters are driven by a Markov chain that is independent of the Brownian
motion Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , under the true physical measure P.
At terminal time t = T , the solution to the classical Merton’s problem
under the utility function UFT (·) in hindsight can be obtained through DPP over
the two sub-horizons (τ1, T ] and then [0, τ1] with the corresponding parameters
applied. Indeed, over the period (τ1, T ], the value function V˜ (x, t) is the
unique strictly increasing and strictly concave (in the spatial variable) classical
solution to the HJB equation
V˜t − λ
2
1
2
V˜ 2x
V˜xx
= 0, a.s.,
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with the terminal condition V˜ (x, T ) = UFT (x) given by (2.30). The value
function is easily obtained as
V˜ (x, t) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λ21(t− τ1)− λ̂2(T − τ1)
))
,
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . By DPP, the value function V˜ (x, t) over [0, τ1] satisfies
V˜ (x, t) = sup
pi
E
[
V˜ (Xτ1 , τ1)
∣∣∣Xt = x] ,
with λ being applied over this first sub-horizon. Here,
V˜ (x, τ1) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
− γλ̂
2
2(γ − 1)(T − τ1)
)
, (2.32)
according to the solution for the second sub-horizon problem. We hence have
the following HJB equation over [0, τ1]
V˜t − λ
2
2
V˜ 2x
V˜xx
= 0,
with terminal condition given by (2.32). Again, this is the classical HJB equa-
tion for the Merton’s problem over [0, τ1] and it completely coincides with the
HJB equation (2.7) in terms of both the equation and the terminal condition
at t = τ1. Uniqueness result on its classical solution hence leads to that
V˜ (x, 0) = V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂).
Recalling (2.31), we conclude that the performance regret of the forward
behavior achieves zero regret given any realized parameter set M(τ1,T ], i.e.,
M[0,T ](x) = 0, a.s. under P, for any admissible x. This remarkable robustness
in terms of path-wise zero regret is mainly due to the forward performance
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process that completely incorporates any unexpected model changes along
real-time, a stability not shared by the stubborn behavior in general.
The stubborn investor, on the other hand, sticks to the fixed terminal
criterion UST (x) = x
γ
γ
, for 0 < γ < 1, when she makes decisions in real-time.
At terminal time t = T , the Merton’s problem in hindsight is also solved under
UST (·). The procedure to obtain the the value functions is almost the same as
that for the forward behavior demonstrated earlier, with the only difference
arising in the terminal criterion. Indeed, the value function over (τ1, T ], given
M1(τ1,T ] = {µ1, σ1, λ1} ∈ Fτ1 , is
V˜ (x, t) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
λ21γ
2(γ − 1)(t− T )
)
,
whereas the value function over [0, τ1] is
V˜ (x, t) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λ2t+ (λ21 − λ2)τ1 − λ21T
))
.
We hence obtain
V˜ (x, 0) = x
γ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
(λ21 − λ2)τ1 − λ21T
))
, (2.33)
a quantity depending on both λ and λ1 due to the backward model com-
mitment nature of classical approach as expected. On the other hand, the
first term E[UST (X
S,∗
T )|M1(τ1,T ]] in definition (2.29) is computed under the true
physical measure P, given the knowledge of realized parameters M(τ1,T ]. Un-
less we have more specific knowledge about the correlation between λ1 and
the underlying Brownian motion under the true physical measure P, we can-
not have explicit result for such quantity. Nonetheless, it is easy to see that
89
M[0,T ](x) as defined in (2.29) is indeed a random variable with M[0,T ](x) ≤ 0
a.s. under P, for all x ≥ 0, since the policy that yields XS,∗T based on the
stubborn behavior is only one admissible policy, and it does not necessarily
coincide with the optimal policy in general, except for special situations. One
of such situations is when λ1 is independent of the Brownian motion under
the genuine measure P, for which we can actually conclude, based on the ex-
plicit computation (2.27) and (2.33), that M[0,T ](x) = 0, a.s., for all x ≥ 0.
This can be seen as a degenerated case, since the optimal strategy induced
by the stubborn behavior over [0, T ] is the same as that of the optimization
problem with full knowledge in hindsight. Such degeneracy arises due to the
optimality of myopic strategy for Merton’s problem under power utility, as
well as the current formulation of model knowledge that is revealed locally in
real-time. In general, however, by the definition for the performance regret
(2.29), it is expected that M[0,T ](x) ≤ 0, a.s. under P, for each admissible x,
under the stubborn behavior, whereas for the forward behavior, as we have
shown, M[0,T ](x) = 0, a.s..
2.5 The forward bridge problem
In the previous two sections, we have seen the respective advantages
and disadvantages of the two approaches in the model revision setting. Specif-
ically, the stubborn approach maintains a fixed objective UT (x) ∈ F0, re-
gardless of any unanticipated model changes in the future. This commitment
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may be sometimes desirable when an investor targets at a certain investment
goal. However, this stubbornness gives rise to time-inconsistent investment
behavior with ill-defined optimality across different time periods, and volatile
investment performance as shown in previous sections. The ill-posedness of the
stochastic optimization problem depicts as the following. The t = 0 optimal
control rule for the second sub-horizon (τ1, T ] is no longer optimal when the
investor reconsiders the optimization problem at t = τ1, and also, at t = τ1, the
t = 0 optimal control rule for the first sub-horizon [0, τ1], reassessed under the
updated model knowledge at t = τ1, turns out to be actually suboptimal. Such
future and past inconsistency indicate the failure of classical optimization ap-
proach, in that a decision made today for the remote future would inevitably
be revised when the future comes, and an investor would inevitably regret
both her decisions for the past and those for the future at each time instant.
The forward approach, on the other hand, leads to a well-defined optimization
problem as time enfolds, i.e., the decision made in the past is still optimal
as the investor gains more new information. It also relieves the investor from
making decisions for the remote future, as she is no longer committed to an
optimization objective at the future time T , and therefore, the (probably vague
and inaccurate) specification of any inflexible model for the far future becomes
unnecessary. The forward approach, however, achieves these desirable flexibil-
ities at the cost of abandoning a fixed target UT (x) ∈ F0 that is specified at
t = 0. Dynamically changing one’s objective in a consistent way may be rea-
sonable in real world where model knowledge at t = 0 is typically insufficient
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for decision making for long-term, but as mentioned earlier, stubbornness is
required in some scenarios. It is the purpose of this section to reconcile the two
approaches, and therefore, to have the advantages of both the two optimization
approaches. Specifically, we will construct a consistent forward performance
process that ultimately recovers the original objective UT (x) ∈ F0 when time
reaches t = T . As we have seen in the previous section, the zero volatility for-
ward process in general cannot achieve such reconciliation (except for special
cases, e.g., see Remark 2.5.2), and hence, it is necessary to consider general
non-zero volatility forward processes. We will provide results for constructing
such forward performance processes in the power, exponential and logarithmic
utility scenarios under suitable conditions on the market parameters.
2.5.1 Power utility case
As demonstrated in section 3, the forward investor starts at t = 0
from the value function V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂) and fully recovers the performance and
optimal portfolio and wealth processes of the stubborn investor up to t = τ1. In
particular, the forward criterion at t = τ1 is UFτ1(x) = V̂
(
x, τ1;λ, λ̂
)
for all x ≥
0. Similar as before, at t = τ1, the goal is to determine a forward performance
process UFt (x), for τ1 < t ≤ T , that satisfies the martingale (supermartingale,
respectively) property along the optimal wealth process (along any admissible
wealth process, respectively), as well as the two “bridge” conditions UFτ1(x) =
V̂
(
x, τ1;λ, λ̂
)
and UFT (x) = UT (x). We refer to this problem as the forward
bridge problem. In this section, we restrict the filtration Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , to
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be the filtration generated by the Brownian motion Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , satisfying
the usual conditions. The following proposition gives a sufficient condition to
construct such a forward performance process in the power utility scenario.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let µt, σt and λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , be the (conditional) model
parameter processes for the second sub-horizon [τ1, T ], and denote by W˜t =
Wt −Wτ1 the standard Brownian motion for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , conditional on Fτ1.
Suppose there exists a progressively measurable process aft , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , such
that the (conditional) stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dft =
(
γ
2(γ − 1)(λt + a
f
t )2 −
(aft )2
2
)
dt+ aft dW˜t, τ1 < t < T, (2.34)
with fτ1 = γλ̂
2
2(1−γ)(T − τ1) and fT = 0 is well defined and has a strong solution
ft ∈ Ft, for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Then the forward bridge problem for a terminal power
utility UFT (x) = x
γ
γ
has a solution
UFt (x) =
xγ
γ
eft ,
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. In the Itoˆ’s diffusion market considered herein, it is reasonable to con-
jecture that the forward performance process with non-zero volatility satisfies
dUFt (x) = b(x, t)dt+ a(x, t)dW˜t,
for τ1 < t < T , conditional on Fτ1 . Recall also the wealth dynamics
dXt = µtpitdt+ σtpitdW˜t,
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with Xτ1 = x ≥ 0 over the same sub-horizon, conditional on Fτ1 . Then, under
suitable conditions, standard argument (see, e.g., [46]) suggests that UFt (x)
is the solution to the fully nonlinear stochastic partial differential equation
(SPDE)
dUFt (x) =
(
µt
∂UFt (x)
∂x
+ σt ∂a(x,t)∂x
)2
2σ2t ∂
2Ut(x)
∂x2
dt+ a(x, t)dW˜t, (2.35)
with initial condition UFτ1(x) = V̂
(
x, τ1;λ, λ̂
)
= xγ
γ
exp
(
γλ̂2
2(1−γ)(T − τ1)
)
and
terminal condition UFT (x) = x
γ
γ
. The power utility types of boundary condi-
tions suggest the scaling property in the spatial variable, leading to a candidate
forward performance process UFt (x) = x
γ
γ
eft for some Ft-adapted process ft,
τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Notice that such forward performance process is indeed strictly
increasing and strictly concave in x at each time τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , satisfying In-
ada’s conditions. Now we further assume that the process ft has the Itoˆ’s
decomposition
dft = bft dt+ aft dW˜t,
for some admissible processes aft and bft such that the above diffusion process
is well defined. Then direct computation yields that
dUFt (x) =
xγ
γ
(
eftdft +
1
2e
ft
(
aft
)2
dt
)
= x
γ
γ
eft
((
bft +
1
2(a
f
t )2
)
dt+ aft dW˜t
)
(2.36)
=
(
xγ−1eftµt + ax(x, t)σt
)2
2(γ − 1)xγ−2eftσ2t
dt+ a(x, t)dW˜t. (2.37)
Now comparing the volatility parts of expressions (2.36) and (2.37), we obtain
a(x, t) = x
γ
γ
eftaft ,
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and comparison of the drift parts yields
xγ
γ
eft
(
bft +
1
2(a
f
t )2
)
= x
γ
2(γ − 1)e
ft
(
λt + aft
)2
,
which leads to bft = γ2(γ−1)
(
λt + aft
)2− (aft )22 . The construction of the solution to
the forward bridge problem therefore boils down to looking for aft , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
an admissible volatility process for the process ft, such that the SDE (2.34) has
an Ft-adapted well defined strong solution, with the two boundary conditions
fτ1 = γλ̂
2
2(1−γ)(T − τ1) and fT = 0 being satisfied. This completes the proof for
the power utility scenario.
Proposition 2.5.1 claims that, once a solution to the SDE (2.34) is
found, a forward performance process that recovers UT (x) at t = T exists, and
therefore, the stubborn approach and the forward approach reconcile. We next
provide sufficient conditions on the parameter processes to prove the existence
and uniqueness of the strong solution to the SDE (2.34), and therefore give
a full characterization of the solution to the forward bridge problem in the
power utility scenario.
Proposition 2.5.2. Let the (conditional) SDE for the forward bridge problem
be given by (2.34), and the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , be uniformly bounded in
(t, ω) and satisfy
exp
(
γλ̂2
2(1− γ)2 (T − τ1)
)
=
EP
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
τ1
λ2sds+
γ
1− γ
∫ T
τ1
λsdW˜s
) ∣∣∣Fτ1
]
. (2.38)
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Then, the SDE (2.34) has a unique uniformly bounded strong solution given
by
ft = (1− γ) lnEP
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
t
λ2sds+
γ
1− γ
∫ T
t
λsdW˜s
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (2.39)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , with ∫ tτ1 afsdW˜s, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , being a BMO (Bounded Mean
Oscillation) martingale under the measure P.
Proof. The SDE (2.34) can be seen as a quadratic backward stochastic differ-
ential equaiton (BSDE) with an extra initial condition. Well established result
on the existence and uniqueness of the solution (f, af ) to quadratic BSDEs ap-
plies here (see, e.g., Chapter 10 of [59]). Indeed, by the assumption that the
process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is uniformly bounded, conditional on Fτ1 , there exists
a unique solution (f, af ) to the BSDE
dft =
(
γ
2(γ − 1)(λt + a
f
t )2 −
(aft )2
2
)
dt+ aft dW˜t, τ1 < t < T, fT = 0,
such that f is uniformly bounded and
(∫ .
τ1 a
f
t dW˜t
)
is a BMO martingale under
P. Our next step is to identify the process f with the explicit representation in
(2.39). To this end, we first, by a change of measure, reduce the (conditional)
SDE (2.34) to
dft =
(
γ
2(γ − 1)λ
2
t +
γ
γ − 1λta
f
t +
1
2(γ − 1)
(
aft
)2)
dt+ aft dW˜t
=
(
γ
2(γ − 1)λ
2
t +
1
2(γ − 1)
(
aft
)2)
dt+ aft dW˜Qt ,
where dW˜Qt = dW˜t + γγ−1λtdt. Under the assumption that λt, τ1 < t ≤ T , is
uniformly bounded, the Novikov’s condition applies, and the process W˜Qt =
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W˜t +
∫ t
τ1
γ
γ−1λsds, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is a Brownian motion under the measure Q
defined by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣FT = exp
− ∫ T
τ1
γ
γ − 1λsdW˜s −
1
2
∫ T
τ1
(
γ
γ − 1
)2
λ2sds
 , (2.40)
with W˜Qτ1 = 0. Next, we define the process f˜t = ft −
∫ t
τ1
γ
2(γ−1)λ
2
sds. Then, the
new process f˜ is also uniformly bounded and satisfies the quadratic BSDE
df˜t =
1
2(γ − 1)
(
aft
)2
dt+ aft dW˜Qt , (2.41)
with terminal condition f˜T = − ∫ Tτ1 γ2(γ−1)λ2sds. Notice that f˜T is bounded, and
hence by the property of quadratic BSDE with bounded terminal condition
(see, e.g., Lemma 10.2 of [59]), we can claim that
(∫ .
τ1 a
f
t dW˜
Q
t
)
is a BMO
martingale under the measure Q, due to that f˜ is uniformly bounded and it
solves the BSDE (2.41) by construction. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma then yields
d
(
e
1
1−γ f˜t
)
= 11− γ e
1
1−γ f˜t
(
1
2(r − 1)
(
aft
)2
dt+ aft dW˜Qt
)
+ 12(1− γ)2 e
1
1−γ f˜t
(
aft
)2
dt
= 11− γ e
1
1−γ f˜taft dW˜
Q
t .
Since f˜ is uniformly bounded and
(∫ .
τ1 a
f
t dW˜
Q
t
)
is a BMO martingale under Q
(hence also square integrable), we claim that the process e
1
1−γ f˜t , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
is a genuine (square integrable) martingale under Q. It hence follows that
e
1
1−γ f˜t = EQ
[
e
∫ T
τ1
γ
2(1−γ)2 λ
2
sds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= EP
[
e
∫ T
τ1
γ
2(1−γ)2 λ
2
sdse−
∫ T
t
γ
γ−1λsdW˜s− 12
∫ T
t
( γγ−1)
2
λ2sds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
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= EP
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
t
λ2sds+
γ
1− γ
∫ T
t
λsdW˜s +
γ
2(1− γ)2
∫ t
τ1
λ2sds
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
which gives rise to
f˜t = (1− γ) lnEP
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
t
λ2sds+
γ
1− γ
∫ T
t
λsdW˜s
+ γ2(1− γ)2
∫ t
τ1
λ2sds
)∣∣∣∣Ft],
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Under assumption (2.38) on the parameter process λt, τ1 ≤
t ≤ T , we can easily verify that the initial condition f˜τ1 = γλ̂
2
2(1−γ)(T − τ1)
is automatically satisfied by the process f˜ . Finally, the unique uniformly
bounded strong solution can be derived as
ft = (1− γ) lnEP
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
t
λ2sds+
γ
1− γ
∫ T
t
λsdW˜s
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
Remark 2.5.1. A further look at the condition (2.38) for the parameter process
λ yields that, under the measure Q defined in (2.40),
EP
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
τ1
λ2sds+
γ
1− γ
∫ T
τ1
λsdW˜s
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= EQ
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)2
∫ T
τ1
λ2sds
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= exp
(
γλ̂2
2(1− γ)2 (T − τ1)
)
.
It hence leads to that
EQ
[
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)2
∫ T
τ1
(
λ2s − λ̂2
)
ds
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= 1. (2.42)
The equivalent condition (2.42) implies that, under the measure Q, the dis-
crepancy process ∆s := λ2s − λ̂2, τ1 ≤ s ≤ T , conditional on Fτ1 , should not
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deviate from zero too much on average under exponential weighting. See a
more detailed discussion for the deterministic parameter case in Remark 2.5.2.
We now summarize the results for the forward bridge problem in the
power utility setting, and also provide the verification theorem to show that
the process UFt (x), τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , we have constructed is indeed a forward
performance process.
Theorem 2.5.3. Suppose that the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is uniformly bounded
and satisfies the condition (2.38). Let (f, af ) be the unique solution to the
(conditional) SDE (2.34) with f being uniformly bounded. Then, the process
UFt (x) = x
γ
γ
eft, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is a forward performance process that achieves
power utility UFT (x) = x
γ
γ
at terminal time t = T , where ft, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
is given by (2.39). The forward performance process in addition satisfies the
following Itoˆ’s decomposition
dUFt (x) =
xγeft
(
λt + aft
)2
2(γ − 1) dt+
xγeftaft
γ
dW˜t, τ1 < t < T, (2.43)
with initial and terminal conditions being UFτ1(x) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γλ̂2
2(1−γ)(T − τ1)
)
and UFT (x) = x
γ
γ
, respectively. The optimal investment strategy is
pi∗t = −
λt + aft
(γ − 1)σtX
∗
t , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.44)
with the optimal wealth process being
X∗t = X∗τ1 exp
∫ t
τ1
(
(1− 2γ)λs − afs
) (
λs + afs
)
2(1− γ)2 ds+
∫ t
τ1
λs + afs
1− γ dW˜s
 ,
(2.45)
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for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Here, X∗τ1 = x exp
(
(1−2γ)λ̂2
2(1−γ)2 τ1 +
λ̂
1−γWτ1
)
is the optimal wealth
at t = τ1.
Proof. It is easy to see that UFt (x) = x
γ
γ
eft is Ft-adapted, and also, for each
fixed t ∈ [τ1, T ], the mapping x 7→ UFt (x) is strictly increasing and strictly
concave, almost surely, with Inada’s conditions being satisfied. One can also
directly verify that the initial and terminal conditions for the bridge problem
are satisfied by the process UFt (x) at time t = τ1 and t = T , respectively,
based on the expression (2.39) for ft and the condition (2.38) on λt. It hence
remains to prove that for any wealth process Xt generated by admissible policy
pit, E
[
UFs (Xs)|Ft
]
≤ UFt (Xt), for τ1 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , and for the wealth process
X∗t given by (2.45), E
[
UFs (X∗s )|Ft
]
= UFt (X∗t ), for τ1 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T . To this
end, we first notice that the process UFt (x) = x
γ
γ
eft has the Itoˆ’s decomposition
dUFt (x) =
xγ
γ
eft
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λt + aft
)2)
dt+ x
γ
γ
eftaft dW˜t,
since the process ft is the unique uniformly bounded solution to the SDE (2.34)
by Proposition 2.5.2. Moreover, the process UFt (x) is smooth enough so that
the Itoˆ-Ventzel’s formula can be applied to yield, for any wealth process Xt
generated by admissible policy pit ∈ A,
dUFt (Xt) =
Xγt
γ
eft
(
γ
2(γ − 1)
(
λt + aft
)2)
dt+ X
γ
t
γ
eftaft dW˜t
+Xγ−1t eftdXt +
1
2(γ − 1)X
γ−2
t e
ft 〈dXt〉+
〈
∂
∂x
(
xγ
γ
eftaft
)
dW˜t, dXt
〉 ∣∣∣∣
x=Xt
=
(
−1− γ2 σ
2
t pi
2
t +
(
µt + σtaft
)
Xtpit +
X2t
2(γ − 1)
(
λt + aft
)2)
Xγ−2t e
ftdt
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+X
γ−1
t e
ft
γ
(
Xta
f
t + γσtpit
)
dW˜t
= −1− γ2
(
σtpit +
λt + aft
γ − 1 Xt
)2
Xγ−2t e
ftdt+ X
γ−1
t e
ft
γ
(
Xta
f
t + γσtpit
)
dW˜t.
Note that −1−γ2 < 0 and hence the drift of the process UFt (Xt), τ1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
would achieve maximum value zero at pi∗t = − λt+a
f
t
(γ−1)σtX
∗
t , where X∗t is the
wealth process generated under such policy pi∗t , for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Define
τn := inf
{
s ≥ t :
∫ s
t
∣∣∣Xγ−1u efu
γ
(
Xua
f
u + γσupiu
) ∣∣∣2du ≥ n} ∧ T.
Then, it holds that for any admissible pit ∈ A,
E
[
UFs∧τn(Xs∧τn)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ UFt (Xt), τ1 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T. (2.46)
Notice that E
[
supτ1≤t≤T |Xt|γ
]
≤ E
[
supτ1≤t≤T |Xt|2
]
+ (T − τ1), and the fact
that for any admissible pit ∈ A, the following estimate holds
E
[
sup
τ1≤t≤T
|Xt|2
]
≤ E
[
sup
τ1≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣X∗τ1 + ∫ t
τ1
µtpitdt+
∫ t
τ1
σtpitdW˜t
∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ 3
(
E|X∗τ1|2 + (T − τ1)E
[∫ T
τ1
|µtpit|2dt
]
+ E
[
sup
τ1≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
τ1
σtpitdW˜t
∣∣∣∣2
])
≤ 3
(
E|X∗τ1|2 + (T − τ1)E
[∫ T
τ1
|µtpit|2dt
]
+ 4E
[∫ T
τ1
|σtpit|2dt
])
,
where we have applied Doob’s maximal inequality. Since
pit ∈ A :=
{
pi : pit is self-financing and Ft − progressively measurable
with E
[∫ T
τ1
|σtpit|2dt
]
<∞ and Xt ≥ 0, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T
}
,
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we have shown that E
[
supτ1≤t≤T |Xt|2
]
< ∞, under the assumption that
the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is uniformly bounded. It hence follows that
E
[
supτ1≤t≤T |Xt|γ
]
< ∞ as well. Let n → ∞ in (2.46), and by dominated
convergence theorem and recalling that the process ft, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is uni-
formly bounded, we obtain E
[
UFs (Xs)
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ UFt (Xt), τ1 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , for any
admissible pit ∈ A, and equality holds when Xt is replaced by X∗t in (2.45)
that is generated by the policy pi∗t in (2.44). The admissibility of the policy pi∗t
given in (2.44) can be easily verified, following from the assumption that the
parameter process λt is uniformly bounded, and the conclusion from Proposi-
tion 2.5.2 that
∫ t
τ1 a
f
sdW˜s is a BMO martingale (hence square integrable) under
P.
Remark 2.5.2. In the case when the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is deterministic,
conditional on Fτ1 , then condition (2.38) reduces to
1
T − τ1
∫ T
τ1
λ2tdt = λ̂2, a.s., (2.47)
indicating that the average of the process λt over the second sub-horizon should
not be very different from the perceived parameter λ̂ for the same sub-horizon.
Within this setting, the forward performance process that achieves power util-
ity at terminal time t = T is given by
UFt (x) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
γ
2(1− γ)
∫ T
t
λ2sds
)
, τ ≤ t ≤ T,
whose Itoˆ’s decomposition is
dUFt (x) =
xγeftλ2t
2(γ − 1)dt, τ ≤ t ≤ T
102
by (2.43). Notice that this is a time-decreasing zero volatility forward perfor-
mance process, and it includes the special case when there is no unanticipated
model switch at t = τ1, i.e., the case when λt(ω) = λ̂, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , for almost
all ω ∈ Ω.
2.5.2 Exponential utility case
The forward bridge problem and the solution for the exponential util-
ity U(x) = −e−γx, γ > 0, basically state in the same way as for the power
utility case, except for a different constant appearing in the drift of the SDE
(2.34). Indeed, following the similar argument as in the power utility set-
ting, one can derive that at the model switching time t = τ1, an expo-
nential utility investor has the forward criterion UFτ1(x) = V̂
(
x, τ1;λ, λ̂
)
=
− exp
(
−γx− λ̂22 (T − τ1)
)
. The goal is then to construct the forward perfor-
mance process UFt (x), for τ1 < t ≤ T , conditional on Fτ1 , while recovering the
terminal exponential utility UFT (x) = −e−γx as time reaches t = T . Argument
similar to Proposition 2.5.1 states as following.
Proposition 2.5.4. Let µt, σt and λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , be the (conditional) model
parameter processes for the second sub-horizon [τ1, T ], and denote by W˜t =
Wt −Wτ1 the standard Brownian motion for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , conditional on Fτ1.
Suppose there exists a progressively measurable process aft , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , such
that the (conditional) stochastic differential equation
dft =
1
2
(
λ2t + 2λta
f
t
)
dt+ aft dW˜t, τ1 < t < T, (2.48)
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with fτ1 = − λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1) and fT = 0 is well defined and has a strong solution
ft ∈ Ft, for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Then the forward bridge problem for a terminal
exponential utility UFT (x) = −e−γx has a solution
UFt (x) = −e−γxeft ,
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. The proof for the exponential utility case is mostly identical to that of
Proposition 2.5.1. Recall that in the current case, the SPDE satisfied by the
forward performance process is given by (2.35), for τ1 < t < T , with initial and
terminal conditions being UFτ1(x) = V̂
(
x, τ1;λ, λ̂
)
= − exp
(
−γx− λ̂22 (T − τ1)
)
and UFT (x) = −e−γx, respectively. The exponential scaling in the bound-
ary conditions suggests a candidate forward performance process UFt (x) =
−e−γxeft for some Ft-adapted process ft, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Notice that such for-
ward performance process is indeed strictly increasing and strictly concave in
x and satisfies Inada’ s conditions at each time τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Now we further
assume that the process ft has the Itoˆ’s decomposition
dft = bft dt+ aft dW˜t,
for some admissible processes aft and bft such that the above diffusion process
is well defined. Then direct computation yields that
dUFt (x) = −e−γx
(
eftdft +
1
2e
ft
(
aft
)2
dt
)
= −e−γxeft
((
bft +
1
2(a
f
t )2
)
dt+ aft dW˜t
)
(2.49)
=
(
γe−γxeftµt + ax(x, t)σt
)2
−2γ2e−γxeftσ2t
dt+ a(x, t)dW˜t. (2.50)
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Now comparing the volatility parts of expression (2.49) and (2.50), we obtain
a(x, t) = −e−γxeftaft ,
and comparison of the drift parts yields
−e−γxeft
(
bft +
1
2(a
f
t )2
)
= −e
−γxeft
2
(
λt + aft
)2
,
which gives rise to bft = 12
(
λ2t + 2λta
f
t
)
. The construction of the forward
bridge problem solution therefore boils down to looking for aft , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , an
admissible volatility process for the process ft, such that the SDE (2.48) has
an Ft-adapted well defined strong solution, with the two boundary conditions
fτ1 = − λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1) and fT = 0 being satisfied. This completes the proof for
the exponential utility scenario.
The existence and uniqueness of solution to the SDE (2.48) can be
similarly handled as in Proposition 2.5.2. It is actually slightly easier in the
current exponential utility case, since the involved BSDE has the affine gener-
ator instead of a quadratic generator. We hence resort to the well established
results on such BSDEs (see, e.g., Chapter 9 of [59]) and obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.5.5. Let the (conditional) SDE for the forward bridge problem
be given by (2.48), and the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , be uniformly bounded in
(t, ω) and satisfy
EP
[∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds exp
(
−
∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds−
∫ T
τ1
λsdW˜s
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1). (2.51)
105
Then, the SDE (2.48) has a unique solution that satisfies EP
[
supτ1≤t≤T |ft|2|Fτ1
]
<
∞ and it is given by
ft = EP
[
−
∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds exp
(
−
∫ T
t
λsdW˜s −
∫ T
t
λ2s
2 ds
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (2.52)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , with ∫ tτ1 aft dW˜t, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , being a square integrable martin-
gale under the measure P.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2.5.2, we first examine the BSDE
dft =
1
2
(
λ2t + 2λta
f
t
)
dt+ aft dW˜t, fT = 0,
which has an affine generator. Under the assumption that λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is
uniformly bounded, well established existence and uniqueness result leads to
that there is a unique solution (f, af ), with EP
[
supτ1≤t≤T |ft|2|Fτ1
]
< ∞ and∫ t
τ1 a
f
t dW˜t, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , being a square integrable martingale under P. Our next
step is to identify this solution ft with the expression in (2.52). We first, by a
change of measure, turn the BSDE into
dft =
λ2t
2 dt+ a
f
t dW˜
Q
t , fT = 0,
with W˜Qt := W˜t +
∫ t
τ1 λsds being a standard Brownian motion under Q, with
W˜Qτ1 = 0. Here, the equivalent measure Q is defined by, on FT ,
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣FT = exp
(
−
∫ T
τ1
λsdW˜s − 12
∫ T
τ1
λ2sds
)
.
Next, let f˜t := ft − ∫ tτ1 λ2s2 ds, then f˜t, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , solves the BSDE
df˜t = aft dW˜Qt , f˜T = −
∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds.
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By existence and uniqueness of solution to the above BSDE, we claim that
(f˜ , af ) is the unique solution with
∫ .
τ1 a
f
t dW˜
Q
t being a square integrable mar-
tingale under measure Q. Thus, f˜ is a genuine martingale, and it has repre-
sentation
f˜t = EQ
[
−
∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= EP
[
−
∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds exp
(
−
∫ T
t
λsdW˜s −
∫ T
t
λ2s
2 ds
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
Direct verification gives that under assumption (2.51), the initial condition
fτ1 = − λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1) is satisfied.
Remark 2.5.3. Similar to Remark 2.5.1, we could rewrite the condition (2.51)
under the measure Q, and hence obtain
EP
[∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds exp
(
−
∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds−
∫ T
τ1
λsdW˜s
) ∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= EQ
[∫ T
τ1
λ2s
2 ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1),
which leads to
EQ
[∫ T
τ1
λ2s − λ̂2
2 ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= 0, a.s.. (2.53)
The interpretation of the condition (2.53) is similar to that of (2.42), i.e., the
discrepancy process ∆s = λ2s − λ̂2, τ1 ≤ s ≤ T , on average should be zero.
Note that, however, it is different from the power utility case (2.42), as there is
no exponential weighting due to the risk aversion parameter on such average.
We next summarize the results for the exponential utility forward bridge
problem in the following theorem, whose proof is similar to that of Theorem
2.5.3 and hence is omitted.
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Theorem 2.5.6. Suppose that the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is uniformly bounded
and satisfies the condition (2.51). Let (f, af ) be the unique solution to the
(conditional) SDE (2.48) with f being given by (2.52). Then, the process
UFt (x) = −e−γxeft, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is a forward performance process that achieves
exponential utility UFT (x) = −e−γx at terminal time t = T . The forward
performance process in addition satisfies the following Itoˆ’s decomposition
dUFt (x) = −e−γxeft
(λt + aft )2
2 dt− e
−γxeftaft dW˜t, τ1 < t < T, (2.54)
with initial and terminal conditions being UFτ1(x) = − exp
(
−γx− λ̂22 (T − τ1)
)
and UFT (x) = −e−γx, respectively. The optimal investment strategy is
pi∗t =
λt + aft
γσt
, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.55)
with the optimal wealth process being
X∗t = X∗τ1 +
∫ t
τ1
λ2s + λsafs
γ
ds+
∫ t
τ1
λs + afs
γ
dW˜s, (2.56)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Here, X∗τ1 is the optimal wealth at t = τ1.
2.5.3 Logarithmic utility case
In the next proposition, we provide the result for the logarithmic utility
scenario, where a condition for the parameter process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , based
on the Martingale Representation Theorem is also needed.
Proposition 2.5.7. Let µt, σt and λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , be the (conditional) model
parameter processes for the second second sub-horizon [τ1, T ], and denote by
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W˜t = Wt −Wτ1 the standard Brownian motion for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , conditional on
Fτ1. If
∫ T
τ1
λ2t
2 dt is square integrable, and that
E
[∫ T
τ1
λ2t
2 dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1), a.s.. (2.57)
Then the forward bridge problem for a terminal logarithmic utility UFT (x) =
ln x, x > 0, has a solution
UFt (x) = ln x+
λ̂2
2 (T − τ1)−
∫ t
τ1
λ2s
2 ds+
∫ t
τ1
afsdW˜s, (2.58)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , with ∫ tτ1 afsdW˜s, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , being a square integrable martin-
gale under the measure P.
Proof. The proof is mostly similar to the one for Proposition 2.5.1. We there-
fore only highlight the main differences. First, similar to the power and ex-
ponential utility scenarios, over the first sub-horizon [0, τ1], the zero volatility
forward performance process fully recovers the value function process given
by the stubborn approach under the t = 0 perceived model P̂. In particu-
lar, UFτ1(x) = V̂
(
x, τ1;λ, λ̂
)
= ln x + λ̂22 (T − τ1), following from the similar
computations for the power utility scenario. The same SPDE (2.35) is satis-
fied by UFt (x) for τ1 < t < T , with the initial and terminal conditions being
UFτ1(x) = ln x +
λ̂2
2 (T − τ1) and UFT (x) = ln x, respectively. The logarithmic
scaling in the boundary conditions suggests a candidate forward performance
process given by UFt (x) = ln x+ft for some Ft-adapted process ft, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Notice that such forward performance process is indeed strictly increasing and
strictly concave in x and satisfies Inada’s conditions at each time τ1 ≤ t ≤ T .
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Let the Itoˆ’s decomposition for ft be dft = bft dt+ aft dW˜t, for some admissible
processes aft and bft such that this diffusion process is well defined. Direct
computation then leads to
dUFt (x) = dft = b
f
t dt+ aft dW˜t (2.59)
=
(
µt
x
+ σtax(x, t)
)2
−2σ2t
x2
dt+ a(x, t)dW˜t. (2.60)
Comparing the volatility parts of expression (2.59) and (2.60), we have aft =
a(x, t), and comparison of drift parts gives rise to bft = −λ
2
t
2 . Therefore, the
construction of the forward performance process UFt (x) for the bridge problem
boils down to looking for an admissible volatility process aft , such that the SDE
dft = −λ
2
t
2 dt+ a
f
t dW˜t, (2.61)
with fτ1 = λ̂
2
2 (T−τ1) and fT = 0 has a well defined Ft-adapted strong solution
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Clearly, the solution to (2.61) is
ft =
λ̂2
2 (T − τ1)−
∫ t
τ1
λ2s
2 ds+
∫ t
τ1
afsdW˜s.
The terminal condition fT = 0 implies
∫ T
τ1
aft dW˜t =
∫ T
τ1
λ2t
2 dt−
λ̂2
2 (T − τ1). (2.62)
Under the conditions on the process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , given in the assumption,
a unique admissible volatility process aft , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , exists, by virtue of the
Martingale Representation Theorem.
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Example 2.5.8. We give an example to explicitly construct the solution to
equation (2.62), and hence obtain the forward bridge solution (2.58). Given
a specific market parameter process λt, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , we will find the volatility
process aft , τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , such that equation (2.62) is satisfied. Recall that con-
ditional on Fτ1, the process W˜t, τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , is a standard Brownian motion.
Let Yt = W˜ 2t − t, then dYt = 2W˜tdW˜t. Let also Xt = t
3
3 . Integrating by parts,
we obtain
T 3
3 (W˜
2
T − T ) = XTYT = Xτ1Yτ1 +
∫ T
τ1
XtdYt +
∫ T
τ1
YtdXt
= −τ1
4
3 +
∫ T
τ1
2
3t
3W˜tdW˜t +
∫ T
τ1
t2(W˜ 2t − t)dt
= −
(
T 4
4 +
τ1
4
12
)
+
∫ T
τ1
2
3t
3W˜tdW˜t +
∫ T
τ1
t2W˜ 2t dt.
We also note that
T 3
3 (W˜
2
T − T ) =
T 3
3
(∫ T
τ1
2W˜tdW˜t − τ1
)
.
It hence follows that
∫ T
τ1
2
3(T
3 − t3)W˜tdW˜t =
∫ T
τ1
t2W˜ 2t dt−
3T 4 + τ 41 − 4T 3τ1
12 . (2.63)
Now, if λt =
√
2CtW˜t, for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , where C := 6λ̂2(T−τ1)3T 4+τ41−4T 3τ1 , then equation
(2.63) yields ∫ T
τ1
aft dW˜t =
∫ T
τ1
λ2t
2 dt−
λ̂2
2 (T − τ1),
with
aft =
2
3C(T
3 − t3)W˜t ∈ Ft,
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for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . We can also easily verify that the constant C ≥ 0 and the
condition (2.57) is satisfied, since E
[
W˜ 2t |Fτ1
]
= t− τ1, for all τ1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.5.4. In section 3 where the model parameter process λt ≡ λ1 ∈ Fτ1 ,
a.s. under P, for all τ1 < t ≤ T , we can actually see from condition (2.57)
that λ1 = λ̂, a.s., must hold in order to construct the forward bridge process.
This basically corresponds to a market without any intermediate unanticipated
model changes, as the model specified at t = 0 will remain valid for the whole
horizon [0, T ]. It is then obvious that one can have a forward bridge solution
starting with V̂ (x, 0;λ, λ̂) by just following the classical value function process
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . This result also implies that it is typically not possible to
construct a forward bridge solution under the predictable model assumption,
except for some degenerated scenario.
Remark 2.5.5. Beyond the predictable model assumption, we can consider
more general model parameter process λt for the second sub-horizon [τ1, T ].
For instance, consider the stochastic volatility model for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T
dSt
St
= µ(Yt)dt+ σ(Yt)dW˜ 1t ,
dYt = b(Yt)dt+ d(Yt)
(
ρdW˜ 1t +
√
1− ρ2dW˜ 2t
)
,
with |ρ| < 1. Here, the process Yt is the stochastic factor that drives the stock
price process St over the sub-horizon [τ1, T ], and W˜t = (W˜ 1t , W˜ 2t ), conditional
on Fτ1 , is the two-dimensional Brownian motion with its natural filtration Ft
satisfying the usual conditions. The deterministic functions µ(·), σ(·), b(·), d(·)
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are such that the two SDEs have unique strong solutions. Then in this in-
complete Itoˆ’s diffusion market, it is reasonable to consider the forward per-
formance process with the decomposition
dUFt (x) = b(x, t)dt+ a1(x, t)dW˜ 1t + a2(x, t)dW˜ 2t = b(x, t)dt+ a(x, t) · dW˜t,
where a(x, t) = (a1(x, t), a2(x, t)). The argument then follows exactly as that
given in the proof of Proposition 2.5.7; namely, the question boils down to
looking for an admissible volatility process aft =
(
af,1t , a
f,2
t
)
such that the SDE
dft = −λ
2(Yt)
2 dt+ a
f
t · dW˜t,
with fτ1 = λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1) and fT = 0 has a well defined Ft-adapted solution for
τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . Then similar as before, under the conditions that ∫ Tτ1 λ2(Yt)2 dt is
square integrable under P and that
E
[∫ T
τ1
λ2(Yt)
2 dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
= λ̂
2
2 (T − τ1), a.s.,
the Martingale Representation Theorem guarantees the existence and unique-
ness of such volatility process aft , for τ1 < t ≤ T , and therefore also the exis-
tence of a solution to the forward bridge problem with the terminal logarithmic
utility.
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Chapter 3
Forward optimal liquidation with market
parameter shift: the quadratic case
3.1 Introduction
Trade execution has been taken as an important component of the
investment process ([23], [18]), since a poorly executed large order can consume
profits from investment in an illiquid market. It is well known that institutional
traders typically face a dilemma of trading speed. A trading that completes
quickly may yield lower revenue due to the insufficient liquidity provided by
the market. However, the trader is relieved from uncertainty of future asset
price movement ([2], [18]). On the other hand, a slow trading may bear more
uncertainty as the execution horizon extends, but benefits from low trading
cost. A possible approach to address the best trade-off between fast and slow
trading resorts to the expected utility optimization paradigm, where the trade-
off between risk and return is characterized by a single utility function. Various
criteria have already been considered in the optimal execution literature, see
[6], [48] for the risk-neutral criterion; [2], [39] for the mean-variance criterion;
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[53] for exponential utility and [52] for more general utility functions.
The optimal liquidation problem, as any other classical expected utility
optimization problems, basically requires two inputs: a model specified by the
investor and a criterion set for the end of a fixed trading horizon. Most ex-
isting works assume that these two elements are given a priori and, therefore,
they can determine the optimal execution strategy (adapted or deterministic)
at time t = 0. In principle, the agent should follow this strategy until the end
of the trading horizon, but in practice, an unexpected market event or new
trading opportunity may occur at any intermediate time, and this should lead
the agent to revise the underlying model specification, trading volume as well
as trading horizon specification. In other words, intermediate reoptimization
due to unexpected model changes is a more realistic and necessary issue to
address. The first contribution of this work is to propose a consistent and rea-
sonable extension of the classical single-optimization problem by following the
forward performance processes theory. More precisely, through incorporating
the unanticipated market information, we determine the updated trading hori-
zon and the updated performance criterion in real-time; together the two yield
a revised optimal trading strategy that is consistent with previous strategies.
When it comes to model specification, typically two price impact com-
ponents are considered in the optimal execution literature. The permanent
impact is independent of current trading rate and can encompass asymmetric
information or the total order flow from other agents, while the temporary
impact measures instantaneous premium of liquidity and has been interpreted
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as a transaction cost ([8], [11], [49]). It is well known that the intraday pattern
of trading volume, liquidity and volatility is time-varying, and the variability
over different days within a week also exists ([15], [14]). [1] further pointed out
that smaller capitalization stocks are generally more difficult to trade as their
liquidity and volatility profiles, unlike those of the large capitalization stocks,
are generally hard to model in advance. To address the evolution of market
parameters, [26], [36], [29] proposed deterministic functions of time to charac-
terize the change of these parameters, while [2] and [8] imposed a probability
distribution over possible updated values of the parameters at a single future
time. Still within the Markovian framework, [25] and [1] considered market
parameters driven by various stochastic processes and essentially worked with
stochastic factor models. More general non-Markovian model can be found in
[4], where the optimal liquidation problem was solved by analyzing a backward
stochastic differential equation with a singular terminal condition. See also [28]
for the inclusion of an uncontrolled factor process in the dynamics of liquidity
and volatility, as well as the associated stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation with a singular terminal condition.
Our work contributes in this direction. Different from the works men-
tioned above where the deterministic or stochastic market profiles are pre-
specified and committed to through the entire trading horizon, however, our
framework based on the forward approach can accommodate the sequentially
updated model knowledge that is unanticipated. Empirical findings in [24]
suggest the low predictability of market impact models (typically < 5% R2),
116
which in turn points to the necessity of updating the parameters in real-time
to compensate for the low accuracy1. However, the classical expected utility
optimization problem (including all the works mentioned above) are commit-
ted to the pre-specified model at t = 0 for the entire horizon, and cannot
accommodate such model revision procedure with intertemporal consistent
trading behavior. Nonetheless, we consider a trading behavior in the classical
framework that naively re-optimizes based on the revised model and violates
time-consistency. Under suitable metrics we introduced, it can be shown that
compared to the naive behavior, the performance of execution under the for-
ward approach is more stable, and remains higher especially in unanticipated
adverse market scenarios (e.g., the Flash Crash). We also present a conver-
gence result of the forward performance process when the model revision is
done continuously in the limit.
3.2 Classical full-liquidation problem
For completeness, we first review the classical optimal liquidation prob-
lem studied in [53]. For easy exposition, we focus on the liquidation of a single
stock. Assume an arbitrary but prechosen finite liquidation time, say T <∞.
The stock price process solves
Pt = P0 + σ0Wt + γ0(Xt −X0) + λ0X˙t, (3.1)
1See [15] for a robust regression model that holds locally for short time interval and
changes along with the well-known intraday seasonality effects.
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t ∈ [0, T ] , where Wt is a standard Brownian motion defined on a probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P) with {Ft} being the natural filtration satisfying the usual
conditions. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that σ0 = 1. The parame-
ters λ0, γ0 model the temporary and permanent price impacts and are positive
constants chosen at t = 0. The inventory process Xt models the amount of
stock shares held at time t. It is taken to be absolutely continuous and solves,
for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xt = x−
∫ t
0
ξudu, (3.2)
with initial inventory X0 = x > 0. The control process ξt represents the rate
of liquidation.
The revenue process Rt is, in turn, given by
Rt =
∫ t
0
ξuPudu = P0x− γ02 x
2 +
∫ t
0
XudWu − λ0
∫ t
0
ξ2udu. (3.3)
The control set A[0,T ] is defined as the set of Ft-progressively measurable pro-
cesses ξt such that x =
∫ T
0 ξsds, ξt ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ] and
∫ T
0 ξ
2
sds < ∞, a.s., and
the associated process Xt is bounded uniformly in (t, ω) , with upper and lower
bounds possibly depending on ξt (see [53], [51]).
The manager is risk averse and seeks, from the one hand, to maximize
the expected utility of terminal revenue and, from the other, to fully liquidate
by T. The authors in [53] considered the stochastic optimization problem
V (x, r, 0;T ) := sup
A[0,T ]
E (v (XT , RT )) , (3.4)
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with r = P0x− γ02 x2 and singular terminal datum
v (x, r) =

−e−r, if x = 0,
−∞, if x > 0.
(3.5)
We will be using the self-evidient notation L (λ0; 0, T ) to denote the above
liquidation problem.
The related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
Vt +
1
2x
2Vrr + sup
ξ
(
−λ0ξ2Vr − ξVx
)
= 0, (3.6)
(x, r, t) ∈ R+ × R× [0, T ] , with V (x, r, T ;T ) = v (x, r) . It turns out that the
value function is given by
V (x, r, t;T ) = − exp
−r +
√
λ0
2 x
2 coth T − t√
2λ0
 , (3.7)
and the optimal feedback liquidation control function is given by
ξ∗ (x, r, t) = 1√
2λ0
x coth T − t√
2λ0
.
Therefore, at initial time,
V (x, r, 0;T ) = − exp
−r +
√
λ0
2 coth
T√
2λ0
x2
 ,
and, for t ∈ [0, T ] , the optimal liquidation and inventory processes are given
explicitly by
X∗t = x
sinh T−t√2λ0
sinh T√2λ0
and ξ∗t =
1√
2λ0
x
cosh T−t√2λ0
sinh T√2λ0
. (3.8)
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From (3.8), it is easy to see that the optimal process ξ∗t indeed leads
to full liquidation, as X∗T = 0. It is worth noticing that this full liquidation
is implicitly ”forced” through the singular form of the terminal datum (3.5).
Note also that both X∗t and ξ∗t are deterministic, and they depend on the t = 0
pre-specified temporary price impact parameter λ0.
A variation of the above problem has been solved in an infinite horizon
setting (T = ∞), using a similar stochastic optimization approach in [52].
Therein, when the terminal utility is the same exponential utility, the optimal
inventory process is X∗t = xe
− t√
2λ0 , where, again, λ0 is the t = 0 pre-specified
price impact parameter for the entire horizon [0,∞). We denote such infinite
horizon liquidation problem by L (λ0; 0,∞).
3.2.1 Inverse liquidation problem
In this section, we introduce a new problem which will serve as the
building block in the method we propose herein. As in the classical case,
the manager starts at t = 0 with a given liquidation model, as in (3.2) and
(3.3), for some arbitrary but fixed price impact parameters. To facilitate the
discussion later on, we only focus on the temporary price impact parameter,
and denote it by λ. Then, we have the model dynamics
dXζt = −ζtdt and dRζt = −λζ2t dt+Xζt dWt, (3.9)
with X0 = x > 0 and R0 = r ∈ R. Here, Wt is a standard Brownian motion
defined for all t ≥ 0 on a probability space (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P) with {Ft} being
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the natural filtration satisfying the usual conditions. We work with the set of
admissible policies A that consists of all Ft-progressively measurable processes
ζ, with ζt ≥ 0, for all t ∈
[
0, T ζ
)
, T ζ = inf
{
t > 0 : x =
∫ t
0 ζsds
}
,
∫ T ζ
0 ζ
2
sds <
L (ζ), and E
∫ T ζ
0 (Xζs )2ds <∞. Here, L (ζ) > 0 is a constant that only depends
on ζ.
We now introduce the new liquidation problem.
Problem P (λ, k; 0): Let λ > 0, and assume that the inventory and
revenue processes satisfy (3.9). Let k > 0 and introduce the function u :
R+ × R −→ R−,
u (x, r, 0) := −e−r+kx2 . (3.10)
Find the longest deterministic time T (λ, k) ≥ 0 and a deterministic
function U (x, r, t) : R× R+ × [0, T (λ, k))→ R−, of the separable form
U (x, r, t) = −e−r+h(x,t), (3.11)
for h ∈ C1,1 (R+ × [0, T (λ, k))), with the following properties:
i) U (x, r, 0) = u(x, r, 0),
ii) for any ζ ∈ A, the process U
(
Xζt , R
ζ
t , t
)
is a supermartingale, for
t ∈
[
0, T (λ, k) ∧ T ζ
)
,
iii) there exists ζ∗ ∈ A such that the process U
(
Xζ
∗
t , R
ζ∗
t , t
)
is a mar-
tingale, for t ∈
[
0, T (λ, k) ∧ T ζ
)
.
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In other words, the manager trades in a similar market environment
as in the classical case but she does not pre-determine a time at which full
liquidation must occur. Rather, she chooses an initial datum of form (3.10)
and seeks the longest time such that the conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied.
While this problem might for now look artificial, we will show in the
sequel that such problem becomes the building block for constructing the
forward performance process under real-time model revision. Moreover, the
aforementioned classical settings can be also recast as P (λ, k; 0) problems with
suitable initial conditions.
We proceed with the solution of the above problem. Let the parameter
m := k
√
2
λ
, (3.12)
and the auxiliary functions F,G : R+ → R,
F (t;m,λ) := cosh t√
2λ
−m sinh t√
2λ
, G (t;m,λ) := cosh t√
2λ
− 1
m
sinh t√
2λ
.
(3.13)
Clearly, F (t; 1, λ) = G (t; 1, λ) and, more generally, F (t;m,λ) = G
(
t; 1
m
, λ
)
,
m > 0. Also, F (0;m,λ) = G (0;m,λ) = 1.
Furthermore, direct calculations yield that
G
√λ
2 ln
1 +m
1−m ;m,λ
 = 0 and F
√λ
2 ln
1 +m
1−m ;m,λ
 > 0, (3.14)
if m ∈ (0, 1), and F
(√
λ
2 ln
m+1
m−1 ;m,λ
)
= 0, if m > 1.
We start with a result about the candidate function(s) h (x, t) that will
appear in (3.11).
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Lemma 3.2.1. Let λ > 0, k > 0 and m = k
√
2
λ
(cf. (3.12)). Define
T (λ, k) :=

√
λ
2 ln
1+m
1−m , if m < 1,
∞, if m = 1,√
λ
2 ln
1+m
m−1 , if m > 1.
(3.15)
Then, for t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)) , the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
ht − 14λh
2
x +
1
2x
2 = 0, (3.16)
with h (x, 0) = kx2, x > 0 and h (0, t) = 0, has a unique non-decreasing in x
solution, given by
h (x, t) = kx2G (t;m,λ)
F (t;m,λ) , (3.17)
with F,G as in (3.13). Furthermore, for x ≥ 0,
lim
t↑T (λ,k)
h (x, t) =

0, if m < 1,
kx2, if m = 1,
∞1{x>0} + 01{x=0}, if m > 1.
(3.18)
Proof. We solve equation (3.16) using the method of characteristics. These
curves, denoted by X (t) , P (t) , satisfy
dX(t)
dt
= − 12λP (t),
dP (t)
dt
= −X(t), (3.19)
and
dh(X(t), t)
dt
= − 14λP
2(t)− 12X
2(t), (3.20)
with P (t) = hx(X(t), t), X (0) = x. Therefore, for t ≥ 0,
X(t) = C1e
t√
2λ + C2e−
t√
2λ and P (t) =
√
2λ
(
−C1e
t√
2λ + C2e−
t√
2λ
)
.
(3.21)
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The initial condition of (3.16) yields P (0) = hx(x, 0) = 2kx. Thus, we must
have
C1 =
x
2
1− k
√
2
λ
 and C2 = x2
1 + k
√
2
λ
 (3.22)
and, in turn, for t ≥ 0,
X (t) = x
(
cosh t√
2λ
−m sinh t√
2λ
)
= xF (t;m,λ) . (3.23)
Therefore, for t ≥ 0,
h(X (t) , t) = h(x, 0)−
∫ t
0
( 1
4λP
2(s) + 12X
2(s)
)
ds
= kx2 +
√
λ
2
(
C22e
−
√
2
λ
t − C21e
√
2
λ
t
)
+
√
λ
2
(
C21 − C22
)
= x2
k cosh
√2
λ
t
−
√
λ
2
(
1
2 +
k2
λ
)
sinh
√2
λ
t

We then seek the maximal time T (λ, k) such that a well defined solution h (x, t)
exists, for each x ≥ 0 and t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)) , that is also nondecreasing in x and
satisfies h (0, t) = 0. For this, we first need to invert the characteristic curve
(3.23), insuring that for each X (t) > 0, with t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)) , there exists a
unique x > 0 that satisfies (3.23).
We look at the following cases:
If m = 1, then F (t; 1, λ) = e−
t√
2λ while, if m < 1, then F (t;m,λ) >
e
− t√
2λ . Thus, for m ≤ 1, F (t;m,λ) > 0, t ≥ 0 and therefore, (3.23) can be
inverted for all times t > 0.
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If, on the other hand, m > 1, curve (3.23) can be inverted only up to
the first zero of F (t;m,λ) , which occurs at the (finite) time, say T1, given by
T1 =
√
2λarc cothm =
√
λ
2 ln
m+ 1
m− 1 .
Therefore, if (with a slight abuse of notation) we define time T1 (λ, k) as
T1 (λ, k) =∞, if m ≤ 1 and T1 (λ, k) =
√
λ
2 ln
m+ 1
m− 1 , if m > 1, (3.24)
we deduce that a well-defined solution is given, for t ∈ [0, T1 (λ, k)) , by
h (x, t) = x2
k cosh
√
2
λ
t−
√
λ
2
(
1
2 +
k2
λ
)
sinh
√
2
λ
t(
cosh t√2λ − k
√
2
λ
sinh t√2λ
)2
= kx2
(
cosh t√2λ − 1m sinh t√2λ
)
(
cosh t√2λ −m sinh t√2λ
) = kx2G(t;m,λ)
F (t;m,λ) .
Note, however, that the above function might not be spatially increasing.
It remains to insure the spatial monotonicity of h (x, t). To this end,
let
T2 (λ, k) :=
√
λ
2 ln
1 +m
1−m, if m < 1 and T2 (λ, k) :=∞, if m ≥ 1.
(3.25)
Then both F (t;m,λ), G(t;m,λ) > 0, for t ∈ [0, T2 (λ, k)), and combining
(3.24) and (3.25), we easily conclude.
To show uniqueness, we assume that there are two solutions that are
non-decreasing in x, h ∈ C1,1 (R+ × [0, T )) and h˜ ∈ C1,1
(
R+ ×
[
0, T˜
))
, with
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T˜ > T, satisfying h (x, 0) = h˜ (x, 0) = kx2, x > 0, h (0, t) = h˜ (0, t) , t ∈ [0, T ) .
Then, H := h− h˜ satisfies, for (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T ) ,
Ht − 14
(
h2x − h˜2x
)
= Ht − 14Hx
(
hx + h˜x
)
= 0,
with H (x, 0) = 0 and H (0, t) = 0. For the characteristics we have dX(t)
dt
=
−hx(X(t),t)+h˜x(X(t),t)4λ0 , with hx (X (t) , t) + h˜x (X (t) , t) ≥ 0. It hence implies that
for any X(t) = x ≥ 0, t ∈ [0), the initial value X(0) = x0 ≥ x ≥ 0. We
conclude, using H(X(t), t) = H(x0, 0) = 0, with x0 ≥ 0, that H ≡ 0 is the
unique solution up to time T. It then follows T = T˜ , and h(x, t) = h˜(x, t), for
(x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T ) .
It remains to show (3.18). The case m = 1 is trivial. If m < 1, then
lim
t↑T (λ,k)
h (x, t) = lim
t↑
√
λ
2 ln
1+m
1−m
kx2
G(t;m,λ)
F (t;m,λ) ,
and using that G
(√
λ
2 ln
1+m
1−m ;m,λ
)
= 0 and F
(√
λ
2 ln
1+m
1−m ;m,λ
)
> 0, we
conclude. The case m > 1, follows similarly.
The next result states that in the class of separable functions (3.11),
the inverse liquidation problem P (λ, k; 0) has, for each pair (λ, k) ∈ R+×R+,
a unique solution, which is also explicitly constructed.
Theorem 3.2.2. Let (λ, k) ∈ R+×R+ and m := k
√
2
λ
. Let also F and G as in
(3.13), T (λ, k) as in (3.15) and h as in (3.17). Then, the following assertions
hold:
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i) The problem P (λ, k; 0) has a solution, given by the pair (T (λ, k) , U (x, r, t))
with U (x, r, t) : R+ × R× [0, T (λ, k)) −→ R− given by
U (x, r, t) := −e−r+h(x,t). (3.26)
This solution is unique in the class of separable functions (3.11).
Furthermore, for each (x, r) ∈ R+ × R,
lim
t↑T (λ,k)
U (x, r, t) =

−e−r, if m < 1,
−e−r+kx2 , if m = 1,
−∞1{x>0} − e−r1{x=0}, if m > 1.
(3.27)
ii) The optimal policy ζ∗ and optimal inventory X∗, are given, respec-
tively, by
ζ∗t =
1
2λhx(X
∗
t , t) = x
k
λ
G (t;m,λ)
F (t;m,λ) , (3.28)
and
X∗t = xF (t;m,λ) . (3.29)
iii) For each x > 0,
lim
t↑T (λ,k)
X∗t =

x
√
(1−m) (1 +m), if m < 1,
0, if m ≥ 1.
(3.30)
Therefore, if m ≥ 1, the optimal policy ζ∗ is also a full liquidation policy at
the solvability time T (λ, k) .
Proof. It follows trivially that U (x, r, 0) = u(x, r, 0).
To show property (ii) and (iii), we work as follows.
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Let ζ ∈ A. Then for t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)), the functions h (x, s) and U (x, r, s)
are well defined for s ∈ [0, t] . On the other hand, Ito’s formula yields
U(Xζt∧T ζ , R
ζ
t∧T ζ , t ∧ T ζ) = u(r, x, 0)+∫ t∧T ζ
0
(
Ut
(
Xζs , R
ζ
s, s
)
− ζsUx
(
Xζs , R
ζ
s, s
)
− λUr
(
Xζs , R
ζ
s, s
)
ζ2s +
1
2Urr
(
Xζs , R
ζ
s, s
) (
Xζs
)2)
ds
+
∫ t∧T ζ
0
Ur(Xζs , Rζs, s)XζsdWs
=
∫ t∧T ζ
0
(
ζs − 12λhx
(
Xζs , s
))2
U
(
Xζs , R
ζ
s, s
)
ds+
∫ t∧T ζ
0
Ur(Xζs , Rζs, s)XζsdWs
= −
∫ t∧T ζ
0
(
ζs − 12λhx
(
Xζs , s
))2
e−R
ζ
s+h(Xζs ,s)ds+
∫ t∧T ζ
0
Ur(Xζs , Rζs, s)XζsdWs,
(3.31)
where we used (3.26). Next, we show that the process
∫ t∧T ζ
0
Ur(Xζs , Rζs, s)XζsdWs =
∫ t∧T ζ
0
e−R
ζ
s+h(Xζs ,s)XζsdWs
is a genuine martingale, for t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)). To this end, we have
E
∫ t
0
(
e−R
ζ
s+h(Xζs ,s)Xζs
)2
ds ≤ x2E
∫ t
0
e−2R
ζ
s+2kx2G(s;m,λ)F (s;m,λ)ds.
Furthermore, if m ≥ 1, (3.13) yields G(s;m,λ)
F (s;m,λ) ≤ G(t;m,λ)F (t;m,λ) , while if m < 1,
G(s;m,λ)
F (s;m,λ) ≤ G(0;m,λ)F (0;m,λ) = 1.
Therefore, it suffices to show that E
∫ t∧T ζ
0 e
−2Rζsds <∞. By admissibil-
ity of ζ ∈ A, there exist constants L(ζ), K(ζ) > 0, such that ∫ T ζ0 ζ2sds < L(ζ),
a.s., and E
∫ T ζ
0 (Xζs )2ds < K(ζ). Hence, using the dynamics (3.9) for Rζ , we
obtain
E
∫ t∧T ζ
0
e−2R
ζ
sds = E
∫ t∧T ζ
0
exp
(
−2r − 2
∫ s
0
XζudWu + 2λ
∫ s
0
ζ2udu
)
ds
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≤ e−2r+2λL(ζ)E
∫ t∧T ζ
0
e−2
∫ s
0 X
ζ
udWuds = e−2r+2λL(ζ)
∫ t
0
E
[
e−2
∫ s∧Tζ
0 X
ζ
udWu
]
ds
≤ e−2r+2λL(ζ)
∫ t
0
e2K(ζ)ds = e−2r+2λL(ζ)+2K(ζ)t < e−2r+2λL(ζ)+2K(ζ)T (λ, k) ≤ ∞,
where we have used the fact that
∫ s∧T ζ
0 X
ζ
udWu, for s ∈ [0, t], is a square
integrable martingale with quadratic variation at most K(ζ).
Next, consider for t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)) the feedback policy ζ∗t = 12λhx (X∗t , t) >
0. Then, (3.13) and (3.17) give
dX∗t = −
k
λ
X∗t
cosh t√2λ − 1m sinh t√2λ
cosh t√2λ −m sinh t√2λ
, X∗0 = x.
We claim that the solution (3.29) follows. In turn, ζ∗t is given by the determin-
istic function in (3.28). Note that for t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)) , all involved quantities
are well defined. We then easily deduce that this policy is admissible. Its
optimality then follows from (3.31).
We now look at limt↑T (λ,k)X∗t . If the parameters (λ, k) are such that
m < 1, then (3.29), (3.13) and (3.15) give
lim
t↑T (λ,k)
X∗t = x
(
cosh
(
tanh−1m
)
−m sinh
(
tanh(−1)m
))
= x
(
1−m2
)
cosh
(
tanh(−1)m
)
= x
(
1−m2
)
cosh
ln
√
1 +m
1−m

= 12x
(
1−m2
)√1 +m
1−m +
√
1−m
1 +m
 = x√(1−m) (1 +m) > 0.
If m = 1, then T (λ, k) = ∞ and (3.29) gives limt↑∞X∗t = limt↑∞ xe−
k
λ
t = 0,
and thus T ζ∗ = T (λ, k) =∞.
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Finally, if m > 1, direct calculations in (3.29) yield that limt↑T (λ,k)X∗t =
0, and that T ζ∗ = T (λ, k) <∞. Therefore, the optimal policy is also a perfect
liquidation policy at time T (λ, k) .
Corollary 3.2.3. For x > 0 and t ∈ [0, T (λ, k)) , we have
ht (x, t) ≷ 0, m ≷ 1 and ht (x, t) = 0, m = 1. (3.32)
Moreover, the optimal liquidation policy ζ∗ satisfies
d
dt
ζ∗t =
1
2
k (m2 − 1)
F 2 (t;m,λ) . (3.33)
Therefore, if m > 1 (m < 1), then ζ∗ is strictly increasing (resp. decreasing)
in time.
As shown in Theorem 3.2.2, the inverse liquidation problem P (λ0, k; 0)
gives rise to different liquidation strategies and different horizons, for various
market conditions characterized by λ. The classical liquidation problems, on
the other hand, lacks in such flexibility, once a fixed terminal singular condition
and the horizon were pre-specified. Beyond this, we will also compare the
solutions of the two problems under suitable metrics, and show that the trading
behavior given by the problem P (λ0, k; 0) is indeed superior.
3.2.2 Reconciling the classical and the inverse liquidation problems
We conclude this section by showing that the classical full-liquidation
problems L (λ0; 0, T ) or L (λ0; 0,∞) are special instances of the inverse liqui-
dation problem P (λ0, k; 0) .
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As we saw earlier, every classical liquidation problem is parametrized
by the market parameter λ0 and the targeted full-liquidation horizon T (finite
or not). We now show that for each such problem, L (λ0; 0, T ) or L (λ0; 0,∞) ,
there exists an inverse liquidation problem P (λ0, k; 0) that has the same op-
timal policies and same full-liquidation times.
3.2.2.1 Problem L (λ0; 0, T ) - finite full-liquidation horizon
With λ0 and T <∞ given, introduce the constant
k0 :=
√
λ0
2 coth
T√
2λ0
, (3.34)
and consider the inverse liquidation problem P (λ0, k0; 0) . Then, (3.12) gives
m0 = coth T√2λ0 > 1. In turn, (3.15) yields
T (λ0, k0) =
√
2λ0 ln
√
1 +m0
1−m0 = T.
Therefore, the full liquidation time T of the classical problem L (λ0; 0, T ) co-
incides with the solvability time T (λ0, k0) of the inverse problem P (λ0, k0; 0).
Furthermore, for t ∈ [0, T ) , (3.28) and (3.34) give,
ζ∗t = x
k0
λ0
cosh t√2λ0 − sinh
t√
2λ0
cosh t√2λ0 − coth
T√
2λ0
sinh t√2λ0
= xk0
λ0
coth T√2λ0 cosh
t√
2λ0
− sinh t√2λ0
coth T√2λ0
(
cosh t√2λ0 − coth
T√
2λ0
sinh t√2λ0
) = x 1√
2λ0
cosh T−t√2λ0
sinh T√2λ0
= ξ∗t .
Obviously X∗,Pt = X∗,Lt , with full liquidation at T.
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Notice that full liquidation at T (λ0, k0) for P (λ0, k0; 0) is expected
since m0 > 1, which further implies that λ0 is relatively small and favorable
for liquidation of the asset.
Tedious but direct calculations also show that, for t ∈ [0, T ) , U (x, r, t) =
V (x, r, t;T ) and limt↑T (λ0,k) U (x, r, t) = limt↑T V (x, r, t) .
Remark 3.2.1. The choice of the constant k0 in (3.34) is not the only one
that yields T (λ0, k0) = T. Indeed, for k′0 :=
√
λ0
2 tanh
T√
2λ0
, we also have
T (λ0, k0) = T. In this case, however, m′0 = tanh T√2λ0 < 1, and as we have seen
in (3.30), the optimal policy for P (λ0, k′0; 0) does not lead to full liquidation.
Therefore, the problems L (λ0; 0, T ) and P (λ0, k′0; 0) do not have the same
solution.
3.2.2.2 Problem L (λ0; 0,∞) - infinite full-liquidation horizon
With λ0 given, let k0 :=
√
λ0
2 and consider the inverse liquidation prob-
lem P (λ0, k0; 0) . Then (3.12) gives m0 = 1 and, thus, T (λ0, k0) = T =∞. In
turn, for t ≥ 0,
ζ∗t = x
1√
2λ0
= xk0
λ0
= ξ∗t .
Furthermore, h (x, t) =
√
λ0
2 x
2 and, thus, U (x, r, t) = − exp
(
−r +
√
λ0
2 x
2
)
.
We easily deduce that the problems L (λ0; 0,∞) and P
(
λ0,
√
λ0
2 ; 0
)
have the
same solution.
Note that, contrary to the previous case of finite full-liquidation hori-
zon, there is a unique choice of the constant k that gives T (λ0, k) = T =∞.
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3.3 “Real-time” single parameter shift
We now consider the following extension of the classical liquidation
setting. At t = 0, we allow for the market impact parameter to change at a
given (deterministic) time, say τ1 < T. While, however, we know a priori that
a change in this parameter will occur at τ1, we do not know a priori its new
value, say λ1, nor its probability distribution at t = 0. In other words, τ1 ∈ F0
and λ1 ∈ F1.
We also consider two trading agents, whom we, respectively, call ”naive”
and ”forward”. They both have access to the information that the parameter
λ0 will change at τ1, and will take (an unknown at t = 0) value λ1.
The two agents exhibit different behavior with regards to this knowl-
edge. We describe this behavior below and analyze the differences and similar-
ities. Essentially, the naive and the forward agents will solve the (conditional)
variants of the problem L (λ; 0, T ) and problem P(λ, k; 0), respectively. It is
worth noting that the basic form of the problem P(λ, k; 0), with the analysis
presented in Theorem 3.2.2, is interesting on its own right.
3.3.1 The naive agent
At t = 0, the agent pre-determines a full-liquation time T and assumes
terminal utility (3.5). In order to solve the related optimization problem (3.4),
he needs to pre-specify at t = 0 a model for the entire horizon [0, T ] , for both
periods [0, τ1) and [τ1, T ] . Since he is aware that the market parameter λ0 will
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be revised at the deterministic time τ1, he chooses dynamics,
dXλ0t = −ξtdt and dRλ0t = −λ0ξ2t dt+Xλ0t dWt, for t ∈ [0, τ1) (3.35)
with X0 = x,R0 = r, and
dX λˆt = −ξtdt and dRλˆt = −λˆξ2t dt+X λˆt dWt, for t ∈ [τ1, T ] , (3.36)
with X λˆτ1 = Xλ0τ1 , Rλˆτ1 = Rλτ1 .
The value λˆ can be interpreted as his best, at t = 0, estimate for the
future new value of the market impact parameter, to be realized at τ1 and to
remain accurate in [τ1, T ] . In general, of course, λˆ might not be the correct
revised value, λ1(ω), since the latter will be realized only at τ1.
The agent starts trading at t = 0 till the predictable revision time
τ1. Then, once the true value λ1(ω) is revealed, he starts a new liquidation
problem in [τ1, T ] , still committed to fully liquidate at the originally chosen
(i.e. at t = 0) time T .
For the remaining trading period (τ1, T ] , he now uses the accurately
revised model dynamics
dXλ1t = −ξtdt and dRλ1t = −λ1ξ2t dt+Xλ1t dWt, for t ∈ (τ1, T ] , (3.37)
with Xλ1τ1 = X∗τ1 > 0 and Rλ1τ1 = R∗τ1 , where X∗τ1 , R∗τ1 are the optimal inventory
and revenue realized at τ1. Naturally, the values X∗τ1 and R∗τ1 have inherited
the model mispecification error, λˆ instead of λ1 in [τ1, T ] , as the explicit ex-
pressions below show.
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To construct the solution in [0, τ1) , the agent needs to first solve prob-
lem L
(
λˆ; τ1, T
)
, as required by backward induction. Of course, a posteriori,
this will be a “virtual” problem, since the agent will never encounter it, for he
will switch to the correct model (3.37) at the model revision time τ1. How-
ever, the solution in [0, τ1) does depend on L
(
λˆ; τ1, T
)
due to the backward
construction, and, thus, on the initial choice of the model input λˆ, which at τ1
will turn out to be inaccurate.
To apply the backward induction, we first solve L
(
λˆ; τ1, T
)
. In analogy
to (3.7), the value function and optimal policy are given, for (x, r) ∈ R+ × R
and t ∈ [τ1, T ] , by
Vˆ (x, r, t;T ) = −e−r+
√
λˆ
2 x
2 coth T−t√
2λˆ and ξˆ∗t = X∗τ1
cosh T−t√
2λˆ
sinh T−τ1√
2λˆ
. (3.38)
In [0, τ1] , we solve an analogous optimal liquidation problem - but without
requiring full liquidation at time τ1 - with dynamics as in (3.35) and terminal
utility
V (x, r, τ1; τ1) = Vˆ (x, r, τ1;T ) = −e−r+x
2
√
λˆ
2 coth
T−τ1√
2λˆ .
The associated HJB equation is the same as (3.6) with the above ter-
minal condition (instead of (3.5)). We again look for separable solutions of
the form V (x, r, t; τ1) = −e−r+h(x,t), with h (x, t) = x2g (t) , for some func-
tion g. Then, for t ∈ [0, τ1) , h will satisfy (3.16) with terminal condition
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h (x, τ1) =
√
λˆ
2x
2 coth T−τ1√
2λˆ
and, thus, g must solve
g′ (t) = 1
λ0
g2 (t)− 12 with g (τ1) =
√
λˆ
2 coth
T − τ1√
2λˆ
.
Let c :=
√
λˆ
λ0
coth T−τ1√
2λˆ
=
√
2
λ0
g (τ1) . We have the following cases:
i) Let c > 1, or equivalently, g (τ1) >
√
λ0
2 . Then, setting C
1 := τ1 +
√
2λ0 coth(−1)
(√
λˆ
λ0
coth T−τ1√
2λˆ
)
, we have
g (t) =
√
λ0
2 coth
C1 − t√
2λ0
=
√
λ0
2 coth
τ1 − t√2λ0 + coth(−1)

√√√√ λˆ
λ0
coth T − τ1√
2λˆ


=
√
λ0
2 coth
(
τ1 − t√
2λ0
+ coth(−1)
(√
2
λ0
g (τ1)
))
.
Then,
V (x, r, t; τ1) = −e−r+x
2
√
λ0
2 coth
C1−t√
2λ0 ,
and the feedback control function is given by ξ∗ (x, t) = x√2λ0 coth
C1−t√
2λ0
.
The optimal inventory and revenue processes are given by
X∗t = x
sinh C1−t√2λ0
sinh C1√2λ0
,
R∗t = r −
∫ t
0
λ0 (ξ∗s )
2 ds+
∫ t
0
X∗sdWs
= r − x
2
4
(
sinh C1√2λ0
)2
t+
√
λ0
2
(
sinh
(√
2
λ0
C1
)
− sinh
(√
2
λ0
(C1 − t)
))
+ x
sinh C1√2λ0
∫ t
0
sinh C
1 − s√
2λ0
dWs,
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for t ∈ [0, τ1).
ii) Let c < 1, or, equivalently, g (τ1) <
√
λ0
2 . Then, setting C1 :=
τ1 +
√
2λ0 tanh(−1)
(√
λˆ
λ0
coth T−τ1√
2λˆ
)
, we have
g (t) =
√
λ0
2 tanh
(
C1 − t√
2λ0
)
=
√
λ0
2 tanh
τ1 − t√2λ0 + tanh(−1)

√√√√ λˆ
λ0
coth T − τ1√
2λˆ


=
√
λ0
2 tanh
(
τ1 − t√
2λ0
+ tanh(−1)
(√
2
λ0
g (τ1)
))
.
Then,
V (x, r, t; τ1) = −e−r+x
2
√
λ0
2 tanh
C1−t√
2λ0
and the feedback control ξ∗ (x, t) = x√2λ0 tanh
C1−t√
2λ0
. Then,
X∗t = x
cosh C1−t√2λ0
sinh C1√2λ0
,
R∗t = r −
∫ t
0
λ0 (ξ∗s )
2 ds+
∫ t
0
X∗sdWs
= r + x
2
4
(
sinh C1√2λ0
)2
t−
√
λ0
2
(
sinh
(√
2
λ0
C1
)
− sinh
(√
2
λ0
(C1 − t)
))
+ x
sinh C1√2λ0
∫ t
0
cosh C1 − s√
2λ0
dWs,
for t ∈ [0, τ1).
iii) Let c = 1, or equivalently, g (τ1) =
√
λ0
2 .
Then, V (x, r, t; τ1) = −e−r+x
2
√
λ0
2 and ξ∗ (x, t) = x√2λ0 . It follows that
X∗t = xe
− t√
2λ0 , and
R∗t = r −
∫ t
0
λ0 (ξ∗s )
2 ds+
∫ t
0
X∗sdWs
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= r + x2
√
λ30
2
e−
√
2
λ0
t − 1
+ x ∫ t
0
e
− s√
2λ0 dWs,
for t ∈ [0, τ1).
At time τ1, the true value λ1 ∈ Fτ1 is revealed. If λ1 = λˆ, then the
solution in [τ1, T ] is given by Vˆ and the the optimal policy in (3.38).
If, on the other hand, λ1 6= λˆ, the agent adjusts his model dynamics to
(3.37) and starts a new liquidation problem L (λ1; τ1, T ) with initial inventory
and revenue given by X∗τ1 , R∗τ1 obtained above for each case.
For this new problem, L (λ1; τ1, T ) , we have, for t ∈ [τ1, T ] ,
V 1 (x, r, t; τ1, T ) = − exp
−r +
√
λ1
2 x
2 coth T − t√
2λ1
 , (3.39)
with V 1 (x, r, T ; τ1, T ) = v (x, r) , v as in (3.5), and
ξ1,∗t =
1√
2λ1
X∗t coth
T − t√
2λ1
and X1,∗t = X∗τ1
sinh T−t√2λ1
sinh T−τ1√2λ1
.
As expected, X1,∗T = 0.
Notice that even though the agent considers an entirely new liquida-
tion model in [τ1, T ] , the initial wrong assessment λˆ - instead of the true, in
hindsight, λ1 - still enters in the solution of L (λ1; τ1, T ) through the initial
condition X∗τ1 , as it depends on g (·), which itself depends on λ0, λˆ through
g (τ1) above.
In summary, if λˆ 6= λ1, the realized strategy of the naive agent, denoted
by ξa, is given by
ξat = ξ∗t 1{t<τ1} + ξ
1,∗
t 1{τ1≤t≤T}.
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It is discontinuous at τ1, with the discontinuity ∆∗τ1
(
λ0, λˆ, λ1
)
:= limt↓τ1 ξ
1,∗
t −
limt↑τ1 ξ∗t given by
∆∗τ1
(
λ0, λˆ, λ1
)
= X∗τ1
(
1√
2λ1
coth T − t√
2λ1
− 1√
2λ
coth T − t√
2λ0
)
,
with X∗τ1 being given as in each case considered above. Naturally, if λˆ = λ1,
∆∗τ1 (λ0, λ1, λ1) = 0. Also, it is easy to check that
∆∗τ1
(
λ0, λˆ, λ1
)
≷ 0, if λ0 ≷ λ1,
which indicates the intuitive behavior of accelerating (decelerating) liquida-
tion if the unanticipated market condition becomes favorable (unfavorable,
respectively).
The realized inventory is given by
Xat =

x
sinh C
1−t√
2λ0
sinh C1√
2λ0
, if c > 1, 0 ≤ t < τ1,
x
cosh C1−t√
2λ0
sinh C1√
2λ0
, if c < 1, 0 ≤ t < τ1,
xe
− t√
2λ0 , if c = 1, 0 ≤ t < τ1,
Xaτ1
sinh T−t√
2λ1
sinh T−τ1√
2λ1
, if τ1 ≤ t ≤ T.
with XaT = 0. It is continuous in [0, T ] .
The value function process associated to the above strategy ξat is given
by
V a (x, r, t) = V (x, r, t; τ1, T ) 1{0≤t<τ1} + V 1 (x, r, t; τ1, T ) 1{τ1≤t≤T}
139
with V computed for each case above, and V 1 as in (3.39).
Naturally, for λˆ 6= λ1, V a (x, r, t) is discontinuous at τ1, which results
from the fact that the agent totally discards the previously realized perfor-
mance as soon as the model dynamics change at time τ1. Indeed,
lim
t↑τ1
V a (x, r, t; τ1, T ) = lim
t↑τ1
V (x, r, t; τ1, T )
= lim
t↓τ1
Vˆ (x, r, t;T ) = − exp
−r +
√
λˆ
2x
2 coth T − τ1√
2λˆ
 ,
while
V 1 (x, r, τ1; τ1, T ) = − exp
−r +
√
λ1
2 x
2 coth T − τ1√
2λ1
 .
3.3.2 The forward agent
The forward agent starts at t = 0 with initial inventory x. She also
assesses the level of the market impact parameter, λ0, and, like the pre-
committed management, she is aware that λ0 will change at τ1 without knowing
at (t = 0) its upcoming new level.
However, at t = 0, she neither pre-specifies a value for the market
parameter in [τ1, T ] nor a full-liquidation time. Rather, she only specifies an
initial criterion U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+kx2 of form (3.11), for some constant k > 0,
and solves the inverse liquidation problem P (λ0, k; 0).
One interpretation of the choice U(x, r, 0) follows from the result of
Theorem 3.2.2. Indeed, according to (3.28), the optimal trading rate under
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the performance criterion U(x, r, 0) at t = 0 is ζ∗0 = kλ0x. Therefor, for fixed
λ0 > 0 and total inventory x > 0 to liquidate at t = 0, the initial performance
criterion has a one to one correspondence to the initial trading rate. In other
words, by specifying a criterion U(x, r, 0) to the forward trading agent, the
client proposes an initial trading profile through the trading rate that she
seeks to consistently preserve in the future.
The fact that k is, for now, arbitrary is only for mere generality and
for showing how we can construct the solution for any given initial condition.
In the sequel, when we compare the performance of the two managers, we will
choose k accordingly, for meaningful comparisons.
Let T (λ0, k) be the solvability time of problem P (λ0, k; 0) and let m :=
k
√
2
λ0
.
Case 1: Model parameter is revised before the solvability time: τ1 <
T (λ0, k)
If m < 1, then no full liquidation occurs in [0, T (λ0, k)) and, thus,
neither in [0, τ1] . Then, equations (3.29), (3.9) and (3.17) yield, with F,G as
in (3.13), that, for t ∈ [0, τ1] ,
X∗t = xF (t;m,λ0) > 0 and R∗t = r−λ0
∫ t
0
(
ζ
∗
s
)2
ds+
∫ t
0
X∗sdWs, (3.40)
and
U (x, r, t) = − exp
(
−r + kG (t;m,λ0)
F (t;m,λ0)
x2
)
.
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Therefore, U (x, r, τ1) can be written as
U (x, r, τ1) = −e−r+k1x2 with k1 := kG (τ1;m,λ0)
F (τ1;m,λ0)
.
At τ1, the agent learns the true value λ1 ∈ Fτ1 and considers a new
inverse liquidation problem, in complete analogy to P (λ0, k; 0). Specifically,
she solves problem P (λ1, k1; τ1) with initial datum U (x, r, τ1) , setting x = X∗τ1
and r = R∗τ1 , where (cf. (3.40)),
X∗τ1 = xF (τ1;m,λ0) > 0 and R
∗
τ1 = r − λ0
∫ τ1
0
(
ζ
∗
s
)2
ds+
∫ τ1
0
X∗sdWs.
Observe that this new inverse liquidation problem P (λ1, k1; τ1) , intro-
duced at time τ1, captures the “real-time” change λ1 at τ1, but also incorpo-
rates the “past”, since its initial condition U
(
X∗τ1 , R
∗
τ1 , τ1
)
depends, through
its form and each of its arguments, on the model input (k, λ0, τ1), which was
chosen at initial time t = 0.
We can now solve P (λ1, k1; τ1) using arguments similar to the ones in
the proof of Theorem 3.2.2.
To this end, let
m1 := k1
√
2
λ1
= k0
G (τ1;m0, λ0)
F (τ1;m0, λ0)
√
2
λ1
= k0
cosh τ1√2λ0 −
1
m0
sinh τ1√2λ0
cosh τ1√2λ0 −m0 sinh
τ1√
2λ0
√
2
λ1
.
If m1 < 1, the solvability time T (λ1, k1; τ1) of the new problem is given
(cf. (3.15)) by T (λ1, k1; τ1) =
√
2λ1 ln
√
1+m1
1−m1 .
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For convenience, we set
T1 := τ1 + T (λ1, k1; τ1) = τ1 +
√
2λ1 ln
√
1 +m1
1−m1 . (3.41)
Then, for t ∈ [τ1, T1) , the solution U1 is given by
U1 (x, r, t) = − exp
(
−r + k1x2G (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
F (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
)
∈ Fτ1 ,
which, by construction, satisfies at revision time τ1 the pasting condition
U (x, r, τ1) = U1 (x, r, τ1) .
Furthermore, the optimal inventory X1,∗t and liquidation strategy ζ1,∗t are
given, for t ∈ [τ1, T1) , by
X1,∗t = xF (τ1;m,λ0)F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) ∈ Fτ1
and
ζ1,∗t = X∗τ1
k1
λ1
G (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) = xF (τ1;m,λ0)
k1
λ1
G (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) .
Combining the above and (3.30), we deduce that there is non-zero optimal
inventory left at T1, given by
X1,∗T1 = xF (τ1;m,λ0)
√
(1−m1) (1 +m1) > 0.
If m1 = 1, then T (λ1, k1; τ1) =∞ and, for t ∈ [τ1,∞) ,
X1,∗t = X∗τ1e
− k1
λ1
(t−τ1) = xF (τ1;m,λ0)F (t− τ1; 1, λ1) ∈ Fτ1
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and
ζ1,∗t = X∗τ1
k1
λ1
= xF (τ1;m,λ0)F (t− τ1; 1, λ1) .
Finally, if m1 > 1, then T (λ1, k1; τ1) =
√
2λ1 ln
√
1+m
m−1 . Setting
T1 := τ1 + T (λ1, k1; τ1) = τ1 +
√
2λ1 ln
√
1 +m1
m1 − 1 ,
then, the results in Theorem 3.2.2 yield that the optimal inventory and liqui-
dation policies are given, for t ∈ [τ1, T1) by
X1,∗t = xF (τ1;m,λ0)F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) ∈ Fτ1
and
ζ1,∗t = X∗τ1
k1
λ1
G (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) = xF (τ1;m,λ0)
k1
λ1
G (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) .
We deduce that full-liquidation occurs at T1, i.e., X1,∗T1 = 0.
Case 2: Model parameter is revised after or at the solvability time:
T (λ0, k) ≤ τ1 <∞
This case is viable only if m 6= 1. The parameter revision per se is
irrelevant, for the inverse liquidation problem P (λ0, k; 0) is not well defined
beyond time T (λ0, k). Trading stops at T (λ0, k) , and the final inventory is
given by (3.30).
Therefore, if m < 1, there is non-zero inventory left, given by X∗T (λ0,k) =
x
√
(1−m) (1 +m).
On the other hand, if m > 1, problem P (λ0, k; 0) is not well defined for
times beyond T (λ0, k) . However, full-liquidation does occur at time T (λ0, k) ,
X∗T (λ0,k) = 0.
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3.4 Comparative analysis for the naive and forward liq-
uidation strategies
Both agents start at t = 0, having the same initial inventory, same
assessement and knowledge about the upcoming change of the market impact
parameter.
The pre-committed agent chooses to liquidate at T, and thus he is
obliged to choose at t = 0 a specific model for the entire [0, T ] . As mentioned
earlier, he chooses (3.35) and (3.36), with λˆ reflecting his best guess at t = 0
for the value of the parameter in the future period (τ1, T ].
The forward agent exhibits different behavior, choosing not to commit
at t = 0 to any parameter selection beyond the (a priori known) revision time
τ1. Furthermore, she does not impose any full-liquidation horizon but, rather,
chooses an initial criterion U (x, r, 0).
To draw meaningful comparisons for the two agents, we assume that
their initial conditions coincide, i.e. for (x, r) ∈ R+ × R,
U (x, r, 0) = V (x, r, 0;T ) ,
with V (x, r, 0;T ) as in previous section for the cases (i)-(iii), corresponding
to different regimes of λˆ. In other words, the forward agent chooses as her
initial datum to be the value function of the naive one. Note that this initial
choice for the forward agent does induce indirect dependence on both λˆ and T,
since V (x, r, 0;T ) is the solution of the backward optimization problem over
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[0, T ] for model (3.35), (3.36). This is unavoidable, if we want to compare the
behaviors and policies of the two agents.
3.4.1 Comparative performance metrics
To draw comparisons between the naive and the forward agents, we
introduce two performance metrics, denoted by R10(x, r) and R20(x, r).
• Metric R10(x, r) is defined as
R10(x, r) := E
[
Uτ (Xζ
a
τ , R
ζa
τ )
]
− V (x, r, 0) ,
and measures the discrepancy between the actual average performance
and the perceived optimal performance at t = 0.
• Metric R20(x, r) is defined as
R20(x, r) := E
[
Uτ (Xζ
a
τ , R
ζa
τ )
]
− sup
ζ
E
[
Uτ (Xζτ , Rζτ )
]
,
and measures the discrepancy between the actual average performance
and the true optimal performance in hindsight, with the full knowledge
of the underlying model. The metric R20(x, r) can be interpreted as the
“regret” of the trading agent for not having taken the genuine optimal
policy under the true measure P that is not fully known at t = 0.
Here, the expectation is taken with respect to P, under which λ1 ∈ Fτ1 is
correctly modeled. The criterion Uτ (x, r) and the evaluation horizon τ vary
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for different problems. For instance, for the naive agent, τ = T is the pre-
specified liquidation horizon, and Uτ (x, r) = −e−r, since Xζτ = 0 always holds
for any admissible ζ, under the singular terminal condition v(x, r) in (3.5).
On the other hand, for a forward agent with model revision time
τ1 < T (λ0, k), the evaluation horizon τ = T1 ∈ Fτ1 is the revised liquidation
horizon, whereas the criterion Uτ (x, r) = U1(x, r, T1) ∈ Fτ1 is the correspond-
ing forward performance criterion at T1.
We first examine R10(x, r) for the naive agent. Recall that the per-
ceived value function V (x, r, 0) is calculated for cases (i)-(iii) under the t = 0
perceived model (3.35) and (3.36).
To compute the actual average performance of the naive agent, we
notice that under the true measure P,
E
[
−e−Rζ
a
T
]
= E
[
E
[
−e−Rζ
a
T
∣∣∣Fτ1]] = E [V 1(Xζaτ1 , Rζaτ1 , τ1)]
= E
−exp
−Rζaτ1 +
√
λ1
2
(
Xζ
a
τ1
)2
coth
(
T − τ1√
2λ1
) , (3.42)
where Rζ
a
T is the terminal revenue generated by the strategy ζa over [0, T ], and
Rζ
a
τ1 , X
ζa
τ1 are the revenue and remaining inventory to liquidate at τ1.
The exact value of the expectation in (3.42) is in general unknown,
unless we further specify how the Brownian motion over [0, τ1) (as it appears
in Rζaτ1 ) is correlated with λ1 under the true measure P.
Nevertheless, we can make qualitative comparisons between this true
average performance and the perceived performance. For instance, if λ1 = λˆ
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a.s., under P, then, the true performance coincides with the perceived one, as
expected.
Another intuitive observation is that, since the function
f(λ1) =
√
λ1
2
(
Xζ
a
τ1
)2
coth
(
T − τ1√
2λ1
)
is increasing in λ1 (notice that Xζ
a
τ1 is a deterministic constant that does not
depend on λ1), we can conclude that if λ1 ≥ λˆ a.s., the actual performance
would be dominated by the perceived performance on average, and vice versa.
This is an intuitive fact, as in a market with unfavorable liquidation
condition (e.g., price impact would increase with high probability), even if
the agent makes direct response to the realized market condition λ1 ∈ Fτ1 , he
may still undergo tremendous loss compared to what he has perceived at t = 0.
Such instability of performance is due to the “stubbornness to a fixed criterion”
that cannot incorporate the unexpected market changes along real-time in a
consistent manner.
3.4.2 Regret and the forward approach
As it was shown in the previous section, the metric R10(x, r) for the
naive agent can be positive or negative, depending on whether the true future
market condition is sufficiently better or worse than initially perceived in a
reasonable way.
Next, we consider the forward liquidation behavior under the two in-
troduced metrics and eventually demonstrate its stability property under both
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of the two metrics.
For a forward agent who revises the model parameter before the solv-
ability time, i.e., τ1 < T (λ0, k), we have derived the actual strategy she would
follow, ζ∗t for t ∈ [0, τ1) and ζ1,∗t for t ∈ [τ1, T1). Denote such strategy by ζa,∗,
with
ζa,∗t := ζ∗t 1{t<τ1} + ζ
1,∗
t 1{τ1≤t<T1}.
We first consider the metric R10(x, r) for the forward liquidation behav-
ior. Recall that we have chosen U(x, r, 0) = V (x, r, 0),
On the other hand, the actual average performance of the forward agent
is
E
[
U
(
Xζ
a,∗
T1 , R
ζa,∗
T1 , T1
)]
= E
[
E
[
U
(
Xζ
a,∗
T1 , R
ζa,∗
T1 , T1
) ∣∣∣ Fτ1]]
= E
[
U
(
Xζ
a,∗
τ1 , R
ζa,∗
τ1 , τ1
) ∣∣∣ Xζa,∗0 = x, Rζa,∗ = r] = U(x, r, 0).
It hence follows that R10(x, r) = 0 for the forward agent.
To examine the regret metric, we now focus on the hypothetical value
function V True(x, r, t), which can be computed based on the true full model
under P.
We solve this virtual problem with backward induction, as it is appli-
cable in the current scenario; i.e., we first solve the problem
V True (x, r, τ1;λ1) := esssup
ζ
E
[
U
(
XζT1 , R
ζ
T1 , T1
) ∣∣∣ Xζτ1 = x, Rζτ1 = r, Fτ1] .
(3.43)
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Here, the forward utility U(x, r, T1) is constructed forward in time, such
that
U(x, r, τ1) = esssup
ζ
E
[
U
(
XζT1 , R
ζ
T1 , T1
) ∣∣∣ Xζτ1 = x, Rζτ1 = r, Fτ1] , a.s..
(3.44)
According to Theorem 3.2.2, conditional on Fτ1 , the solution U(x, r, T1)
to problem (3.44) exists, and the essential supremum is attained by ζ1,∗. It
follows, by the uniqueness of essential supremum, V true(x, r, τ1) = U(x, r, τ1)
a.s, under P.
By backward induction, solving the problem over [0, τ1) using such
intermediate value function V true(x, r, τ1) gives the true optimal value at t = 0,
namely,
V True(x, r, 0) = sup
ζ
E
[
V True
(
Xζτ1 , R
ζ
τ1 , τ1
)∣∣∣ Xζ0 = x, Rζ0 = r]
= sup
ζ
E
[
U
(
Xζτ1 , R
ζ
τ1 , τ1
)∣∣∣ Xζ0 = x, Rζ0 = r] = U(x, r, 0),
with the last equality, again, follows from Theorem 3.2.2. Hence, we have
shown zero regret for the forward liquidation behavior.
The study of the regret metric R20(x, r) for the naive agent, similar to
that of R10(x, r), requires more specific knowledge of the interaction between
the Brownian motion and λ1, under the true measure P. Nonetheless, it is
clear that although the naive agent reacts promptly at τ1 to the true model
when it is revealed, the overall policy ζa implemented is only one admissible
policy. Therefore, in general, such policy cannot outperform the optimal policy
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computed under the true measure P, which leads to R20(x, r) ≤ 0 for the naive
agent, in contrast with the zero regret stability under the forward approach.
3.4.3 Comparison under adverse market conditions
The forward approach has demonstrated sound stability under the two
metrics R10(x, r) and R20(x, r), which is generally lacking under the classical
optimization framework. In this section, we will further show that the for-
ward agent outperforms the naive agent in terms of the liquidation revenue,
under unanticipated adverse market condition that mostly concerns the trad-
ing agents (e.g., the 2010 Flash Crash). Such unfavorable market condition
corresponds to that a large price impact λ1 ∈ Fτ1 is realized at t = τ1. The
naive agent would nonetheless have a full liquidation at T , regardless of the
adverse market condition. The forward agent, on the other hand, has the abil-
ity to endogenously determine the revised liquidation horizon and the volume
to trade, which allows her to obtain higher expected liquidation revenue with
comparable variance, as we will show next.
Recall that we have taken U(x, r, 0) = V (x, r, 0) for the forward agent.
Then, for case 1 in section 3.2 (i.e., τ1 < T (λ0, k)), direct computation yields
that the forward and the naive agents have the same optimal policy , i.e.,
ζ∗t = ξ∗t , for t ∈ [0, τ1). Moreover, both of them execute their policies over
[0, τ1) in the underlying market with the common parameter λ0. It follows
that the two agents have the same (non-zero) inventory and revenue at t = τ1,
denoted by X∗τ1 and R∗τ1 , respectively. We also denote their terminal revenue
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by Rn,∗T and R
f,∗
T1 , with T1 given as in (3.41) corresponding to m1 < 1 (i.e., λ1
large). Notice that
Rn,∗T = R∗τ1 − λ1
∫ T
τ1
(
ξ1,∗t
)2
dt+
∫ T
τ1
Xn,∗t dWt,
and
Rf,∗T = R∗τ1 − λ1
∫ T1
τ1
(
ζ1,∗t
)2
dt+
∫ T1
τ1
Xf,∗t dWt,
with Xn,∗t , Xf,∗t being the inventory processes for the naive and forward agent,
after the model revision time τ1. As the revenue at τ1 is the same for both
agents, we aim to compare the conditional mean revenue E[Rn,∗T |Fτ1 ] and
E[Rf,∗T1 |Fτ1 ], as well as the conditional variance Var[Rn,∗T |Fτ1 ] and Var[Rf,∗T1 |Fτ1 ].
For the former, due to λ1, T1 ∈ Fτ1 , we obtain
E
[
Rf,∗T1 |Fτ1
]
−E
[
Rn,∗T |Fτ1
]
= E
[
λ1
∫ T
τ1
(
ξ1,∗t
)2
dt
∣∣∣Fτ1]−E[λ1 ∫ T1
τ1
(
ζ1,∗t
)2
dt
∣∣∣Fτ1]
= 12
(
X∗τ1
)2∫ T
τ1
cosh2 T−t√2λ1
sinh2 T−τ1√2λ1
dt−
∫ T1
τ1
sinh2 T1−t√2λ1
cosh2 T1−τ1√2λ1
dt

=
√
2λ1
4
(
X∗τ1
)2coth T − τ1√
2λ1
− tanh T1 − τ1√
2λ1
+
T−τ1√
2λ1
sinh2 T−τ1√2λ1
+
T1−τ1√
2λ1
cosh2 T1−τ1√2λ1
 .
Using that
T1 = τ1 +
√
2λ1 tanh(−1)

√√√√ λˆ
λ1
coth T − τ1√
2λˆ
 , (3.45)
from (3.41), for the case m1 < 1, we conclude with
E
[
Rf,∗T1 |Fτ1
]
− E
[
Rn,∗T |Fτ1
]
→∞, as λ1 →∞.
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Therefore, the (conditional) mean revenue of the forward agent is higher than
that of the naive agent, if the unanticipated price impact is large. To examine
the (conditional) variance, we first notice that, due to λ1, T1 ∈ Fτ1 ,
Var[Rf,∗T1 |Fτ1 ] = E
[∫ T1
τ1
(
Xf,∗t
)2
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
=
(
X∗τ1
)2 ∫ T1
τ1
cosh2 T1−t√2λ1
cosh2 T1−τ1√2λ1
dt
= 12
(
X∗τ1
)2√2λ1 tanh T1 − τ1√2λ1 + T1 − τ1cosh2 T1−τ1√2λ1
 .
Again, by (3.45), we obtain the limit
Var[Rf,∗T1 |Fτ1 ]→
(
X∗τ1
)2√
2λˆ coth T − τ1√
2λˆ
, as λ1 →∞.
On the other hand, for the naive agent, we have
Var[Rn,∗T |Fτ1 ] = E
[∫ T
τ1
(Xn,∗t )
2
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ1
]
=
(
X∗τ1
)2 ∫ T
τ1
sinh2 T−t√2λ1
sinh2 T−τ1√2λ1
dt
−→
(
X∗τ1
)2 T − τ1
3 , as λ1 →∞,
by dominated convergence theorem. The above results suggest that the for-
ward agent outperforms the naive agent in unanticipated catastrophic market
conditions (i.e., λ1 → ∞), by achieving higher expected liquidation revenue
with comparable variance. The variance of her revenue as well as that of
the naive agent both approach to some pre-determined constants, as the new
market price impact becomes significantly large.
One intuitive explanation for such superiority of the forward approach
is based on the metric R10(x, r) = 0, as shown before. Regardless of the the
future market condition, the forward agent can always deliver a pre-chosen
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performance V (x, r, 0), by consistently revising the liquidation criterion, the
liquidation horizon and the volume to trade. However, the naive agent typi-
cally experiences R10(x, r) < 0 when facing unanticipated adverse market con-
ditions, due to the stringent commitment to the terminal criterion (3.5) set at
t = 0.
Another possible explanation relates to the discontinuity of the realized
strategy ζa,∗ at τ1 for the forward agent. Indeed, similar to the discontinuity
∆∗τ1(λ0, λˆ, λ1) defined for the naive agent, we define
∆f,∗τ1 (λ0, λˆ, λ1) = limt↓τ1 ζ
1,∗
t − lim
t↑τ1
ζ∗t ,
for the forward agent. It follows from direct computation that
∆f,∗τ1 (λ0, λˆ, λ1) ≷ ∆
∗
τ1
(
λ0, λˆ, λ1
)
≷ 0, if λ0 ≷ λ1.
This result implies that, compared to the naive agent, the forward agent can
take more advantage of the new market conditions, by increasing (decreasing)
the trading rate with a larger magnitude if the market turns out to be favorable
(adverse, respectively) for the liquidation activity.
3.5 Sequential “real-time” model updating and forward
liquidation
We now present the construction of the forward performance process in
general multi-period setting. It is a direct extension of the previous two-period
setting where the market parameter shifts once at τ1.
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• At t = 0, the trading agent starts with an initial criterion U (x, r, 0) ,
and assesses the market impact parameter λ0 for [0, τ1) , with τ1 ∈ F0.
The time τ1 is the first time that the market impact parameter will be
reassessed, and it is known at t = 0. The time period [0, τ1) is subjective,
as it reflects how long the agent would remain confident in the t = 0
estimated market parameter λ0.
The initial criterion is taken to be of the form
U (x, r, 0) = − exp
(
−r + k0x2
)
,
(x, r) ∈ R+ × R, for some k0 > 0.
The choice of such initial criterion is flexible enough to cover several
interesting scenarios. For instance, it may be taken to coincide with the initial
condition V (x, r, 0), indicating that the client would like to achieve a pre-
specified performance. The forward approach allows the agent to deliver such
performance to the client, due to the first metric R10(x, r) = 0 as we have
shown. It is also possible for the criterion U(x, r, 0) to have implicit dependence
on some pre-chosen liquidation time T , through the parameter k0 > 0. This
follows from the reconciliation of the forward and the classical liquidation
problems discussed earlier. A third interesting choice for U(x, r, 0), as we
have observed, is to take into account the initial trading profile the client
preferred. Indeed, given λ0 > 0 and x > 0 at t = 0, k0 (hence U(x, r, 0)) is
uniquely determined by the initial (preferred) trading rate ζ∗0 of the client (cf.
(3.28)). The forward agent then takes it as an input and outputs a consistent
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trading pattern for later times, by solving sequentially the forward liquidation
problems in real-time.
Starting at t = 0, the agent solves the first inverse liquidation problem
P (λ0, k0; 0) . According to Theorem 3.2.2, if its solvability time T (λ0, k0) ≤ τ1,
then trading stops at T (λ0, k0) . Let m0 = k0
√
2
λ0
, then, if m0 < 1, there is
non-zero inventory left, X∗T (λ0,k0) > 0, while if m0 ≥ 1, full liquidation occurs
optimally with X∗T (λ0,k0) = 0, and the liquidation program stops.
The more interesting case is when model revision happens before the
liquidation problem stops. That is T (λ0, k0) > τ1, then clearly X∗τ1 > 0. and
there will be non-zero inventory left at the first model revision time τ1 at which
the market parameter λ1 ∈ Fτ1 is revealed. We will continue with this case.
• At t = τ1 ∈ F0, the agent considers the inverse liquidation problem
P (λ1, k1; 0) , with λ1 ∈ Fτ1 being the actual, realized value of the market
impact parameter and constant k1 = k0G(τ1;m0,λ0)F (τ1;m0,λ0) ∈ F0.
From Theorem 3.2.2, we have that conditional on Fτ1 , the solution is given,
for t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + T (λ1, k1)) , by
U1 (x, r, t;ω) = − exp
(
−r + h1 (x, t;ω)
)
∈ Fτ1 ,
where h1 solves, for t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + T (λ1, k1)) the HJ equation
ht − 14λ1h
2
x +
1
2x
2 = 0,
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with h1 (x, τ1) = k1x2. Denote m1 := k1
√
2
λ1
, then, according to Lemma 3.2.1,
h1 (x, t) = k1x2
G (t− τ1;m1, λ1)
F (t− τ1;m1, λ1) ,
for t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + T (λ1, k1)). The solvability horizon T (λ1, k1) ∈ Fτ1 is given by
(3.15) in Lemma 3.2.1.
At t = τ1, the agent also needs to choose the next model revision time
τ2 ∈ Fτ1 . If m1 ≥ 1, and τ2 ≥ τ1 + T (λ1, k1), then full liquidation occurs
with X∗τ1+T (λ1,k1) = 0, and the liquidation program stops. Notice that m1 ≥ 1
implies that λ1 is relatively small, while τ2 being large indicates that the agent
is confident that the current market condition with small price impact would
last. It is hence intuitively reasonable to complete the liquidation program in
such long-standing favorable market conditions.
On the other hand, if m1 < 1, we assume that the agent chooses τ2 <
τ1 + T (λ1, k1) and, therefore, the forward liquidation program continues, with
the remaining inventory
X∗τ2 = X
∗
τ1F (τ2 − τ1;m1, λ1) > 0.
This assumption is reasonable, since m1 < 1 corresponds to a relatively large
λ1 that indicates adverse market condition for liquidation. The agent typically
would not commit to such λ1 for a long time, but rather, revise it before the
solvability horizon.
The forward liquidation program continues for n ≥ 3 as depicted above,
whenever at each model revision time τn ∈ Fτn−1 , there exists non-zero inven-
tory X∗τn > 0 left.
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3.6 Continuous time forward liquidation with market
parameters update
In this section, we consider the continuous time forward performance
process for the liquidation problem. Le Wt, t ≥ 0 be a standard Brownian
motion defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P) with the filtration Ft
satisfying the usual conditions.We consider the forward performance process,
as well as the inventory and revenue processes, given by, for t ≥ 0,
dU(x, r, t) = b(x, r, t)dt+ a(x, r, t)dWt,
and
dXζt = −ζtdt, dRζt = σtXζt dWt − λtζ2t dt, (3.46)
with U(x, r, 0) = u(x, r, 0), Xζ0 = x ∈ R+, and Rζ0 = r ∈ R. The pro-
cesses λt > 0 and σt > 0 are Ft-progressively measurable price impact pro-
cess and volatility process, respectively. We also assume that a(x, r, t) is Ft-
progressively measurable and continuously differentiable in the variable r.
Assuming that U(x, r, t) is smooth enough so that the Itoˆ-Ventzell for-
mula can be applied to U(Xζt , Rζt , t), for each admissible policy ζ, we then
obtain
dU(Xζt , Rζt , t) = b(Xζt , Rζt , t)dt+ a(Xζt , Rζt , t)dWt − Ux(Xζt , Rζt , t)ζtdt
+Ur(Xζt , Rζt , t)σtXtdWt − Ur(Xζt , Rζt , t)λtζ2t dt
+12Urr(X
ζ
t , R
ζ
t , t)σ2tX2t dt+ ar(X
ζ
t , R
ζ
t , t)σtXtdt
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=
(
b− Uxζt − Urλtζ2t +
1
2Urrσ
2
tX
2
t + arσtXt
)
dt+
(
UrσtXt + a
)
dWt,
where we have suppressed the arguments in the last equality.
For the process U(x, r, t) to be a forward performance process, we need
to further assume that the mapping r 7→ U(x, r, t) is strictly concave and
increasing, for fixed (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, τ), almost surely, with t = τ being
the solvability horizon to be determined. By the first and the second order
condition (since Ur > 0), we calculate the optimal trading rate as
ζ∗t = −
Ux(X∗t , R∗t , t)
2λtUr(X∗t , R∗t , t)
, (3.47)
and it should be nonnegative in a liquidation program. Since Ur > 0, we hence
obtain the constraint that Ux ≤ 0. Note that such constraint already exists in
the construction of the forward performance process in discrete time, through
the condition hx(x, t) ≥ 0, for all (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T (λ, k)).
Unlike the backward scenario, with the forward formulation, we are al-
lowed to choose the volatility process a(x, r, t) which determines the drift pro-
cess b(x, r, t) and, in turn, the dynamics of the performance process U(x, r, t).
Indeed, based on the (local) martingale property of U(X∗t , R∗t , t) and the (lo-
cal) supermartingale property of U(Xζt , Rζt , t), we can deduce that the drift
satisfies
b(x, r, t) = − Ux(x, r, t)
2
4λtUr(x, r, t)
− 12Urr(x, r, t)σ
2
t x
2 − ar(x, r, t)σtx2.
Therefore, the forward performance process U(x, r, t) satisfies the stochastic
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partial differential equation (SPDE)
dU(x, r, t) =
(
− Ux(x, r, t)
2
4λtUr(x, r, t)
−
(
σt
2 Urr(x, r, t)+ar(x, r, t)
)
σtx
2
)
dt+a(x, r, t)dWt,
(3.48)
with the terminal datum U(x, r, 0) = u(x, r, 0). The first natural step is to con-
sider the zero volatility case, i.e., a(x, r, t) ≡ 0. In this case, the SPDE(3.48)
reduces to
dU(x, r, t) = −
(
Ux(x, r, t)2
4λtUr(x, r, t)
+ 12Urr(x, r, t)σ
2
t x
2
)
dt. (3.49)
It is easy to see that the zero volatility case does not necessarily yield a time
monotone forward performance process. Another observation is that in the
constant parameters scenario, i.e., λt ≡ λ > 0 and σt ≡ σ > 0, the solution to
equation (3.48) is the deterministic function satisfying the HJB equation
Ut(x, r, t) +
Ux(x, r, t)2
4λUr(x, r, t)
+ 12Urr(x, r, t)σ
2x2 = 0, (3.50)
with initial datum U(x, r, 0) = u(x, r, 0), whose solvability has been studied
in Theorem 3.2.2. Next, we present another scenario where the SPDE (3.48)
has a unique well defined solution, under suitable conditions on the involved
parameter processes.
3.6.1 The coordinated variation parameters case
[1] studied the coordinated variation case, namely when σ2t λt = constant,
a case typically considered normal for periods where largest fraction of the
trading happens. Without loss of generality, we assume that σ2t λt = 1. Also,
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to make reasonable connection to the classical liquidation problem, we choose
the initial datum for the forward performance process to be the t = 0 value
function of the classical liquidation problem with λ = σ = 1. It is easy to see
that the following result holds for any u(x, r, 0) = −e−r+kx2 , k > 0, as usual.
Proposition 3.6.1. Suppose that the coefficients in equation (3.49) satisfy
the coordinated variation condition
σ2t λt = 1,∀ t > 0 a.s., (3.51)
and the initial datum is given by
u(x, r, 0) = − exp
(
−r + x
2
√
2
coth
(
T√
2
))
, (3.52)
for some constant T > 0. Then, for 0 < t < τ := inf{s > 0| ∫ s0 1λudu = T},
U(x, r, t) = − exp
−r + x2√
2
coth
T − ∫ t0 1λsds√
2
 (3.53)
is the unique solution to the equation (3.48) with the separable form, and the
optimal admissible inventory process is
X∗t = x exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1√
2λs
coth
(T − ∫ s0 1λudu√
2
)
ds
)
. (3.54)
Proof. We consider rescaling of time, i.e., let U(x, r, t) = u(x, r,
∫ t
0 σ
2
sds), for
a smooth deterministic function u(x, r, t) that satisfies (3.52). The equation
(3.49) and the coordinated variation condition (3.51) direct yield that
ut +
u2x
4ur
+ 12urrx
2 = 0,
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with initial condition (3.52). Within the separable family u(x, r, t) = −e−r+h(x,t),
we obtain the unique solution according to Lemma 3.2.1
u(x, r, t) = −e−r+ x
2√
2 coth(
T−t√
2 ),
with T > 0 being the solvability horizon. The solution (3.53) then follows
easily. The optimal trading rate can be derived from (3.47), i.e,
ζ∗t = −
Ux(X∗t , R∗t , t)
2λtUr(X∗t , R∗t , t)
= X
∗
t√
2λt
coth
T − ∫ t0 1λsds√
2
 ,
which is admissible as it is clearly nonnegative. This leads to the optimal
inventory process given in (3.54).
It is easy to see from (3.54) that the optimal trading strategy of the
forward agent does not necessarily lead to a full liquidation before or at the
desired calender time T , which is set by the client based on the information
(i.e., λ = σ = 1) at t = 0, and the solution of the classical problem (cf. (3.52)).
This is actually reasonable in a market with stochastic market coefficients.
Indeed, if ∫ t
0
1
λs
ds < T − ε, ∀t > 0, a.s., (3.55)
for some small ε > 0. Then, τ =∞, a.s., and we obtain a forward performance
process defined for all time. It is easy to show that there exists a positive
constant C, such that X∗t > C > 0,∀t > 0, a.s., based on (3.54). The
condition (3.55) may hold in a market with large price impact where the
consistent (optimal) strategy aiming to complete liquidation in finite time is
no longer available. On the other hand, if 0 < C1 < λt < C2 uniformly in
162
(t, ω)), then τ < ∞, and we can show X∗τ = 0. This implies, with moderate
market impact, it is always possible to complete liquidation in finite time and
maintain intertemporal consistency. However, τ may no longer coincide with
the pre-determined time T .
3.6.2 Convergence to the continuous time zero volatility forward
process
The multi-period forward performance process constructed in section
5 gives the criteria U(x, r, τn), n ≥ 1, provided that each model revision time
τn ∈ Fτn−1 is strictly before the solvability horizon T (λn−1, kn−1) ∈ Fτn−1 .
Notice that the initial condition and the solution to the HJ equation (3.16)
are both quadratic in the spatial variable within the solvability horizon and,
hence, such desirable construction of the performance criteria for all n ≥ 1
becomes feasible.
The continuing construction of the forward criteria allows us to study
the limiting process, as the update of the price impact parameters λn at each
τn is done more and more frequently. Indeed, we will show that under suitable
conditions on the parameter processes in the continuous time problem (3.46),
the discrete time forward criteria sequence U(x, r, τn) converges to the zero
volatility forward performance process that solves the equation (3.49). Recall
that U(x, r, τn) ∈ Fτn−1 , for n ≥ 1. Our convergence result hence shows the
close connection between the discrete time predictable forward performance
process and the continuous time zero volatility forward performance process,
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as the model revision period vanishes.
To establish such connection, we assume σt = 1, t ≥ 0, as in the multi-
period setting. It follows that in analogy to Proposition 3.6.1, the equation
(3.49) with the initial datum U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+k0x2 , k0 > 0, has an admissible
solution given by U(x, r, t) = −e−r+k(t;ω)x2 , if the nonegative function k(t;ω)
solves the (random) Riccati equation almost surely
dk(t)
dt
= k
2(t)
λt
− 12 , (3.56)
with k(0) = k0. We make the following assumption for λt in equation (3.56).
Assumption 1. λt, t ≥ 0, is continuous and satisfies inft≥0 λt > 0, a.s..
We next introduce the sequence of strictly increasing model revision
times τNn , n ≥ 0, that satisfies
lim
N→∞
sup
n≥0
|τNn+1 − τNn | = 0,
and τN0 ≡ 0, for all N ≥ 1. Indeed, for each N ≥ 1 and each n ≥ 0, let
τNn+1 ∈ FτNn be given by
τNn+1 = τNn +
T (λNn , kNn ) ∧ 1
N + 1 ,
with T (λNn , kNn ) being the solvability horizon for the (n + 1)-th period. Here,
λNn = λτNn ∈ FτNn is the value of the price impact process λt at time τNn , while
kNn is constructed recursively forward in real-time through mNn = kNn
√
2
λNn
and
kNn+1 = kNn
G(τNn+1 − τNn ;mNn , λNn )
F (τNn+1 − τNn ;mNn , λNn )
,
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for n ≥ 0, with kN0 ≡ k0, for all N ≥ 1. Note that because each τNn is strictly
before the corresponding solvability horizon, it follows that kNn > 0 is well
defined, for all N ≥ 1, n ≥ 0. Finally, for each N ≥ 1, denote by kN the
mapping form [0, limn→∞ τNn ) into R+, obtained as the the linear interpolation
of the function τNn 7→ kNn , n ≥ 0. Then, we have the following convergence
result.
Theorem 3.6.2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, there exist T ∗ > 0 and a
continuous function k : [0, T ∗) 7→ R+, such that, for any t ∈ (0, T ∗),
lim sup
N→∞ s∈[0,t]
|kN(s)− k(s)| = 0, a.s..
Moreover, k is uniquely determined by the Riccati equation (3.56) for t ∈
[0, T ∗), and
T ∗ = sup{t > 0 : there exists a bounded nonnegative solution
to equation (3.56) for s ∈ [0, t]}. (3.57)
Proof. We conduct the proof for each fixed ω ∈ Ω that does not belong to the
null set. Let C1 > k0 be a constant, and for each N ≥ 1, we construct the
sequence {kˆNn }n≥0 as follows
kˆNn = kNn∧τN , τN = inf{l ≥ 0 : kNl > C1},
with the convention inf ∅ = ∞. Then, it easily follows that 0 ≤ kˆNn ≤ C1, for
all N ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0. Notice also that kˆNn = kˆNn−1 for n > τN . Hence, we only
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consider 1 ≤ n ≤ τN , and obtain
∣∣∣kˆNn − kˆNn−1∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣kˆNn−1G(τNn − τNn−1;mNn−1, λNn−1)F (τNn − τNn−1;mNn−1, λNn−1) − kˆNn−1
∣∣∣∣∣
= kˆNn−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
cosh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
− 1
mNn−1
sinh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
cosh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
−mNn−1 sinh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= kˆNn−1
∣∣∣∣∣mNn−1 − 1mNn−1
∣∣∣∣∣
sinh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
cosh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
−
√
2kˆNn−1√
λNn−1
sinh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
≤
√2(kˆNn−1)2√
λNn−1
+
√
λNn−1
2
 sinh
τNn −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
cosh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
−
√
2kˆNn−1√
λNn−1
sinh τ
N
n −τNn−1√
2λNn−1
.
Hence, we can find some constant C > 0 that only depends on C1 and inft≥0 λt,
such that |kˆNn − kˆNn−1| ≤ C(τNn − τNn−1), for all n ≥ 0, as N → ∞. Denote
δ1 := lim infN→∞ τN . Then, since we have shown that the linear interpolation
functions {kN}N≥1 are uniformly Lipschitz, it follows that δ1 > 0. We assume
for now that δ1 < ∞. By Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem, we conclude that {kN}N≥1
is compact in C([0, δ1]), and kN(δ1)→ C1, as N →∞.
Now consider any convergent subsequence of {kN}N≥1, and denote its
limit function by k(t), for t ∈ [0, δ1]. For any fixed t ∈ (0, δ1) and N ≥ 1 that
is sufficiently large, denote j(N) = max{n ≥ 0 : τNn < t}. Then, we divide by
τNj(N)+1 − τNj(N) on both sides of the recursive equation that connects kˆNj(N+1)
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and kˆNj(N)
kˆNj(N+1) − kˆNj(N) = kˆNj(N)

cosh τ
N
j(N)+1−τNj(N)√
2λN
j(N)
− 1
mN
j(N)
sinh τ
N
j(N)+1−τNj(N)√
2λN
j(N)
cosh
τN
j(N)+1−τNj(N)√
2λN
j(N)
−mNj(N) sinh
τN
j(N)+1−τNj(N)√
2λN
j(N)
− 1
 ,
and let N → ∞, to obtain that k(t) satisfies the Riccati equation (3.56)
at t. Therefore, we conclude that k(t) solves the equation (3.56) for t ∈
[0, δ1]. Notice that the solution to equation (3.56) is unique in the family
of bounded nonnegative functions, as follows from the standard contraction
argument. Therefore, we conclude that kN converges to k in C([0, δ1]), the
unique bounded nonnegative solution to equation (3.56), as N →∞.
Choosing an increasing sequence {Cm}m≥1, with limm→∞Cm =∞, and
repeating the above constructions, we obtain an increasing sequence {δm}m≥1,
such that kN converges to k in C([0, δm]), as N → ∞, and k satisfies equa-
tion (3.56) for t ∈ [0, δm]. Let T ∗ := limm→∞ δm, we conclude that k satisfies
equation (3.56), for t ∈ [0, T ∗). Assume that there exists a bounded non-
negative solution to equation (3.56) for t ∈ [0, T ′], with T ′ > T ∗. Then, it
follows that T ∗ < ∞ and hence, δm < ∞, for all m ≥ 0, and such solution
has to coincide with k on every [0, δm], due to the uniqueness of a bounded
nonnegative solution to equation (3.56). However, when δm < ∞, we have
kN(δm)→ k(δm) = Cm, which converges to infinity as m→∞. This leads to
a contradiction and thus, T ∗ satisfies (3.57). It is clear that T ∗ is also uniquely
determined by (3.57).
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Chapter 4
Forward optimal liquidation with market
parameter shift: the general case
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide the companion work to the forward optimal
liquidation problem discussed in the previous chapter. The contributions of
the current work are twofold. In terms of the solution to the forward liqui-
dation problem, we present more general results that fully accommodate the
quadratic case in the previous chapter for various formulations, namely, the
single inverse problem formulation, the multi-period forward optimal liquida-
tion formulation and finally, the continuous time forward performance process
formulation. These generalizations reveal that the initial performance crite-
rion in the previous work, which includes the t = 0 value function of the
classical optimal liquidation problem, is only one specific choice from a much
larger family of admissible initial conditions presented in this work for the the
forward processes.
The second contribution of this work is to present new insights on clas-
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sical optimal liquidation problem that has been studied extensively in recent
years. The literature on the liquidation problem has shown various interests,
including both the single agent optimal liquidation in rather general market
settings ([1],[4], [11], [26] and [28]) and the mean filed game formulation ([9],
[31]). In the classical optimal liquidation setting, it becomes almost conven-
tional to impose a singular terminal condition to guarantee full liquidation
by a fixed time T , which yields an optimal strategy that unwinds all possible
shares by T . However, in reality, the total amount of shares of any stock is
finite in the market, and hence an agent should only be concerned about full
liquidation of initial inventory with a finite upper bound. Under the condition
that the initial inventory is bounded from above, the forward optimal liqui-
dation formulation gives rise to a classical optimal liquidation problem with a
regular terminal condition to guarantee full liquidation by any fixed time T .
Moreover, the t = 0 value function is higher under the regular terminal con-
dition than that under the singular terminal condition. This is a reasonable
consequence, since choosing to fully liquidate any amount of initial inventory,
even it is virtual, is a stringent requirement on the agent’s optimal strategy
and, hence, decreases the optimal value. Another interesting fact under the
forward formulation is that the liquidation horizon is endogenously determined
by the initial normalized trading rate and the market price impact parameter.
We obtained the intuitive result that liquidation can be complete earlier if the
initial trading is relatively fast, and if the market is relatively liquid. It is in
contrast with the typical classical setting (see e.g., [52], [53]) where liquidation
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horizon coincides with the pre-determined T for any initial inventory and any
market condition.
Our analysis is based on the study of the existence and uniqueness of
the classical solution to a Hamilton-Jacobi equation with a state dependent
Hamitonian that is concave in the gradient, and with a not necessarily convex
initial condition. In particular, we examine in detail under what conditions the
method of characteristics can be applied to give a smooth solution. Obviously,
a global solution (up to any finite time T ) does not exist in general, and
one contribution of the current paper is to give a class of admissible initial
datum under which the HJ equation has a unique classical solution up to an
explicitly determined time horizon. This time horizon for solvability depends
on both the shape of the initial datum and the parameters in the HJ equation.
Moreover, in the special case of quadratic initial datum, including the finite
and infinite horizon classical optimal liquidation problems as in [53] and [52],
we obtain the tight bound on the solvability horizon, and fully recover the
existing results. Working with the suitable class of initial conditions, we can
also show that the classical solution to the HJ equation has the same properties
as its initial condition at any time within the solvability horizon. This self-
similarity enables us to provide a continuing construction of the multi-period
forward performance process recursively forward in real-time, similar to the
quadratic case discussed in the previous chapter.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 4.2, we restate
the results of the classical finite horizon liquidation problem for completeness
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and also set up the model dynamics for later discussion. Section 4.3.1 provides
the main result for the single inverse liquidation problem and the its connec-
tion to the classical liquidation problem with non-singular terminal condition.
In section 4.3.2, we incorporate real-time model updating and recursively con-
struct the intertemporally consistent forward performance process in discrete
time. Finally, section 4.3.3 discusses the convergence of the discrete time
forward performance process to the continuous time zero volatility forward
performance process, in the limit case as the model revision period shrinks to
zero.
4.2 Classical approach
The optimal liquidation problem in continuous time has been analyzed
for finite and infinite horizon by Schied et al. [53] and [52], respectively. In
this section, we briefly recall the results in [53], and will address more on the
connections between the classical (backward) scenario and the forward scenario
in the sequel. For simplicity, we consider liquidation of only one single asset
within a finite horizon T > 0. Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped
with a filtration Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , that satisfies the usual conditions, the price
follows the dynamics
Pt = P0 + σWt + γ(Xt −X0) + λX˙t,
where Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is the standard Brownian motion, while γ and λ are
the permanent and temporary price impact parameters, respectively. Under
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the assumption that the inventory process Xt is absolutely continuous, i.e.,
Xt = x − ∫ t0 ξsds for some admissible trading rate ξ, and that the liquidation
completes at T , the terminal revenue RT (ξ) can be calculated as
RT (ξ) =
∫ T
0
ξtPtdt = P0x− γ2x
2 + σ
∫ T
0
XtdWt − λ
∫ T
0
ξ2t dt.
Therefore, the two processes involved in the stochastic control problem are
Xξt := x−
∫ t
0
ξsds, (4.1)
Rξt := r + σ
∫ t
0
XξsdWs − λ
∫ t
0
ξ2sds, (4.2)
where 0 ≤ t ≤ T , x > 0 is the initial inventory and r ∈ R is the initial revenue.
Now consider the exponential utility U(r) = −e−r, and we want to maximize
the expected utility of terminal revenue, i.e., define
V (x, r, 0;T ) = sup
ξ
E
[
− e−RξT
∣∣∣∣Xξ0 = x,Rξ0 = r].
Applying Dynamic Programming Principle and Itoˆ’s lemma to the process
V (Xξt , Rξt , t;T ), we derive that the deterministic function V (x, r, t) satisfies
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
Vt +
1
2σ
2x2Vrr + sup
ξ
(−λξ2Vr − ξVx) = 0, (4.3)
with the terminal conditions
V (0, r, T ) = −e−r,
V (x, r, T ) = −∞, for x > 0.
(4.4)
The first condition is due to definition of value function V , whereas the second
condition follows from the fact that the liquidation should be completed before
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T ; otherwise an infinite penalty will be imposed. The HJB equation (4.3) gives
the value function (setting σ = 1)
V (x, r, t;T ) = − exp
(
− r +
√
λ
2x
2 coth T − t√
2λ
)
. (4.5)
In addition, the optimal trading rate in the classical setting is given by
ξ∗t = −
Vx(X∗t , R∗t , t)
2λVr(X∗t , R∗t , t)
= 1√
2λ
X∗t coth
T − t√
2λ
.
This quantity is positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , a desired property of the trading rate
in the liquidation problem. Solving (4.1), we get the optimal inventory process
X∗t =
x sinh
(
T−t√
2λ
)
sinh
(
T√
2λ
) . (4.6)
It satisfies the condition XT = 0.
We notice that the above classical backward problem is a single evalua-
tion problem, in the sense that at t = 0 the agent is given the trading horizon
T , the terminal utility function and the dynamics of the market parameter
processes (deterministic or stochastic), all of which are fixed over the entire
horizon [0, T ]. The optimal trading rule and the intermediate value functions
are then completely determined a priori at t = 0, as a consequence of the back-
ward reasoning of the classical approach. Such framework would fail in the
case where the agent is in a volatile market with unanticipated time-varying
market parameters, or his estimates of the market parameters are not correct
at t = 0 even if their true values stay unchanged.
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To overcome the model commitment issue under the single evaluation
backward formulation, we adopt the forward performance process approach
in the following sections. The forward approach allows to incorporate the
real-time updates of the unanticipated market information into the trading
criterion, and gives rise to interteomparrly consistent trading behavior.
4.3 Forward approach
4.3.1 Single inverse problem
We present the idea, formulation and results regarding the optimal
liquidation problem under the forward performance process. In the first part,
we focus on the first period of the liquidation activity. In contrast to the
classical backward formulation, we aim to find a consistent terminal utility
for a given initial perfomance, and hence the problem considered herein can
be seen as the inverse of the classical problem. This problem also serves
as the foundation of the multi-period problem. Indeed, the general forward
optimal liquidation problem under discrete time model revision boils down to
addressing how to solve each single inverse liquidation problem, and how to
concatenate them to obtain a multi-period forward performance process. The
next theorem states the main result of the first inverse problem. For simplicity,
we take σ ≡ 1 henceforth.
Theorem 4.3.1. Assume that U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+g(x), with the function g ∈
C2(R+) satisfying g′(0), g′′(0) ∈ R, and that there exist positive constants a ≥
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b > 0 1 such that
sup
x>0
g′′(x) ≤ a and inf
x>0
g′(x)
x
≥ b. (4.7)
Then, the initial condition U(x, r, 0) is admissible in the sense that an optimal
pure liquidation policy exists under the forward performance process, for 0 ≤
t < T g(λ), where
T g(λ) :=
√
2λmin
(
tanh(−1)
( b√
2λ
∧ 1
)
, coth(−1)
( a√
2λ
∨ 1
))
, (4.8)
with the convention that tanh(−1)(1) = coth(−1)(1) =∞.
Proof. The time T g(λ) is the solvability horizon for the inverse liquidation
problem under the initial condition U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+g(x) and the price impact
parameter that would appear in the HJB equation. To characterize T g(λ)
more specifically, we note that in the current formulation, the (deterministic)
forward performance process satisfies
U(x, r, t) = sup
ξ
E
[
U(Xξs , Rξs, s)|Xξt = x,Rξt = r
]
,
with U(0, x, r) = −e−r+g(x), for 0 ≤ t ≤ s < T g(λ). Since the initial condition
U(x, r, 0) is of exponential form, it is reasonable to expect a similar function
form for the forward process U(x, r, t) = −e−r+h(x,t), with some function h to
be determined. Based on the definition for the forward performance process,
U(x, r, t) satisfies the HJB equation (4.3) with the initial condition U(0, x, r) =
1a ≥ b must hold; otherwise the condition g′(0) ∈ R would be violated
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−e−r+g(x). Hence, the function h(x, t) is the solution to the following Hamilton-
Jacobi equation
ht − 14λh2x + 12x2 = 0, x > 0, 0 < t < T g(λ),
h(x, 0) = g(x), x > 0.
(4.9)
First order condition yields the optimal strategy ξ∗t =
hx(X∗t ,t)
2λ , for 0 ≤ t <
T g(λ), and it is expected to be nonnegative in a liquidation program. There-
fore, we aim to look for the solvability horizon T g(λ) up to which the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation (4.9) has a unique C1,1 (R+ × [0, T g (λ))) solution with non-
negative spatial derivative for all 0 ≤ t < T g(λ).
We apply the method of characteristics (see, e.g., section 3.2.5 in [22])
to system (4.9), and obtain the following characteristic ODEs
dX(s)
ds
= − 12λP (s);
dP (s)
ds
= −X(s);
dh(X(s),s)
ds
= − 14λP 2(s)− 12X2(s),
(4.10)
where P (s) = hx(X(s), s), which yields that
X(s) = C1e
s√
2λ + C2e−
s√
2λ ,
P (s) = −√2λC1e
s√
2λ +
√
2λC2e−
s√
2λ .
(4.11)
Now, since P (0) = hx(X(0), 0) = g′(X(0)) = g′(x0) following from the initial
condition of (4.9), let s = 0 in (4.11), and we can get the two constants C1
and C2 
C1 =
x0− g
′(x0)√
2λ
2 ,
C2 =
x0+ g
′(x0)√
2λ
2 .
(4.12)
176
Then for any (x, t) ∈ R+×(0, T g(λ)), integration along the characteristic curve
gives
h(x, t) = h(x0, 0) +
∫ t
0
(
− 14λP
2(s)− 12X
2(s)
)
ds
= g(x0) +
√
2λ
2
(
C22e
− 2t√
2λ − C21e
2t√
2λ
)
+
√
2λ
2
(
C21 − C22
)
= g(x0)−
√
2λ
2
(
x20
2 +
g′(x0)2
4λ
)
sinh
( 2t√
2λ
)
+ x0g
′(x0)
2
(
cosh
( 2t√
2λ
)
− 1
)
.
(4.13)
We notice that in expression (4.13), to have a solution for any (x, t) ∈ R+ ×
(0, T g(λ)), it is necessary to represent the initial state x0 ∈ R+ by a unique
function of (x, t) ∈ R+× (0, T g(λ)). Under the assumption (4.7), we can prove
the existence and uniqueness of such a function. Indeed, following from (4.11)
and (4.12), the characteristic curve is
X(s) =
x0 − g′(x0)√2λ
2 e
s√
2λ +
x0 + g
′(x0)√
2λ
2 e
− s√
2λ ,
and to have X(t) = x for a given pair of (x, t), it is clear that
x0 cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g
′(x0)√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
= x. (4.14)
Now it remains to show that for any given (x, t) ∈ R+ × (0, T g(λ)), x0 ∈ R+
is uniquely determined through the equation
G(x0, t) = x,
where the function
G(x0, t) := x0 cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g
′(x0)√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
,
177
for any x0 ∈ R+, 0 < t < T g(λ).
Let 0 < t < T g(λ) be fixed. We consider the single variable function
G(·, t) : R+ −→ R defined above. From supx>0 g′′(x) ≤ a in condition (4.7)
and T g(λ) defined in (4.8), we know for x0 ∈ R+, 0 < t < T g(λ),
Gx0(x0, t) = cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g
′′(x0)√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0. (4.15)
Condition (4.7) infx>0 g
′(x)
x
≥ b > 0 further leads to 0 ≤ g′(0) < ∞, yielding
that G(0, t) ≤ 0. It remains to show that
G(x0, t)→∞, as x0 →∞ (4.16)
Proposition (B.1.1) in Appendix implies that for each ε > 0, there exist dε > 0,
such that g′(x) ≤ dε(x+ ε), for all x > 0. Hence,
G(x0, t) ≥ x0
(
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− dε√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
))
− εdε√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
. (4.17)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (4.16) to be valid is
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
≥ dε√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
(4.18)
for 0 < t < T g(λ). Recall from Proposition (B.1.1) dε =
√
2aK with K =
max{a2 , g
′(0)
2ε ,− c0ε2}. Then for large enough ε > 0, we obtain K = a2 and dε = a.
The sufficient condition therefore reduces to
a ≤
√
2λ coth
(
t√
2λ
)
for 0 < t < T g(λ), which is implied by the definition (4.8) of T g(λ). Therefore,
given any (x, t) ∈ R+ × (0, T g(λ)), we can find a unique x0 ∈ R+, the starting
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point of the characteristic curve passing through (x, t), and integrate along the
characteristic curve to obtain the function h(x, t) through (4.13).
After showing that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.9) has a unique
classical solution up to time T g(λ), the last constraint we need to consider is to
have nonnegative spatial derivative hx(x, t) for all (x, t) ∈ R+×(0, T g(λ)). Let
f(x, t) := hx(x, t), then the function f(x, t) is the solution to the quasilinear
equation 
ft − 12λffx + x = 0, x > 0, 0 < t < T g(λ),
f(x, 0) = g′(x), x ≥ 0.
(4.19)
Equation (4.19) can be solved by the method of characteristics as (4.9). Direct
calculation yields the same characteristic curve as in (4.14), and the solution
f(x(x0, t), t) = g′(x0) cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λx0 sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
. (4.20)
Then, a sufficient condition to have nonnegative value for f(x(x0, t), t) given
any (x, t) ∈ R+ × (0, T g(λ)) is therefore
g′(x0) cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λx0 sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
≥ 0. (4.21)
Definition of T g(λ) in (4.8) as well as the conditions (4.7) satisfied by the
function g(·) imply that (4.21) is valid for all (x0, t) ∈ R+ × (0, T g(λ)).
We conclude the proof by showing the uniqueness of the classical so-
lution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.9). To this end, we assume that
there are two solutions that are non-decreasing in x, h ∈ C1,1 (R+ × [0, T ))
and h˜ ∈ C1,1(R+ × [0, T˜ )), with T˜ > T, satisfying h (x, 0) = h˜ (x, 0) = g(x),
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x > 0. Then, H := h− h˜ satisfies, for (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T ) ,
Ht − 14
(
h2x − h˜2x
)
= Ht − 14Hx
(
hx + h˜x
)
= 0,
with H (x, 0) = 0. For the characteristics we have dX(t)
dt
= −hx(X(t),t)+h˜x(X(t),t)4λ0 ,
with hx (X (t) , t) + h˜x (X (t) , t) ≥ 0. It hence implies that for any X(t) =
x ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ), the initial value X(0) = x0 ≥ x ≥ 0. We conclude,
using H(X(t), t) = H(x0, 0) = 0, with x0 ≥ 0, that H ≡ 0 is the unique
solution up to time T. It then follows T = T˜ , and h(x, t) = h˜(x, t), for (x, t) ∈
R+ × [0, T ) .
Remark 4.3.1. The condition (4.7) can be interpreted as the following. Since
g′(x) = hx(x, 0) following from the equation (4.9), and hx(x, 0) is the trading
rate at time t = 0 with initial inventory x > 0, the condition
inf
x>0
g′(x)
x
≥ b > 0
then basically requires that the normalized initial trading rate (or the percent-
age with respect to initial inventory) should be uniformly bounded away from
zero. This is reasonable from practical point of view, as b > 0 can be taken as
δ/∆t, where δ is the minimal percentage of shares that are allowed to trade
in the market, and ∆t is the time discretization of the continuous time model.
If the initial trading rate is zero, then the starting time of trading is actually
postponed to some later time at which the above condition is satisfied.
Theorem 4.3.1 gives the condition for the ill-posed inverse liquidation
problem to be solvable over the time interval [0, T g(λ)), based on the analysis
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of the existence and uniqueness of solution to the HJ equation (4.9). In the
next proposition, we provide a verification argument to the inverse liquida-
tion problem and therefore complete the discussion for single-period forward
liquidation problem.
Theorem 4.3.2. Assume that U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+g(x), with g satisfying the
assumption in Theorem 4.3.1. Then, the process U(x, r, t) = −e−r+h(x,t) is a
forward performance process, for 0 ≤ t < T g(λ), where the function h(x, t) is
the unique classical solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation with nonnegative
spatial derivative
ht − 14λh2x + 12x2 = 0, x > 0, 0 < t < T g(λ),
h(x, 0) = g(x), x > 0,
(4.22)
and T g(λ) is given by (4.8). Moreover, the optimal liquidation strategy under
this forward performance process is
ξ∗t =
hx(X∗t , t)
2λ , (4.23)
and the corresponding optimal inventory process is
X∗t = X0 −
∫ t
0
ξ∗sds = X0 cosh
t√
2λ
− g
′ (X0)√
2λ
sinh t√
2λ
, (4.24)
with initial inventory X0 > 0. In particular, full liquidation can be achieved
under the forward optimal trading strategy (4.24) if and only if
T ∗ :=
√
2λ coth(−1)
(
g′(X0)√
2λX0
∨ 1
)
≤ T g(λ). (4.25)
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Proof. Let A be the admissible set that consists of all Ft-progressively mea-
surable processes ξ, such that ξt ≥ 0, for all t ∈
[
0, T ξ
)
,
∫ T ξ
0 ξ
2
sds < L (ξ) a.s.,
and E
∫ T ξ
0 (Xξs )2ds < ∞, with T ξ = inf
{
t > 0 : X0 =
∫ t
0 ξsds
}
, and L (ξ) > 0
being a constant that only depends on ξ.
The verification argument aims to show, for any 0 < T < T g(λ) ≤ ∞
and any admissible ξ ∈ A, the process U(Xξt∧T ξ , Rξt∧T ξ , t ∧ T ξ), t ∈ [0, T ] is a
supermartingale, while for the specific ξ∗ and T ∗ given in (4.23) and (4.25),
respectively, the process U(X∗t∧T ∗ , R∗t∧T ∗ , t ∧ T ∗), t ∈ [0, T ] is a martingale.
The upper bound of the horizon T ξ ∧ T g(λ) or T ∗ ∧ T g(λ) for the verification
argument is needed, since the function h(x, t) in the forward performance
process U(x, r, t) is only well defined for (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T g(λ)). We start by
applying Itoˆ’s lemma, and obtain, for every ξ ∈ A, and 0 ≤ t ≤ T < T g(λ),
that
U(Xξt∧T ξ , R
ξ
t∧T ξ , t ∧ T ξ) = U(x, r, 0) +
∫ t∧T ξ
0
Us(Xξs , Rξs, s)ds
−
∫ t∧T ξ
0
Ux(Xξs , Rξs, s)ξsds− λ
∫ t∧T ξ
0
Ur(Xξs , Rξs, s)ξ2sds
+12
∫ t∧T ξ
0
Urr(Xξs , Rξs, s)(Xξs )2ds+
∫ t∧T ξ
0
Ur(Xξs , Rξs, s)XξsdWs
= U(x, r, 0) +
∫ t∧T ξ
0
(
Us − Uxξs − λUrξ2s +
1
2Urr(X
ξ
s )2
)
ds+
∫ t∧T ξ
0
UrX
ξ
sdWs
where we have suppressed the arguments of U in the last equality. It follows
from the last equality and the fact h(x, t) solves the HJ equation (4.22) that
for ξ∗t =
hx(X∗t ,t)
2λ , the drift vanishes. For any other ξ ∈ A, the drift remains
nonpositive, giving the supermartingale property away from the optimum once
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we have shown the stochastic integral is a true martingale. We next show the
stochastic integral
∫ t∧T ξ
0
Ur(Xξs , Rξs, s)XξsdWs =
∫ t∧T ξ
0
e−R
ξ
s+h(Xξs ,s)XξsdWs,
is a true martingale, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T < T g(λ). It suffices to show the square
integrability
E
∫ T∧T ξ
0
e−2R
ξ
s+2h(Xξs ,s)(Xξs )2ds <∞,
for each admissible ξ ∈ A. Notice that for any 0 ≤ s ≤ T ξ, the inventory
process |Xξs | ≤ X0 uniformly in (s, ω), and
∣∣∣h(Xξs∧T ξ , s ∧ T ξ)∣∣∣ ≤ max(x,s)∈[0,X0]×[0,T ] |h(x, s)| <∞,
as T < T g(λ). It hence remains to show E
∫ T∧T ξ
0 e
−2Rξsds <∞. By admissibility
of ξ ∈ A, there exist constants Lξ, Kξ > 0, such that ∫ T g(λ)0 ξ2s∧T ξds < Lξ, a.s.,
and E
∫ T g(λ)
0 (Xξs∧T ξ)2ds < Kξ. Therefore, we obtain
E
∫ T∧T ξ
0
e−2R
ξ
sds = E
∫ T∧T ξ
0
exp
(
−2r − 2
∫ s
0
XξudWu + 2λ
∫ s
0
ξ2udu
)
ds
≤ e−2r+2λLξE
∫ T∧T ξ
0
e−2
∫ s
0 X
ξ
udWuds = e−2r+2λLξ
∫ T
0
E
[
e
−2
∫ s
0 X
ξ
u∧TξdWu
]
ds
≤ e−2r+2λLξ
∫ T
0
e2Kξds = e−2r+2λLξ+2KξT <∞,
where we have used the fact that the process
∫ s
0 X
ξ
u∧T ξdWu, 0 ≤ s ≤ T < T g(λ)
is a square integrable martingale with quadratic variation at most Kξ.
This completes the proof of showing the genuine martingality of the
stochastic integral for any ξ ∈ A. We next complete the verification argument
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by deriving the candidate optimal strategy ξ∗ and showing its admissibility.
Indeed, recall from the characteristic ODEs (4.10) that
X(t)−X(0) = − 12λ
∫ t
0
P (s)ds = −
∫ t
0
hx(X(s), s)
2λ ds. (4.26)
The proof of Theorem 4.3.1 guarantees that for any 0 ≤ t < T g(λ) and any
X(t) = x ≥ 0, there exists a unique initial value X(0) = x0 ≥ 0, such that
X(t) in (4.26) can be alternatively obtained through the characteristic curve
x = G(x0, t) as following
X(t) = X(0) cosh t√
2λ
− g
′ (X(0))√
2λ
sinh t√
2λ
. (4.27)
On the other hand, the above verification argument has shown that the (can-
didate) optimal inventory process X∗t starting from initial inventory X∗0 = X0
should satisfy, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗ ∧ T g(λ), that
X∗t −X0 = −
∫ t
0
ξ∗sds = −
∫ t
0
hx(X∗s , s)
2λ ds. (4.28)
A comparison of (4.26) and (4.28) therefore yield that the optimal inventoryX∗t
can be represented by (4.27) with a uniquely determined initial inventory X∗0 =
X(0) ≥ 0. Conversely, given any initial inventory X0 > 0, the process defined
by (4.27) with X(0) = X0 is the unique optimal inventory process under the
forward performance process U(x, r, t) = −e−r+h(x,t). Hence, we obtain the
conclusion (4.24) and in particular (4.25) after we show the admissibility of ξ∗
for generic initial function g(x) satisfying (4.7). When T g(λ) = T ∗ =∞ for a
specific function g(x) and a specific initial inventory X0 > 0, we can directly
check by (4.24) that ξ∗ = X0√2λe
− t√
2λ and, hence, admissibility easily follows.
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For any other choices of g(x) and inventory X0 > 0, we have T ∗ ∧T g(λ) <∞.
If T ∗ < T g(λ) ≤ ∞ or T ∗ = T g(λ) < ∞, then according to (4.24), both
X∗ and ξ∗ are uniformly bounded over the finite interval [0, T ∗], and hence∫ T ∗
0 ξ
∗
t
2dt <∞ and E ∫ T ∗0 (X∗t )2dt <∞. On the other hand, if T ∗ > T g(λ), it
follows from (4.24) that T ∗ = ∞, and that X∗ and ξ∗ are only defined over
the finite interval [0, T g(λ)) and remain uniformly bounded. The conditions∫ T ∗
0 ξ
∗
t
2dt =
∫ T g(λ)
0 ξ
∗
t
2dt < ∞ and E ∫ T ∗0 (X∗t )2dt = E ∫ T g(λ)0 (X∗t )2dt < ∞ are
also satisfied. Finally, in all above cases, ξ∗t ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t < T ∗ is guaranteed
by (4.24) and the construction of T g(λ) as in Theorem 4.3.1.
Remark 4.3.2. A simple scenario is when g′(0) = 0, which leads to T ∗ ≥ T g(λ).
Indeed, if g′(0) = 0, we have g′(x) ≤ ax, for all x > 0 and all a ≥ supx>0 g′′(x).
Comparing the expressions (4.8) and (4.25), we obtain
T ∗ =
√
2λ coth(−1)
(
g′(X0)√
2λX0
∨ 1
)
≥
√
2λ coth(−1)
(
a√
2λ
∨ 1
)
≥ T g(λ).
The scenario g′(0) = 0 includes both the classical finite and infinite horizon
liquidation problems under exponential utility ([53], [52]), as well as other
possible choices for the function g(x), for example, g(x) = ax2 + 1
x2+c , with
c > 0, or g(x) = ax2 − x2e−cx, with c > 0 and properly chosen constant a,
among others. In such scenario, there would be non-zero inventory at any time
strictly before the solvability horizon of the inverse liquidation problem.
In classical finite and infinite horizon liquidation problems, the full
liquidation time is independent of the initial inventory X0. This is also obvious
from (4.25), as for quadratic function g(x) = ax2, we have g′(X0)
X0
= 2a being a
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constant. However, intuitively, the quantity to liquidate should have an effect
on the liquidation time. In the forward framework, this is true, since the full
liquidation time T ∗ depends on the normalized initial trading rate g′(X0)
X0
(see
Remark 4.3.1) and its magnitude relative to the price impact parameter λ. It
is easy to see that the higher the normalized initial trading rate, the sooner
the liquidation would be completed. This is in compliance with the widely
observed “front-loaded” characteristic of most trading strategies. From the
perspective of market liquidity conditions, (4.25) indicates that the higher the
price impact parameter λ, i.e., less liquidity available in the market, the longer
the liquidation horizon would be, and full liquidation would only be possible
if T ∗ ≤ T g(λ). In the forward framework, these qualitative properties agree
well with practical intuition.
As shown by (4.25), it is possible to have T ∗ < T g(λ) or T ∗ ≥ T g(λ) by
properly choosing g(·), X0 and λ. An interesting consequence of the scenario
T ∗ < T g(λ) is that it is not necessary to impose a singular terminal condition
to guarantee a full liquidation as in most existing works (e.g., [53], [4], [28],
etc). Indeed, we may take U(x, r, T ∗) = −e−r+h(x,T ∗) as the terminal utility
function where h(x, t) is the solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.22)
with an appropriate initial condition g(·). This is a classical expected utility
maximization problem with the same optimal trading strategy (4.24) that fully
unwinds a range of initial inventory at T ∗. The terminal utility is non-singular
since Theorem 4.3.1 guarantees well-posedness of h(x, t) up to T g(λ) > T ∗. In
fact, the possibility of full liquidation under non-singular terminal condition
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basically results from g′(0) > 0 (see Remark 4.3.2 for otherwise). In the
next proposition, we examine the maximum initial inventory that could be
fully unwound by the associated time horizon T g(λ), given an admissible g(·)
function and a fixed market impact λ.
Another interesting observation is that specifying a function g(·) is
equivalent to specifying an initial trading rate (see Remark 4.3.1), which is
practically meaningful as a client may only know her preferred trading profile
at t = 0 when she comes to the trading agent, rather than being fully aware
of her future utility function. The agent can then come up with the consistent
trading behavior following this initial profile by solving the inverse liquidation
problem, and as a side result, we can also infer the non-singular terminal
criterion that is consistent with the client’s initial preference.
Proposition 4.3.3. Assume that the function g satisfies the assumption in
Theorem 4.3.1, and in addition, g′(0) > 0. Then, there exist 0 < X ≤ ∞
and an increasing function Z : [0, T g(λ)) → [0, X), such that, for any 0 <
T < T g(λ), and any initial inventory X0 ∈ [0, Z(T )], the full liquidation
can be achieved under the classical non-singular terminal utility U(x, r, T ) =
−e−r+h(x,T ) .
Proof. For a given admissible g(x) with g′(0) > 0, we define the function
f(X0) := X0 cosh
T√
2λ
− g
′(X0)√
2λ
sinh T√
2λ
,
for any X0 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ T < T g(λ). Then clearly, f(0) ≤ 0 and f(X0) is
strictly increasing in X0 due to the construction of T g(λ) in Theorem 4.3.1
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and that T g(λ) > T . Next, we show f(X0) → ∞, as X0 → ∞. Indeed,
since (4.8) implies a ≤ √2λ coth T g(λ)√2λ , we can find a constant d > 0 such that
a < d <
√
2λ coth T√2λ for 0 ≤ T < T g(λ). We also know from Proposition
(A.1) that g′(x) ≤ dε(x+ ε), for all x > 0, ε > 0, and for large enough ε0 > 0,
we obtain g′(x) ≤ a(x + ε0). Now it is easy to check for x > aε0d−a , we have
g′(x) ≤ a(x+ ε0) < dx. Hence, for X0 sufficiently large, we have
f(X0) ≥ X0
(
cosh T√
2λ
− d√
2λ
sinh T√
2λ
)
→∞
as X0 → ∞, for 0 ≤ T < T g(λ). We therefore conclude that there exists a
unique function Z(T ; g) ∈ [0,∞), such that f(Z(T ; g)) = 0 for any 0 ≤ T <
T g(λ), and any admissible g(x) with g′(0) > 0. Hence, Z(·; g) : [0, T g(λ)) →
[0,∞) is well defined, and Z(0; g) = 0. Also, due to the implicit function
theorem and the fact f ′(X0) > 0 for all 0 ≤ T < T g(λ), we know dZ(T ;g)dT exists.
Differentiation of the equation f(Z(T ; g)) = 0 with respect to T gives rise to
dZ(T ; g)
dT
(
cosh T√
2λ
− g
′′(Z(T ; g))√
2λ
sinh T√
2λ
)
= 1√
2λ
(
g′(Z(T ; g))√
2λ
cosh T√
2λ
− Z(T ; g) sinh T√
2λ
)
.
Direct check of the terms in the two parentheses shows that they are strictly
positive for 0 ≤ T < T g(λ), giving that dZ(T ;g)
dT
> 0, for any 0 ≤ T < T g(λ),
and any admissible g(·) with g′(0) > 0. Therefore, limT↑T g(λ) Z(T ; g) exists.
Finally, we notice by (4.24) that for fixed admissible g(·) with g′(0) > 0 and
fixed λ, if the initial inventory X̂0 > 0 can be fully unwound by some time
horizon T < T g(λ) under the optimal strategy (4.24), then for any initial
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inventory 0 < X0 ≤ X̂0, its corresponding full liquidation time stays within
[0, T ].
Obviously, in Proposition 4.3.3, X = limT↑T g(λ) Z(T ; g) is the max-
imum initial inventory that could be liquidated under the pre-chosen func-
tion g(·) and the market condition λ > 0. This maximum initial inventory
can be infinite in some scenarios, indicating that any initial inventory can be
fully liquidated by 0 < T < T g(λ), under the non-singular terminal utility
U(x, r, T ) = −e−r+h(x,T ). For instance, taking g(x) = x2 + x and 0 < λ < 2,
then
Z(T ; g) = 1√
2λ coth T√2λ − 2
,
and clearly, limT↑T g(λ) Z(T ; g) =∞. Nevertheless, our finding does not contra-
dict with the classical results under the singular terminal condition. Indeed,
in our framework, the full liquidation time T ∗ increases as the initial inven-
tory X0 increases, whereas in the classical setting, a fixed common liquidation
horizon T̂ is imposed for all initial inventory X0 > 0. If there exists such fixed
horizon T̂ > 0 in our framework, such that T ∗ ≤ T̂ < T g(λ) for all X0 > 0,
then this amounts to imposing a finite penalty to achieve full liquidation for
any inventory by a fixed time. If this could happen, then a comparison of
(4.8) and (4.25) yields infx>0 g
′(x)
x
> supx>0 g′′(x). Taking two constants C1,
C2, such that infx>0 g
′(x)
x
> C1 > C2 > supx>0 g′′(x), it is then easy to see
C1x− g′(0) < g′(x)− g′(0) < C2x,
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which leads to (C1−C2)x < g′(0), for all x > 0. This violates the assumption
that g′(0) is finite in Theorem 4.3.1 and Proposition 4.3.2.
Our results bring new insights to the classical optimal liquidation prob-
lem, in that, instead of specifying a singular terminal criterion, we can specify
an initial trading profile, and infer from that the consistent trading horizon
and the (possibly non-singular) consistent terminal criterion. The flexibility
to choose an initial trading profile is rooted in the flexibility of forward per-
formance process in terms of the initial condition, which is not possible in the
classical framework due to the backward construction.
Another interesting question related to the classical problem under the
forward formulation is as follows. Given any fixed time horizon T > 0, and any
initial inventory X0 ∈ [0, X], with X being the finite total number of shares in
the market, determine whether it is possible to choose a non-singular terminal
criterion at T , such that on one hand, full liquidation is guaranteed by T for
any X0 ∈ [0, X], and on the other, this criterion yields higher t = 0 value
compared to that under the classical singular terminal criterion. We provide
a positive answer following Proposition 4.3.3. First recall the fact that if an
initial inventory X̂0 can be fully liquidated by some time 0 < T < T g(λ)
following the forward optimal strategy (4.24), then any other initial inventory
0 < X0 ≤ X̂0 can also be fully liquidated by T following the strategy (4.24).
This observation implies that we can look for an admissible function g(·), such
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that the given pair (X,T ) satisfies both
X cosh T√
2λ
− g
′
(
X
)
√
2λ
sinh T√
2λ
= 0 (4.29)
and 0 < T < T g(λ), simultaneously. With such admissible function g(·),
according to Theorem (4.3.1) and Proposition (4.3.2), we have a unique non-
singular terminal criterion U(x, r, T ) = −e−r+h(x,T ) for all x ≥ 0 at the fixed
time T . Moreover, the corresponding optimal inventory process (4.24) achieves
full liquidation for any X0 ∈ [0, X] by T .
The solution g(·) to (4.29) is clearly not unique, and we only focus
on the quadratic case g(x) = ax2 + bx + c, with a, b > 0 and c ∈ R. The
condition b = g′(0) > 0 is necessary, as discussed in Remark 4.3.2. Notice
this case is fundamentally different from the quadratic case considered in the
previous chapter and the existing works (e.g., [53], [52]), due to the condition
g′(0) > 0. With the function g(·), the condition (4.29) reduces to 2a + b
X
=
√
2λ coth
(
T√
2λ
)
. This together with the condition 0 < T < T g(λ) gives rise to
one family of solutions among others, provided that
√
2λ < 2a <
√
2λ coth T√
2λ
,
2a+ b
X
=
√
2λ coth T√
2λ
,
and b > 0 are satisfied simultaneously. It is easy to check the above system
of equations are compatible and solutions exist. We next compare the t = 0
performance under the the non-singular terminal criterion associated to the
solution g(·) and the classical singular terminal criterion (4.4). First, for any
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initial inventory X0 ∈ [0, X], the full liquidation time under the optimal trad-
ing trajectory (4.24) is a deterministic time T ∗(X0) ≤ T < T g(λ) due to (4.25)
and the condition (4.29). The martingale property along the optimum under
the forward performance process therefore implies the t = 0 optimal value is
−e−r+g(x) = E
[
−e−R∗T∗(X0)+h(0,T ∗(X0))
∣∣∣∣R0 = r,X0 = x]
for all X0 = x ∈ [0, X], where we have applied the fact X∗T ∗(X0) = 0. On
the other hand, the classical problem takes the optimal strategy (4.6) which
unwinds all initial inventory X0 ∈ [0, X] exactly at the fixed time T . Hence,
its optimal t = 0 value is
−e−r+g˜(x) = E
[
−e−R∗T
∣∣∣∣R0 = r,X0 = x] ,
where the function g˜(x) =
√
2λ
2 x
2 coth T√2λ , according to the classical value
function (4.5). Direct computation then shows that for any solution (a, b)
that satisfies the system of equations, if
c ≤ b
2
4a−√2λ coth
(
T√
2λ
) < 0,
then g(x) ≤ g˜(x), which yields that given the same initial revenue and inven-
tory, the t = 0 optimal value under the non-singular terminal criterion exceeds
the optimal value under the classical singular terminal criterion, while both
criteria lead to full liquidation of all initial inventory X0 ∈ [0, X] by a common
fixed time T .
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4.3.2 Multi-period problem
Following [3], once we have the result for the single inverse liquidation
problem, the multi-period forward performance process can be constructed
recursively forward in time. In the multi-period setting, we also incorporate
model revision as in the previous chapter. The success of a continuing con-
struction of the forward performance process in the previous chapter is based
on the nice property that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.9) with quadratic
initial condition g(·) has a quadratic solution h(·, t), for any 0 ≤ t < T g(λ).
This self-similarity makes it possible to concatenate each single inverse liqui-
dation problem after a conditioning argument. In this section, we show that
for general initial datum g(·) that is not necessarily quadratic, the same self-
similarity property holds as well. More precisely, the unique classical solution
to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.9) stays in the same class as its initial
datum, which leads to a feasible concatenation of the solution to the single
inverse liquidation problem.
Proposition 4.3.4. Assume that the function g satisfies the conditions in
Theorem 4.3.1. Then, the unique classical solution h of the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (4.9) with nonnegative spatial derivative satisfies, for every 0 ≤ t <
T g(λ), that
inf
x>0
hx(x, t)
x
≥ b cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− b√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
) > 0, (4.30)
and also that
sup
x>0
hxx(x, t) ≤
a cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− a√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
) > 0. (4.31)
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Proof. In Theorem 4.3.1, we have shown that for each 0 ≤ t < T g(λ), the
mapping G(·, t) : R+ → R is well defined and strictly increasing, where
G(x0, t) = x0 cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g
′(x0)√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
,
for all x0 ∈ R+. Denote the spatial inverse of G(·, t) by x0 = x0(x, t), for
each x > 0, and 0 ≤ t < T g(λ), then the mapping x0(·, t) : R+ → R+ is well
defined and continuously differentiable with ∂x0
∂x
> 0, due to the construction of
T g(λ) in Theorem 4.3.1. Differentiating both sides of the characteristic curve
equation G(x0, t) = x with respect to x, we obtain
∂x0
∂x
= 1
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g′′(x0)√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
) ≤ 1
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− a√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
) .
(4.32)
Now, recall that hx(x, t) = f(x, t) in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, with
f(x(x0, t), t) = g′(x0) cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λx0 sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
, (4.33)
and the same characteristic curve equation as for h(x, t)
x(x0, t) = x0 cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g
′(x0)√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
,
for all x0 ∈ R+, and 0 ≤ t < T g(λ). Therefore, for all x > 0, and 0 ≤ t <
T g(λ), we have x0 > 0 and
hx(x, t)
x
=
g′(x0) cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−√2λx0 sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
x
= x0
x
(
g′(x0)
x0
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
))
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≥
b cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− b√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
) > 0, (4.34)
following from g′(x0) ≥ bx0, for all x0 ∈ R+, and that
0 < x
x0
= cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− g
′(x0)
x0
√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
≤ cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− b√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
from the characteristic curve equation. The numerator
b cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0
is due to the construction of T g(λ) (cf. (4.8)). The denominator
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− b√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0
follows from the fact a ≥ b > 0 and, hence,
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− b√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
≥ cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− a√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0,
again due to the construction of T g(λ). The proof for (4.30) is therefore
complete. We next prove (4.31). Indeed, differentiating both sides of equation
(4.33) with respect to x, we obtain
hxx(x, t) =
∂x0
∂x
(
g′′(x0) cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
))
≤
a cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− a√2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
) > 0,
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following from g′′(x0) ≤ a, for all x0 ∈ R+, and the inequality (4.32). The
denominator
cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
− a√
2λ
sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0
is due to the construction of T g(λ), while the numerator
a cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0
follows from the fact a ≥ b > 0 and, hence,
a cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
≥ b cosh
(
t√
2λ
)
−
√
2λ sinh
(
t√
2λ
)
> 0,
again due to the construction of T g(λ).
4.3.2.1 General result
In this section, we provide the result for constructing the general for-
ward performance process in a model switching scenario. The model revision
is the same as in the previous chapter, but we allow more general initial perfor-
mance datum for the forward process. The argument of Theorem 4.3.5 is based
on the desirable self-similarity property of the solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation discussed in Proposition 4.3.4.
Theorem 4.3.5. Assume that U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+g(x), with g satisfying the
assumption in Theorem 4.3.1. Then, for any predictable time τn ∈ Fτn−1,
n ≥ 1, such that τ0 = 0, and τn−1 < τn < τn−1 + T g(λ1, · · · , λn), with
T g(λ1, · · · , λn) :=
√
2λn min
 tanh(−1) (bn−1(λ1, · · · , λn−1)√
2λn
∧ 1
)
,
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coth(−1)
(
an−1(λ1, · · · , λn−1)√
2λn
∨ 1
) ∈ Fτn−1 , (4.35)
the process
U(x, r, τn) = −e−r+h(n)(x,τn) ∈ Fτn−1 , (4.36)
is the unique predictable forward performance process in the separable form,
where the random function h(n) is the unique classical solution with nonnegative
spatial derivative to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation with random coefficient λn ∈
Fτn−1, n ≥ 1,
h
(n)
t −
1
4λn
h(n)x
2 + 12x
2 = 0, x > 0, τn−1 < t < τn−1 +T g(λ1, · · · , λn), (4.37)
with initial condition h(n)(x, τn−1) = h(n−1)(x, τn−1), for n ≥ 1, and h(0)(x, 0) =
g(x). For n ≥ 2, the positive random variables an−1, bn−1 in (4.35) are Fτn−2-
measurable, and satisfy
an−1(λ1, · · · , λn−1) ≥ sup
x>0
h(n−1)xx (x, τn−1),
and
bn−1(λ1, · · · , λn−1) ≤ inf
x>0
h(n−1)x (x, τn−1)
x
,
while a0 = a, and b0 = b, with a, b as in (4.7).
Proof. We prove by induction. Clearly, for n = 1, we have U(x, r, 0) =
−e−r+g(x), and Theorem 4.3.1 together with the verification argument of The-
orem 4.3.2 guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a forward performance
process in the separable form up to the deterministic time T g(λ1) given by
(4.8). Assume now the deterministic time 0 < τ1 < T g(λ1) is chosen at τ0, then
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obviously U(x, r, τ1) = −e−r+h(1)(x,τ1), with h(1)(x, t) being the unique classi-
cal solution that has nonnegative spatial derivative to the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (4.37) with deterministic coefficient λ1 ∈ F0. The forward optimal
inventory process X∗ is given by (4.24), and we assume X∗τ1 > 0 to make
the subsequent continuation still interesting (otherwise, the forward optimal
liquidation stops at the deterministic time T ∗(X0) ≤ T g(λ1) by (4.25)).
Now assume the conclusion of the proposition is true for k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
with n ≥ 1, i.e., assume we have determined τn ∈ Fτn−1 and obtained the
forward performance criterion
U(x, r, τn) = −e−r+h(n)(x,τn)
at τn, and X∗τn > 0. Then at τn, according to the definition of the predictable
forward performance process in [3], the goal is to seek a predictable time τn+1 ∈
Fτn and a predictable utility function U(x, r, τn+1) ∈ Fτn , for (x, r) ∈ R+×R,
such that
U
(
X∗τn , R
∗
τn , τn
)
= esssup
ξ
E
[
U
(
Xξτn+1 , R
ξ
τn+1 , τn+1
)∣∣∣∣Fτn], a.s.. (4.38)
where R∗τn ∈ R, X∗τn > 0 are the optimal revenue and optimal inventory
at time τn, respectively, due to the previous forward optimal trading strate-
gies. Suggested by the scaling property of the criterion U(x, r, τn), we look for
U(x, r, τn+1) with a similar separable form and rewrite the above definition as
−e−R∗τn+h(n)(X∗τn ,τn)
= esssup
ξ
E
[
− e−R
ξ
τn+1+h
(n+1)
(
Xξτn+1 ,τn+1;ω
)∣∣∣∣Fτn], a.s.
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with some Fτn-measurable function h(n+1)(x, t;ω). By martingality and Itoˆ’s
lemma, conditional on Fτn , the random function h(n+1)(x, t;ω) solves the fol-
lowing Hamilton-Jacobi equation almost surely
h
(n+1)
t − 14λn+1 (h(n+1)x )2 + 12x2 = 0, x > 0, τn < t < τn+1,
h(n+1)(x, τn) = h(n)(x, τn), x > 0.
(4.39)
By Proposition 4.3.4, the initial condition h(n)(·, τn) satisfies the desired prop-
erty to be an admissible initial condition and, hence, a repeated application
of Theorem 4.3.1 is possible, conditional on Fτn . That is, for almost ev-
ery ω ∈ Ω, a well defined unique solution h(n+1)(x, t;ω) exists for (x, t) ∈
R+ × [τn, τn+1], provided τn < τn+1 < τn + T g(λ1, . . . , λn+1). The solvability
horizon T g(λ1, . . . , λn+1) is determined by the bounds on the first and second
order derivatives of the admissible initial condition h(n)(·, τn), following Theo-
rem 4.3.1. Moreover, conditional on Fτn , the verification argument in Theorem
4.3.2 shows the optimality condition (4.38) for any sub-horizon [τn, τn+1], such
that τn+1 ∈ Fτn and τn < τn+1 < τn + T g(λ1, · · · , λn+1).
4.3.3 Continuous time problem
Theorem 4.3.5 presents the result for general multi-period forward opti-
mal liquidation problem along with discrete time model revision. The update
of the criterion and the update of the model parameter λ both take place at
the same frequency in discrete time. A natural question to ask is what the
limit would be as the updating frequency goes to infinity. It is easier to see
that, as model revision is conducted more and more often, we could observe
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a path of the realized market parameter process (λt)t≥0, instead of a sequence
of realized values of the random variables {λn}n≥1. The limit of the forward
performance process (4.36) in discrete time, however, is less clear, since we
need first to show the limit indeed exists before we can identify it with any
known process.
In the previous chapter, we have studied this problem in detail under
quadratic initial condition g(x) = kx2, k > 0, and identified the limit as the
continuous time zero volatility forward performance process in the optimal
liquidation context. The continuous time forward theory has been developed
since the initiation of the study on forward performance processes, with the
zero volatility case extensively analyzed in the work [45], among others. This
family of forward performance processes is more convenient to tackle, com-
pared to the general non-zero volatility forward processes, although it still
has the challenging ill-posedness issue for the the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations. In the previous chapter, we have shown that in addition
to its tractability, the zero volatility forward process is the the limit of a se-
quence of well defined forward performance process in discrete time. Such
result brings new insight into the zero volatility forward performance process
family, beyond its sound mathematical properties.
In this section, we present a more general convergence argument under
initial condition g(·) that is not necessarily quadratic. The success of tje
similar argument in the previous chapter is partly because we have the explicit
solution for the discrete time forward performance process under quadratic
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initial condition. For general admissible g(·), such explicit representation is
no longer available. Nevertheless, based on the semi-explicit expression (4.13)
and the characteristic curve equation (4.14), we can obtain the limit that still
coincides with the zero volatility forward performance process under general
admissible g(·). For complete discussion, we recall from the previous chapter
that the zero volatility forward process in the optimal liquidation context
satisfies the equation
dU(x, r, t) = −
(
Ux(x, r, t)2
4λtUr(x, r, t)
+ 12Urr(x, r, t)σ
2
t x
2
)
dt, (4.40)
with initial condition U(x, r, 0) = −e−r+g(x), for admissible g(·). Here, the
market parameter processes λt and σt are assumed to be general progres-
sively measurable stochastic processes. In some very special cases, including
constant λ and σ and the coordinated variation scenario considered in the
previous chapter, the equation (4.40) has an explicit solution under quadratic
initial condition g(·), and an existence and uniqueness result under other g(·)
that satisfies the assumption in Theorem 4.3.1. For more general parame-
ter processes, the existence and uniqueness of solution to (4.40) is not clear.
Hence, we only present the heuristic argument and consider the solutions of
the separable form U(x, r, t) = −e−r+h(x,t). Direct computation yields the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation with random coefficient (taking σt = 1, t ≥ 0 for
simplicity)
ht(x, t)− 14λth
2
x(x, t) +
1
2x
2 = 0, a.s.
with initial condition h(x, 0) = g(x).
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We now turn to the discrete time forward performance process defined
as follows. For each ω ∈ Ω, and each admissible initial condition g(·), define
the model revision times {τNn }n≥1 and the the functions {h(n,N)}n≥1 for every
integer N ≥ 1 as
• τNn = τNn−1 +
T g(λ1,··· ,λn)∧1
N+1 , for all n ≥ 1, with T g(λ1, · · · , λn) given by
(4.35); set also τN0 = 0 for all N ;
• h(n,N)(x, t;ω) is the unique classical solution with nonnegative spatial
derivative to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
h
(n,N)
t −
1
4λn(ω)
(h(n,N)x )2 +
1
2x
2 = 0, x > 0, τNn−1 < t < τNn , (4.41)
with initial condition h(n,N)(x, τNn−1) = h(n−1,N)(x, τNn−1), for n ≥ 1, and
h(0,N)(x, 0) = g(x) for all N .
Notice that the above recursive construction is well defined for all integer n ≥ 1
and N ≥ 1, due to the self-similarity property of the solution to the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation under admissible g(·) (cf. Proposition 4.3.4). The random
variable λn, n ≥ 1, for the n-th period is the price impact parameter given by
λn = λτNn−1 ∈ FτNn−1 and, hence, the realization λn(ω) is known at the beginning
of each interval [τNn−1, τNn ]. Finally, for each N ≥ 1, we denote by hN the
continuous mapping from R+× [0, TN) to R, obtained from the concatenation
of the functions {h(n,N)}n≥0 across each τn, n ≥ 1. Here, TN := limn→∞ τNn is
clearly well defined for every N ≥ 1. We then have the following convergence
result.
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Theorem 4.3.6. Assume that the function g satisfies the assumption in The-
orem 4.3.1, and λt, t ≥ 0, is continuous with inft≥0 λt > 0, a.s. Then, for
any subsequence of {hN}N≥1, there exist a convergent subsequence {h˜N}N≥1,
a T ∗ > 0, and a continuous function h˜ : R+ × [0, T ∗) 7→ R, such that for any
compact subset D ⊂ R+ and any 0 < T < T ∗,
lim
N→∞
max
(x,t)∈D×[0,T ]
∣∣∣h˜N(x, t)− h˜(x, t)∣∣∣ = 0, a.s.. (4.42)
Furthermore, if for any convergent subsequence {h˜N}N≥1, it holds that h˜Nx →
h˜x and h˜Nt → h˜t uniformly on D × [0, T ], as N → ∞. Then, convergence
in (4.42) also holds for the original sequence {hN}N≥1, and h˜ and T ∗ are
determined by
h˜t(x, t)− 14λt h˜
2
x(x, t) +
1
2x
2 = 0, a.s. (4.43)
with initial condition h˜(x, 0) = g(x), and
T ∗ = sup{t > 0 : The Hamilton-jacobi equation (4.43) has a unique
classical solution with nonnegative spatial derivative for s ∈ [0, t]}.
Proof. We provide the proof for each fixed ω ∈ Ω that does not belong to the
null set. First, let C1 > |g(x)| and C1 > |g′(x)| for all x ∈ D ⊂ R+. Denote
τN(ω) := inf
n≥1
{
∣∣∣h(n,N)(x, τNn )∣∣∣ > C1 or ∣∣∣h(n,N)x (x, τNn )∣∣∣ > C1 for some x ∈ D},
with the convention inf ∅ =∞, and the truncated sequence
hˆ(n,N)(x, τNn ) := h(n,N)(x, τNn∧τN )
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for all N ≥ 1. Now for 1 ≤ n ≤ τN , we have that for any x, y ∈ D,
hˆ(n,N)(x, τNn )− hˆ(n−1,N)(y, τNn−1) = hˆ(n,N)(x, τNn )− hˆ(n,N)(y, τNn−1)
= hˆ(n,N)t · (τNn − τNn−1) + hˆ(n,N)x · (x− y),
with the first equality following from the multi-period concatenation (cf. The-
orem 4.3.5), and the second one due to the Mean Value Theorem. Since the
function h(n,N)(x, t) satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.41), we have that
for 1 ≤ n ≤ τN , the temporal derivative hˆ(n,N)t is also uniformly bounded, due
to the uniform boundedness of the spatial derivative hˆ(n,N)x and the compact-
ness of D. Hence, the family of continuous functions {hˆN}N≥1 is uniformly
bounded and equicontinuous. Denote T 1(ω) := lim infN→∞ τN(ω) and, since
{hˆN}N≥1 is uniformly Lipschitz in (x, t), it is direct to see T 1 > 0. Finally, by
the Arcela`-Ascoli Theorem, we can conclude, up to a subsequnce, hˆN converges
uniformly on D × [0, T ] for any 0 < T < T 1, as N →∞.
Now consider a converging subsequence over some compact domain
D × [0, T ] and denote its limit as h˜. For any t ∈ (0, T ], denote j(N) =
max{n ≥ 1 : τNn−1 < t}. Then clearly, as N →∞, λj(N) → λt. Next, by (4.13),
we have over the interval [τNj(N)−1, τNj(N)] that,
hˆ(j(N),N)(x, τNj(N)) = hˆ(j(N),N)(x0, τNj(N)−1)
−
√
2λj(N)
2
x20
2 +
hˆ(j(N),N)
2
x (x0, τNj(N)−1)
4λj(N)
 sinh
2(τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1)√
2λj(N)

+
x0hˆ
(j(N),N)
x (x0, τNj(N)−1)
2
 cosh
2(τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1)√
2λj(N)
− 1
, (4.44)
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with x0 and x being connected through the characteristic equation (4.14), i.e.,
x0 cosh
(τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1)√
2λj(N)
− hˆ(j(N),N)x (x0, τNj(N)−1)√
2λj(N)
sinh
(τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1)√
2λj(N)
 = x.
(4.45)
Notice that
hˆ(j(N),N)(x, τNj(N))− hˆ(j(N),N)(x0, τNj(N)−1)
=
[
hˆ(j(N),N)(x, τNj(N))− hˆ(j(N),N)(x0, τNj(N))
]
+
[
hˆ(j(N),N)(x0, τNj(N))− hˆ(j(N),N)(x0, τNj(N)−1)
]
.
Dividing both sides of (4.44) by τNj(N)− τNj(N)−1 and letting N →∞, we obtain
that at t ∈ (0, T ], the limit function h˜ satisfies, due to the uniform convergence
of {hˆN}N≥1, and the assumption h˜Nx → h˜x and h˜Nt → h˜t uniformly,
lim
N→∞
hˆ(j(N),N)x x− x0τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1
+ h˜t(x, t) +
(
x2
2 +
h˜2x(x, t)
4λt
)
= 0,
where we have used that x0 → x, as τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1 → 0. Moreover, we also
have
lim
N→∞
x− x0
τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1
= − h˜x(x, t)2λt ,
after an application of the characteristic curve equation (4.45), and the fact
that x0 → x, as τNj(N) − τNj(N)−1 → 0. Combining the above results, we con-
clude that, for any converging subsequence {hˆ}N≥1, the limit is a continuously
differentiable function h˜ that satisfies (4.43) with nonnegative spatial deriva-
tive. Moreover, if the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (4.43) has a unique solution,
then the original family of functions {hˆ}N≥1 (not just subsequence) converge
uniformly on any compacts to the solution of (4.43).
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More precisely, consider the above construction for an unbounded in-
creasing sequence Cm > C1 and define analogously the increasing times {Tm}m≥1
and the limit T ∗ = limm Tm. Then the above argument still holds for each
pair (Cm, Tm), and the limit function h˜ has the property that h˜(x, Tm) = Cm
or h˜x(x, Tm) = Cm, if Tm is finite. If equation (4.43) has a unique classical
solution with nonnegative spatial derivative up to some time T̂ > T ∗, then it
has to coincide with the limit function h˜ over every [0, Tm], leading to h˜(x, Tm)
or h˜x(x, Tm) exceeding Cm. This is a contradiction since Cm → ∞ as m in-
creases, while a classical solution obviously has uniformly bounded function
values and spatial derivatives on the compact domain D × [0, T ∗]. It is also
obvious that T̂ < T ∗ cannot happen, due to the assumption that a unique
classical solution with nonnegative spatial derivative exists up to T̂ , and the
fact that the limit function h˜ is such a classical solution to (4.43) up to T ∗.
Hence, we conclude T ∗ = T̂ .
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Chapter 5
Relative forward indifference valuation of
real-time incoming projects
5.1 Introduction
Options pricing/projects evaluation, as one of the core areas of math-
ematical finance, is well understood in complete market. When the market is
incomplete, there is no unique arbitrage free price as it is no longer possible
to fully eliminate the risk through replication. One approach to price options
in incomplete market, including real options, is to resort to expected utility
maximization methodology, which is commonly known as the utility indiffer-
ence valuation approach (see, e.g., [10], [50], [30]). The investor would accept
a price today such that she is indifferent to proceed optimally under the cur-
rent investment opportunity with and without a liability at the terminal time
t = T . This price is known as indifferent price of the option.
The classical backward indifference valuation methodology can apply
to the evaluation of a single real option, a portfolio of options, or a single
option relative to an existing portfolio of options, the latter of which is known
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as relative indifference valuation (see, e.g., [5], [56] and [57]). Nonetheless, as
other utility-based optimal control problems, the backward reasoning is sub-
ject to substantial commitment at t = 0, which restricts the class of projects
that can be priced. One of such restrictions is that a model that describes the
underlying market for employing (partial) hedging strategies needs to be spec-
ified to a full extent at t = 0, and fixed thereafter. In contrast, information
in reality unfolds along real-time, as the underlying market may experience
unanticipated favorable or unfavorable conditions for hedging purpose after
t = 0. Moreover, for real options pricing or projects evaluation, another com-
mitment inherent to the classical approach arises, which we refer to as projects
commitment. Since the classical optimization/valuation approach solves the
problem backwards in time, the investor has to know at t = 0 the complete
profile of all the incoming projects with their characteristics (e.g., initiation,
expiry and payoff functional, etc), and no new projects can be included once
the valuation and hedging procedures start at t = 0 in order to maintain
time-consistency and exclude pricing discrepancy. Again, this may not be re-
alistic; instead, project investors in practice decide on the risk exposure of a
new project typically based on the performance of existing ones rather than
to make an inflexible overall evaluation ahead of time. For instance, a drug
company may decide on the risk of developing another new drug only at its
initiation, based on the progress of the concurrent R&D of the drugs already
under development, or on the market conditions at that future time. All of
such information would be generally hard to know or model at the initial time
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t = 0.
In the current work, we study the indifference valuation of real options
in real-time within the forward performance process framework. The real-time
feature is in direct contrast with both the model commitment and the projects
commitment due to the backward reasoning under the classical stochastic opti-
mization methodology. The forward approach, on the other hand, can address
the unanticipated real-time changes in both the market investment opportu-
nity and the projects profile. In particular, we first consider the evaluation of
a single real option, but with unanticipated model change before the expiry of
the option. Under classical framework, such real-time model change could lead
to pricing discrepancy under the fixed terminal evaluation criterion, as well as
time-inconsistency for the underlying stochastic control problems. We develop
the forward indifference valuation scheme to overcome the model commitment
issue of the classical approach, and demonstrate that both pricing discrepancy
and time-inconsistency would not occur if the evaluation criterion is adaptive
enough to capture the unanticipated model switch along real-time.
We then examine the relative indifference valuation problem of two real
options by adopting the forward approach. To demonstrate the flexibility of
the forward approach and the absence of the projects commitment, we work
under less restrictive assumption; that is, at t = 0, we don’t assume any knowl-
edge of the full characteristics of the second option, except its initiation time.
The expiry and the payoff functional of the second option are only observable
at the initiation time of this option. In other words, different from what is
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typically assumed under the classical backward approach, the investor only
prices the first option at t = 0, without knowing the full profile of the second
option. Such relaxed assumption accounts for real world problems where mul-
tiple phases of a long-term project (e.g., R&D project, drug development, oil
exploration, etc.) can be regarded as separate real options, while the risk expo-
sures of the options in the remote future are typically difficult to be accurately
modeled/predicted at t = 0.
Due to projects commitment discussed earlier, time-inconsistency would
arise if the terminal valuation criterion is not revised after the arrival of the
second option. We hence adopt the forward performance approach to seek con-
sistent terminal criterion under which the original valuation of the first option
would remain valid even after the arrival of the second option, i.e., to exclude
intertemporal pricing discrepancy due to unanticipated incoming new options.
The revised criterion at t = T would typically depend on the characteristics
of the second option. In this work, we consider two families of forward per-
formance processes, the predictable family and the adaptive family, and also
compute their respective relative indifference prices of the first option given
the risk exposure of the second. It is interesting to notice that although the
two types of forward criteria have different measurability, they give rise to the
same relative indifference price that is consistent with the initially settled price
for the first option. Such robustness of relative indifference valuation together
with the greater flexibility to incorporate unanticipated model/projects profile
changes along real-time make the forward performance process approach more
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appealing in real world applications.
We then turn to the valuation of the second option once it is introduced
with its full profile available at the initiation time. In the classical framework
where the full profile of both options is available at t = 0, the relative indif-
ference valuation of the second option given the first is essentially the same as
that of the first option given the second. However, in the current asynchronous
information arrival setting, the relative indifference valuation of the new op-
tion requires both model extension and criterion extension, beyond the expiry
of the first option. We extend the (relative) valuation criterion following the
forward performance process theory and discuss the additivity property of the
resulting relative indifference prices, the residual optimal wealth processes and
the residual risk processes.
5.2 Single real option with model revision
In this section, we consider the indifference valuation of a single project/real
option with model revision. As we have mentioned, since the real-time model
revision is not anticipated at t = 0, following the classical backward indif-
ference valuation methodology would result in time-inconsistency and pricing
discrepancy (see also the discussion in [44]). We therefore consider indiffer-
ence valuation under the forward performance approach, aiming at achieving
intertemporal consistency along with real-time model revision. Here, we con-
sider the two-period model revision extension of the dynamic market environ-
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ment proposed in [43]. Precisely, the investment universe consists of a riskless
asset and two risky assets. We assume for simplicity that the riskless asset is
given by a zero interest Bond Bt = 1, for all t ≥ 0. The first risky asset is a
stock that can be traded, whose price follows the log-normal diffusion prior to
the model revision time t = τ1
dSs = µ1Ssds+ σ1SsdW 1s ,
with St = s > 0, and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ τ1. The second asset is a nontraded asset
whose value is modeled by the diffusion process
dYs = b(Ys, s)ds+ a(Ys, s)dWs,
with Yt = y ∈ R, and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T. The two Brownian motions W 1,W are
defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P), with the filtration Ft, 0 ≤
t ≤ T , generated by (W 1,W ) and satisfying the usual conditions. We suppose
the correlation between W 1,W is ρ ∈ (−1, 1), and that the deterministic
functions b(·, ·), a(·, ·) are such that the stochastic differential equation for Y
has a unique strong solution.
The model revision time 0 < τ1 < T is a known deterministic time at
which the investor would re-estimate the model parameters µ1 and σ1 > 0,
probably due to scheduled market information release or self-planned model
reassessment procedure. During (τ1, T ], the investor will change her view on
the market condition and hold onto µ2, σ2 ∈ Fτ1 , with σ2 > 0, a.s., under P.
We denote the respective Sharpe ratios as λ1 := µ1σ1 ∈ F0 and λ2 := µ2σ2 ∈ Fτ1 .
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A European type real option is initiated at t = 0 and expires at t = T , with
payoff being G(YT ) for a bounded function G(·).
As in the classical framework, the indifference valuation mechanism
involves two competing investors, with one being only investing optimally in
the stock market, and the other being holding the real option and proceeding
optimally in the market. We refer to the first investor as the plain investor
and the second the writer of the option (in the case she pays G(YT ) at expiry).
The plain investor maintains the following forward performance process by, on
one hand, optimally investing in the stock market, and on the other, taking
into account the unanticipated model change in real-time,
U(x, t) = −e−γx+ 12
∫ t
0 λ
2
sds (5.1)
with λs = λ1 for 0 ≤ s ≤ τ1 and λs = λ2 for τ1 < s ≤ T .
The writer, also starting with initial utility U0(x) = −e−γx, maintains
optimality in the stock market but with an extra liability G(YT ) at the terminal
time1. During the first period [0, τ1], she has the same correct view about the
market as the plain investor, i.e., the Sharpe ratio is λ1. To proceed optimally
from U0(x) = −e−γx, she aims to find a consistent indirect utility V W,λ1(x, τ1)
1Here, both the plain investor and the writer start with an initial utility U0(x) = −e−γx,
γ > 0, instead of a terminal utility. However, we mention that both of them can choose
the original terminal utility UT (x) = −e−γx and start with U0(x) = V (x, 0;λ1), the value
function at t = 0 with the best estimated model parameter λ1 up to the initiation time of
the option. The rest of the argument would still follow.
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such that
− e−γ(x−h0(y)) = supE
[
V W,λ1(Xτ1 , τ1)|X0 = x, Y0 = y
]
, (5.2)
where the expectation is taken under the [0, τ1] marginal of the true underlying
measure P, and we note that such marginal is known to the writer at t = 0.
The process X denotes the wealth process over the first period [0, τ1], and is
given by
dXs = µpisds+ σpisdW 1s ,
with Xt = x ∈ R, and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ τ1. The quantity h0(y) is the indifference
price of the real option at t = 0. In general, the plain investor and the
writer can agree on an initial price h0(y) ≥ 0 and then both proceed optimally
forward in time starting from a common initial utility U0(x) = −e−γx. A more
reasonable choice for h0(y) is the classical indifference price at t = 0 when
both investors view the market over the whole horizon [0, T ] with λ1 ∈ F0 and
take the common terminal utility UT (x) = −e−γx. Then after t = τ1, both
investors take into account the new realized market condition λ2 ∈ Fτ1 and
seek to determine their respective revised terminal utility that is consistent
with their individual optimal investment behavior during [0, τ1]. We follow
this reasoning and choose
h0(y) =
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ̂
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(YT )|Y0 = y
]
, (5.3)
whit Q̂ being the minimal relative entropy martingale measure with respect
to the hypothetical measure P̂ that models the market with λ1 being ap-
plied for the whole horizon (see Theorem 2 in [43]). The remaining step is to
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find V W,λ1(x, τ1) such that (5.2) is true. Notice that the procedure involves
solving an inverse problem, as in equation (5.2), the initial value function is
given while the goal is to find the (indirect) utility function V W,λ1(x, τ1). The
induced Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is therefore ill-posed and
existence and uniqueness of solution is typically lacking. To find one solution
V W,λ1(x, τ1) in (5.2), we consider the distortion transformation as in [43]
V W,λ1(x, t) = −e−γxv(Yt, t)
1
1−ρ2 ,
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1. Direct computation then yields that the deterministic
function v(y, t) solves the ill-posed linear parabolic partial differential equation
(PDE)
vt +
1
2a
2(y, t)vyy + [b(y, t)− ρλ1a(y, t)]vy = 12(1− ρ
2)λ21v, (5.4)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, with initial condition v(y, 0) = er(1−ρ2)h0(y). Although the ill-
posedness in general leads to extra difficulty in terms of obtaining existence and
uniqueness results, we can actually determine one positive classical solution to
(5.4), under the proper choice (5.3). Indeed, consider the hypothetical problem
V̂ (x, y, t) := supEP̂
[
UW,λ1(XT −G(YT ), T )|Xt = x, Yt = y
]
,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where the conditional expectation is taken under the hypothet-
ical measure P̂ over [0, T ], and UW,λ1(x, T ) = −e−γx+T2 λ21 . Then by the same
distortion transformation
V̂ (x, y, t) = −e−γxv̂(y, t) 11−ρ2 ,
215
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , one can deduce a well-posed problem for function v̂(y, t),
i.e., v̂(y, t) solves the linear PDE (5.4) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , with terminal condition
v̂(y, T ) = e(1−ρ2)(γG(y)+ 12λ21T ). Classical rigorous result regarding this well-posed
problem the applies (see [60]) and a unique positive solution is obtained by
Feynman-Kac representation
v̂(y, t) = EQ̂
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(YT )+ 12λ21t)|Yt = y
]
. (5.5)
It is then easy to see that v̂(y, 0) = er(1−ρ2)h0(y) = v(y, 0), for all y ∈ R. We
therefore can take V W,λ1(x, τ1) = −e−γxv̂(Yτ1 , τ1). Also, it follows that the
indifference price over the first period [0, τ1] under V W,λ1(x, τ1) is
ht(y) =
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ̂
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(YT )|Yt = y
]
. (5.6)
As we can see, the indifference price under the forward performance process
approach before the market model revision coincides with its classical coun-
terpart, as a result of the particular choice of h0(y) in (5.3).
At the reassessment time τ1 ∈ F0, both investors change their views
on the market and realize the risk-premium has changed to λ2 ∈ Fτ1 . Up
to t = τ1, the plain investor has preserved her performance up to U(x, τ1) =
−e−γx+λ
2
1
2 τ1 , while the writer, holding the real option and proceeding opti-
mally, has achieved V W,λ1(x, τ1). The goal for both investors is to choose
their respective terminal utilities, taking into account that λ2 ∈ Fτ1 , to be
consistent with their individual optimality they have preserved so far. As we
already know, the consistent terminal utility for the plain investor is given
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by (5.1) U(x, T ) = −e−γx+λ
2
1
2 τ1+
λ22
2 (T−τ1). The remaining step is to determine
UW,λ2(x, T ), such that
V W,λ1(x, τ1) = esssupE
[
UW,λ2(XT −G(YT ), T )
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xτ1 = x], a.s.. (5.7)
Notice that the conditional expectation is taken under the (τ1, T ] marginal
of the underlying physical measure P, conditional on Fτ1 , which is known to
the writer when she solves the problem (5.7) at t = τ1. To find one solution
UW,λ2(x, T ) to the inverse problem (5.7), similar as before, we define the value
function for the remaining time period (τ1, T ] as
V (x, y, t;ω) = esssupE
[
UW,λ2(XT −G(YT ), T )
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x, Yt = y], a.s..
(5.8)
By the same distortion transformation V (x, y, t;ω) = −e−γxv˜(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 , we
obtain that v˜(y, t;ω) solves almost surely the ill-posed linear parabolic PDE
v˜ + 12a
2(y, t)v˜yy + (b(y, t)− ρλ2a(y, t)) v˜y = 12(1− ρ
2)λ22v˜ (5.9)
with initial condition v˜(y, τ1) = EQ̂[e
r(1−ρ2)G(YT )+ 12 (1−ρ2)λ21τ1 |Yτ1 = y]. The ini-
tial condition follows from that at t = τ1, V W,λ1(x, τ1) = V (x, Yτ1 , τ1), a.s.,
according to requirement for consistency (5.7). Again, it is not clear whether a
positive solution exists for the ill-posed equation (5.9). However, following the
same argument as before, we study a well-posed problem which produces the
initial condition v˜(y, τ1). To be specific, suppose UW,λ2(x, T ) = −e−γx+F (τ1,T ;ω)
with F (τ1, T ;ω) ∈ Fτ1 . Then v˜(y, t) solves the random linear PDE (5.9) over
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(τ1, T ], with a terminal condition v˜(y, T ) = e(1−ρ
2)(γG(y)+F (τ1,T )) ∈ Fτ1 . Condi-
tional on Fτ1 , by the Feynman-Kac representation, we derive for τ1 < t ≤ T ,
v˜(y, t) = EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(YT )+F (τ1,T ))− 12 (1−ρ2)λ22(T−t)|Yt = y
]
,
where conditional on Fτ1 , the measure Q˜ on FT is defined by
dQ˜
dP
∣∣∣∣FT = e−λ2(W
1
T−W 1τ1 )−
1
2λ
2
2(T−τ1) (5.10)
and W˜s := Ws −Wτ1 + λ2ρ(s − τ1), τ1 ≤ s ≤ T , is a standard Brownian mo-
tion under Q˜. Finally, the consistency condition (5.7) leads to V W,λ1(x, τ1) =
V (x, Yτ1 , τ1), which implies v˜(y, τ1) = v(y, τ1). Under the predictable assump-
tion that F (τ1, T ) ∈ Fτ1 , we derive that
F (τ1, T ) =
1
2
(
λ21τ1 + λ22(T − τ1)
)
+ 11− ρ2 ln
EQ̂[e
γ(1−ρ2)G(YT )|Yτ1 ]
EQ˜[eγ(1−ρ
2)G(YT )|Yτ1 ]
∈ Fτ1 .
Hence, the consistent terminal utility for the writer would be
UW,λ2(x, T ) = − exp
(
− γx+ 12(λ
2
1τ1 + λ22(T − τ1))
+ 11− ρ2 ln
EQ̂[e
γ(1−ρ2)G(YT )|Yτ1 ]
EQ˜[eγ(1−ρ
2)G(YT )|Yτ1 ]
)
∈ Fτ1 . (5.11)
The indifference price of the project during (τ1, T ] therefore follows from the
equilibrium between two investors
U(x− ht(y;ω), t;ω) = V (x, y, t;ω), a.s.,
from which we derive
ht(y;ω) =
1
γ(1− ρ2)
lnEQ˜[eγ(1−ρ2)G(YT )|Yt = y]+ ln EQ̂
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(YT )|Yτ1
]
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ2)G(YT )|Yτ1
]
 ,
(5.12)
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for τ1 < t ≤ T . Compared with U(x, T ), the terminal utility of the plain
investor, it is clear that UW,λ2(x, T ) has an additional correction term which
is Fτ1-measurable. This is different form [44] where the forward terminal
utility U(x, T ) is used for both the plain investor and the writer. Therein, un-
der the forward criterion U(x, T ), the indifference valuation problem is solved
backwards. In particular, to solve for the first period [0, τ1], one needs to
know/commit to the dynamics of market parameters during the second period
(τ1, T ] (as shown in the HJB of Proposition 12 in [44]). However, in the sce-
nario of real-time model revision as we modeled here, the investor would not
have been able to know the necessary information of λ2 ∈ Fτ1 in order to settle
the indifference price as well as the partial hedging strategy during the first
period. The forward performance process approach when applied in real-time
therefore can allow for more flexibility in terms of model pre-specification, by
solving the valuation problem period by period forward in time.
Remark 5.2.1. A simple scenario is when λ2 = λ1, a.s., i.e., no model revision
is necessary. Then the forward indifference valuation problem should collapse
to the classical one proposed in [43]. Indeed, one can easily check that both
plain investor and the writer’s utilities reduce to U(x, T ) = −e−γx+λ
2
1
2 T that
corresponds to U0(x) = −e−γx (they will reduce to U(x, T ) = −e−γx if the
initial utility U0(x) = V (x, 0;λ1)). Moreover, the indifference price (5.12) for
the second period also reduces to its classical counterpart in [43].
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5.3 Forward evaluation of a flow of real options
The classical backward indifference valuation methodology is subject
to both model commitment and projects commitment, due to the backward
reasoning used to solve the associated underlying stochastic optimization prob-
lems. In previous section, we have demonstrated how the forward performance
process approach can overcome the model commitment issue, in a real-time
model revision scenario where a single real option is evaluated. We now con-
tinue to show that the forward approach can also handle the projects commit-
ment issue, and develop the relative forward indifference valuation scheme for
a flow of real options that arrive with asynchronous information of their risk
profiles.
5.3.1 Relative forward indifference valuation of the first option
To expose the main idea, we work with two projects in a market with
a priori known probabilistic dynamics (i.e., no model revision is needed, for
simplicity) over a fixed horizon [0, T ]. The difference between our scenario
and classical multiple projects (relative) indifference valuation is that, we do
not assume full knowledge of the second project at t = 0, deterministically or
probabilistically; in particular, the expiry and payoff functional of the second
project only reveal at the its initiation time 0 < τ1 < T which we assume to
be known at t = 0. This model setup can describe more general scenarios in
practice; for instance, a drug company may know when to start developing the
second drug, but it is not clear today how long the process would take and
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how the risk of the development would be for the second drug, as these char-
acteristics may mostly depend on other factors, including the R&D outcome
of the first drug, and they are more possible to be known when the second
drug development officially starts.
Formally, we extend the one project valuation model in [43] in the
following way. Let the horizon [0, T ] be given, and assume the first project
is initiated at t = 0 with expiry at t = T . It pays H(YT ) at expiry with
H(·) ∈ F0. A second project arrives at τ1 ∈ F0 and expires at τ2 ∈ Fτ1 with
0 < τ1 < τ2 ≤ T . It pays G(Yτ2) with payoff functional G(·) ∈ Fτ1 . The
investors involved (i.e., both the plain investor and the writer) are assumed to
take exponential utility UT (x) = −e−γx at time t = 0, but they are allowed to
update this terminal criterion (and intermediate criteria) based on the arrival
of the second project. Hence, this F0-measurable terminal utility UT (x) =
−e−γx would only be used for the valuation of the first project before t = τ1;
after this time, both investors would have enough knowledge to revise their
respective performance criterion in a consistent way.
We now start with pricing the first project. During the period [0, τ1),
both the writer and the plain investor have no clue about the profile of the
second project, and they can only price the first project under the common
terminal utility UT (x) = −eγx. Therefore, essentially, a classical indifference
valuation is done for this period. We define the following classical value func-
tion processes for the plain investor and the writer over [0, τ1],
V 0(x, t) = esssupE
[
− e−γXT
∣∣∣Ft, Xt = x], (5.13)
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V P1(x, t) = esssupE
[
− e−γ(XT−H(YT ))
∣∣∣Ft, Xt = x], (5.14)
respectively. The classical results give that (see [43])
V 0(x, t) = −e−γx− 12λ2(T−t),
and
V P1(x, t) = uP1(x, Yt, t),
with
uP1(x, y, t) := −e−γx
(
EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−t)
∣∣∣Yt = y]) 11−ρ2 ,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1, where Q is the minimal relative entropy martingale measure
with respect to P. At t = τ1, the writer has preserved her individual optimality
under the risk exposure of the first project up to V P1(x, τ1), and the plain in-
vestor has achieved V 0(x, τ1). Also, both investors realize the arrival of second
project with its profile, i.e, τ2, G(·) ∈ Fτ1 . Assuming that the investment in
the second project is for sure to happen, both investors would evaluate the first
project during the life-span of the second one following a relative indifference
valuation reasoning. More precisely, during [τ1, τ2], the goal for the writer is
to find a valuation criterion UW (x, τ2) such that consistency along the opti-
mality of investment in first project is preserved, under the extra liability to
pay G(Yτ2) at t = τ2. In particular, at t = τ1, she solves
V P1(x, τ1) = esssupE
[
UW (Xτ2 −G(Yτ2), τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xτ1 = x], a.s.. (5.15)
Similarly, the plain investor would also undertake the liability G(Yτ2) of the
second project but without the liability H(YT ) of the first one. The goal
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is to determine the valuation criterion U0(x, τ2) to maintain intertemporal
consistency along optimality and exclude pricing discrepancy. At t = τ1, the
plain investor solves
V 0(x, τ1) = esssupE
[
U0(Xτ2 −G(Yτ2), τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xτ1 = x], a.s.. (5.16)
Once the two utility functions UW and U0 are determined, we can define the
value function processes similarly as in (5.14) and (5.13) for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2,
conditional on Fτ1 ,
V P1,P2(x, t;ω) := esssupE
[
UW (Xτ2 −G(Yτ2), τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x], (5.17)
and
V P2(x, t;ω) := esssupE
[
U0(Xτ2 −G(Yτ2), τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x]. (5.18)
The forward indifference price of the first project relative to the second project
during period [τ1, τ2] would be naturally defined as the “break-even” process
H
P1|P2
t , τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2, that satisfies
V P2(Xt −HP1|P2t , t) = V P1,P2(Xt, t), a.s..
The problem now boils down to looking for the respective forward crite-
rion UW and U0 for the writer and the plain investor, such that the con-
sistency conditions (5.15) and (5.16) hold. Notice that as in the continu-
ous time framework for the forward performance processes, the consistent
(t = τ2) forward criterion in general is not unique. In the following sec-
tions, we consider two types of forward performance criteria, namely the pre-
dictable criteria (i.e., UW (x, τ2), U0(x, τ2) ∈ Fτ1) and the adaptive criteria
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(i.e., UW (x, τ2), U0(x, τ2) ∈ Fτ2). As we will see, different class of forward cri-
teria lead to different relative indifference prices, but time-inconsistency and
pricing discrepancy are excluded in both cases.
5.3.1.1 Predictable forward criteria and relative indifference valu-
ation
We first consider the predictable forward family and the associated
relative indifference price of the first project during [τ1, τ2]. Suppose the writer
has the consistent forward criteria of the form UW (x, τ2) = −e−γx+Fτ2 with
Fτ2 ∈ Fτ1 . We apply the distortion transformation
V P1,P2(x, t;ω) = −e−γxv(Yt, t;ω)
1
1−ρ2 ,
then equation (5.17) can rewrite as
−e−γxv(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 = esssupE
[
UW (XT−G(Yτ2), τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x, Yt = y], a.s..
The function v(y, t;ω) solves almost surely the random linear parabolic equa-
tion
vt +
1
2a
2(y, t)vyy +
(
b(y, t)− ρλa(y, t)
)
vy =
1
2(1− ρ
2)λ2v (5.19)
for τ1 < t < τ2 with terminal condition v(y, τ2;ω) = eγ(1−ρ
2)G(y)+(1−ρ2)Fτ2 ∈ Fτ1 .
Conditional on Fτ1 , the solution to (5.19) has the Feynman-Kac representation
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2,
v(y, t;ω) = EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)Fτ2− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y], a.s.. (5.20)
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Conditional on Fτ1 , the measure Q˜ is defined on Fτ2 as
dQ˜
dP
∣∣∣∣
τ2
= e−λ(W 1τ2−W 1τ1 )− 12λ2(τ2−τ1),
and W˜s = Ws−Wτ1+ρλ(s−τ1) is a standard Brownian motion for τ1 ≤ s ≤ τ2.
In particular,
v(y, τ1) = EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)Fτ2− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−τ1)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yτ1 = y],
while the consistency condition (5.15) suggests on the other hand that
v(y, τ1) = EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−τ1)
∣∣∣Yτ1 = y]. (5.21)
Under the fact Fτ2 ∈ Fτ1 , we derive from (5.21) that
Fτ2 = −
1
2λ
2(T − τ2) + 11− ρ2 ln
EQ[eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )|Yτ1 ]
EQ˜[eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )|Yτ1 ]
∈ Fτ1 . (5.22)
Hence, the consistent predictable forward criterion for the writer at the expiry
of the second project would be
UW (x, τ2) = − exp
(
−γx−12λ
2(T−τ2)+ 11− ρ2 ln
EQ[eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )|Yτ1 ]
EQ˜[eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )|Yτ1 ]
)
∈ Fτ1 .
(5.23)
The next step is to determine the predictable forward criterion U0(x, τ2) for
the plain investor who only pays G(Yτ2) at t = τ2. The procedure follows
closely to the derivation of UW (x, τ2). To be specific, suppose U0(x, τ2) =
−e−γx+F˜τ2 , with F˜τ2 ∈ Fτ1 , and consider as usual the distortion transformation
V P2(x, t;ω) = −e−γxv˜(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 . Then from equation (5.18), we can conclude
that the function v˜(y, t;ω) solves almost surely the linear parabolic PDE
v˜t +
1
2a
2(y, t)v˜yy +
(
b(y, t)− ρλa(y, t)
)
v˜y =
1
2(1− ρ
2)λ2v˜ (5.24)
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with terminal condition v˜(y, τ2;ω) = eγ(1−ρ
2)G(y)+(1−ρ2)F˜τ2 ∈ Fτ1 . Conditional
on Fτ1 , the Feynman-Kac representation of the solution to (5.24) is
v˜(y, t;ω) = EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)F˜τ2− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y], a.s., (5.25)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2. Finally, consistency condition (5.16) for the plain investor
implies on the other hand that
v˜(y, τ1) = e−
1
2 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−τ1),
and under the assumption F˜τ2 ∈ Fτ1 , we can derive that
F˜τ2 = −
1
2λ
2(T − τ2)− 11− ρ2 lnEQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )
∣∣∣Yτ1] ∈ Fτ1 . (5.26)
The consistent predictable forward criterion for the plain investor therefore is
U0(x, τ2) = − exp
(
−γx− 12λ
2(T − τ2)− 11− ρ2 lnEQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )|Yτ1
])
∈ Fτ1 .
(5.27)
Next we are ready to derive the relative indifference price HP1|P2t for the first
project given the second project over [τ1, τ2]. From the distortion transforma-
tion and the (relative) indifference price definition
V P2(Xt −HP1|P2t , t) = V P1,P2(Xt, t), a.s.,
we have
− e−γ(x−h(y,t;ω))v˜(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 = −e−γxv(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 , a.s., (5.28)
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where we have assumed HP1|P2t = h(Yt, t;ω), due to the exponential utility in
terms of wealth. Then it easily follows from (5.28) that for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2,
h(y, t;ω) = 1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
v(y, t;ω)
v˜(y, t;ω) =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln e
(1−ρ2)(Fτ2−F˜τ2 )
= 1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )|Yτ1
]
, a.s.. (5.29)
We notice that after t = τ1, i.e., the arrival/initiation time of the second
project, the consistent price for the first project over [τ1, τ2] remains constant
(conditional on Fτ1) under the predictable assumption of the utility functions
for the two investors. The price of the first project would stay on the level
exactly before the arrival of the second project. Such constant extension of the
valuation problem over [0, τ1] is probably the simplest way to maintain pricing
consistency before and after the appearance of a new project. As we will see in
the next section, even under a different class of forward performance processes
that are not predictable, the same conditionally constant indifference price can
be derived to excludes time-inconsistency and pricing discrepancy.
5.3.1.2 Adaptive forward criteria and relative indifference valua-
tion
In this section, we work with the consistent forward criteria that are
adaptive, i.e., UW (x, τ2), U0(x, τ2) ∈ Fτ2 . The main argument will follow
closely as in the previous section, except that we consider factor form for-
ward criteria UW (x, τ2) = −e−γx+F (Yτ2 ,τ2) for the writer, and U0(x, τ2) =
−e−γx+F˜ (Yτ2 ,τ2) for the plain investor, where F (y, τ2;ω) and F˜ (y, τ2;ω) are both
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Fτ1-measurable. Under this assumption and applying the distortion transfor-
mation, we derive form (5.17) that v(y, t;ω) solves almost surely the linear
parabolic PDE (5.19) with terminal condition v(y, τ2;ω) = eγ(1−ρ
2)G(y)+(1−ρ2)F (y,τ2) ∈
Fτ1 . Conditional on Fτ1 , the Feynman-Kac representation of the solution is
v(y, t;ω) = EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y], a.s.,
(5.30)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2, where the measure Q˜ is defined as in the previous section.
Consistency condition (5.15) for the writer then writes as
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−τ1)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yτ1 = y]
= EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−τ1)
∣∣∣Yτ1 = y], a.s.. (5.31)
One can directly verify that
F (Yτ2 , τ2) = −
(
γG(Yτ2) +
1
2λ
2(T − τ2)
)
+ 11− ρ2 lnEQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )
∣∣∣Yτ1]
(5.32)
would satisfy the consistency condition (5.31). Hence, the writer’s adaptive
forward criterion at the expiry of the second project is
UW (x, τ2) = −e−γ(x+G(Yτ2 ))− 12λ2(T−τ2)
(
EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )
∣∣∣Yτ1]) 11−ρ2 ∈ Fτ2 .
(5.33)
We next derive the plain investor’s adaptive forward criterion U0(x, τ2) ∈
Fτ2 . Following the same argument as above, we propose the factor form
U0(x, τ2) = −e−γx+F˜ (Yτ2 ,τ2) with F˜ (y, τ2) ∈ Fτ1 . After the application of the
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distortion transformation and the (conditional) Feynman-Kac representation,
the consistency requirement (5.16) for the plain investor gives that
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)F˜ (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−τ1)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yτ1 = y] = e− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−τ1).
(5.34)
One can then verify that
F˜ (Yτ2 , τ2) = −γG(Yτ2)−
1
2λ
2(T − τ2) ∈ Fτ2 (5.35)
satisfies the consistency equation (5.34). The plain investor’s consistent for-
ward utility is therefore
U0(x, τ2) = −e−γ(x+G(Yτ2 ))− 12λ2(T−τ2) ∈ Fτ2 . (5.36)
The relative indifference price of the first project given the second project over
[τ1, τ2] again follows from (5.28)
−e−γ(x−h(y,t;ω))v˜(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 = −e−γxv(y, t;ω) 11−ρ2 , a.s.,
where
v˜(y, t;ω) = EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)F˜ (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y],
and
v(y, t;ω) = EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)G(Yτ2 )+(1−ρ2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y],
respectively. It follows that
h(y, t;ω) = 1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
v(y, t;ω)
v˜(y, t;ω)
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= 1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )
∣∣∣Yτ1], a.s., (5.37)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2, which yields the same (conditionally) constant relative indif-
ference price of the first project over [τ1, τ2] as in the previous section
H
P1|P2
t = h(Yt, t) =
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )
∣∣∣Yτ1].
5.3.2 Relative forward indifference valuation of the second real op-
tion
In this section, we discuss the relative indifference valuation of the
second real option/project given the first under the forward approach. As
before, it is assumed that the second project has an initiation time 0 < τ1 < T
with expiry τ2 ∈ Fτ1 and payoff G(Yτ2) and G(·) ∈ Fτ1 . The case we are
mainly interested in is when τ2 > T a.s., where t = T is the expiry of the first
project whose payoff is H(YT ); the other case when the second project expires
before the first project is easier to handle. We continue to work with the
log-normal model in [43] and denote the Sharpe ratio over [0, T ] by λ ∈ F0.
At t = τ1, the second project is introduced and the investor is aware of its
expiry and payoff structure. It is then necessary for her to extend the current
log-normal model at t = τ1 to cover the life-span of the new project for the
purpose of (relative) indifference valuation. We assume that conditional on
Fτ1 , the extended model over [T, τ2] still follows the log-normal dynamics with
the Sharpe ratio λ1 ∈ Fτ1 . For simplicity, we also assume that the model for
the nontraded asset Y would remain the same after extension to [T, τ2]. A
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At t = 0 : 0 T
P1 = H(YT )
At t = τ1 : τ1 T τ2
P1 = H(YT ) P2 = G(Yτ2)
project P2 introduced
and specified
project P2 matures
Figure 5.1: Model inputs for relative indifference valuation of the second real
option.
summary of the model inputs is given in Figure 5.1.
To price the second project relative to the existing first project, we
would regard the plain investor as the investor under the liability of first
project. The writer then becomes the investor who holds both the first and
second projects. Conditional on Fτ1 , we look for an extended forward perfor-
mance criterion U(x, τ2) under which the optimiality of the benchmark perfor-
mance, i.e., the performance of the investor holding only the first project, can
be preserved over [T, τ2]. Once such consistent forward evluation criterion is
found, the relative indifference price of the second project over period [τ1, τ2]
then is the classical indifference price, conditional on Fτ1 , such that the writer
is indifferent with and without the second project under U(x, τ2). Throughout
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this work, we focus on the class of forward criteria that are in factor form, i.e.
U(x, τ2) = −e−γx+F (Yτ2 ,τ2), (5.38)
for some F (y, τ2) ∈ Fτ1 , with x, y ∈ R. Conditional on Fτ1 , the optimiality of
the plain investor should be preserved over [T, τ2], indicating that
− e−γ(x−H(y)) = esssupE
[
U(Xτ2 , τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , XT = x, YT = y] , a.s., (5.39)
where the left hand side is the (benchmark) performance of the investor with
exponential utility U(x) = −e−γx at t = T , under the liability of the first
project only. To determine the forward criterion U(x, τ2), specifically to de-
termine F (Yτ2 , τ2) in (5.38), we define the value function for T ≤ t ≤ τ2 as
V (x, t) = esssupE
[
U(Xτ2 , τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x] , a.s., (5.40)
and apply the distortion transformation as usual
V (x, t;ω) = −e−γxv(Yt, t;ω)
1
1−ρ2 .
Standard argument (see [43]) implies that V (x, t) in (5.40) solves a (random)
HJB PDE with v(y, t) being the solution to the (random) linear parabolic
equation
vt +
1
2a
2(y)vyy +
(
b(y)− ρλ1a(y)
)
vy =
1
2(1− ρ
2)λ21v, a.s., T < t < τ2 (5.41)
and the terminal condition v(y, τ2) = e(1−ρ
2)F (y,τ2) ∈ Fτ1 . Conditional on Fτ1 ,
the Feynman-Kac yields that
v(y, t) = EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y] , a.s.,
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where the measure Q˜, conditional on Fτ1 , is defined on Fτ2 as
dQ˜
dP
∣∣∣∣
τ2
= e−λ1(W 1τ2−W 1T )− 12λ21(τ2−T ).
Under the measure Q˜, the process W˜s = Ws−WT +ρλ1(s−T ), for T ≤ s ≤ τ2,
is a standard Brownian motion with W˜T = 0, and, it follows that the process
Y , conditional on Fτ1 , has the dynamics
dYs =
(
b(Ys, s)− ρλ1a(Ys, s)
)
ds+ a(Ys, s)dW˜s, (5.42)
with Yt = y ∈ R, for T ≤ t ≤ s ≤ τ2 under the measure Q˜. Then the forward
consistency condition (5.39) implies
−e−γ(x−H(y)) = −e−γx
(
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , YT = y]) 11−ρ2 , a.s.,
which yields
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , YT = y] = eγ(1−ρ2)H(y)+ 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−T ), a.s.. (5.43)
It in turn leads to that the random function
h(y, t;ω) := EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y]
is a nonnegative solution to the random linear parabolic equation
ht +
1
2a
2(y)hyy +
(
b(y)− ρλ1a(y)
)
hy = 0, T < t < τ2, (5.44)
with initial condition h(y, T ;ω) = eγ(1−ρ2)H(y)+ 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−T ) ∈ Fτ1 , where we
have applied the fact that Y , conditional on Fτ1 , has dynamics given by (5.42)
under the measure Q˜. Equation (5.44) is ill-posed, and we refer to the work
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[47] for more detailed discussions of the nonnegative solution to the (random)
ill-posed parabolic equation. Now once we find the nonnegative solution to
(5.44), it is straightforward to get
F (y, τ2;ω) =
1
1− ρ2 ln h(y, τ2;ω), (5.45)
for y ∈ R, and we are able to define the value functions for the plain investor
and the writer over [T, τ2], respectively. Indeed, the former is given by (5.40)
as
V (x, t) = −e−γx
(
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)− 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt]) 11−ρ2 , (5.46)
whereas the latter is defined in a similar way, but with the liability of the
second project taken into account,
V W (x, t) := esssupE
[
U(Xτ2 −G(Yτ2), τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Xt = x, Yt] a.s.. (5.47)
As before, the standard argument and the (conditional) distortion transfor-
mation give rise to, for T ≤ t ≤ τ2,
V W (x, t) =
− e−γx
(
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))− 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt]) 11−ρ2 . (5.48)
The relative indifference price of the second project over [T, τ2] is then the con-
ditional “break-even” price between the value functions V (x, t) and V W (x, t).
Indeed, it is the process H2|1t that satisfies, conditional on Fτ1 ,
V (Xt −H2|1t , t) = V W (Xt, t), a.s., T ≤ t ≤ τ2.
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Further computation yields that, for T ≤ t ≤ τ2,
H
2|1
t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt]
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt] , (5.49)
with F (y, τ2) ∈ Fτ1 given by (5.45), being the nonnegative solution to the
ill-posed problem (5.44). To calculate the relative indifference price H2|1t of
the second project over period [τ1, T ], we still need to compare the optimal
performance of the (benchmark) plain investor who holds only the first project
and that of the writer who holds both the first and the second project. At
t = T , the plain investor pays liability H(YT ) under the exponential utility
U(x) = −e−γx, whereas the writer pays both H(YT ) and H2|1T , with the latter
given by (5.49). The price H2|1T can be seen as the time t = T analogue of the
terminal liability G(Yτ2) under the extended forward criterion U(x, τ2) that
has been found. Denote
Ĝ(YT ) :=
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))
∣∣∣Fτ1 , YT ],
then from (5.49) we have H2|1T = Ĝ(YT ) − H(YT ) − λ
2
1
2γ (τ2 − T ). The value
function of the plain investor who is holding a single liability H(YT ) over
[τ1, T ] udner the exponential utility at t = T follows from the classical result
(see [43])
V (x, t) = −e−γx
(
EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)H(YT )− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−t)
∣∣∣Yt]) 11−ρ2 ,
where the measure Q is defined on FT by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
T
= e−λW 1T− 12λ2T .
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The writer’s optimization problem is similar but with the liability H(YT )+H2|1T
at t = T ; the value function is given by
V W (x, t) = −e−γx
(
EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)Ĝ(YT )− 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−T )− 12 (1−ρ2)λ2(T−t)
∣∣∣Yt]) 11−ρ2 .
The relative indifference price of the second project is again defined as the
“break-even” price between the two value functions, i.e.,
V (Xt −H2|1t , t) = V W (Xt, t),
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T . A further computation leads to
H
2|1
t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ
[
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))
∣∣∣YT ] ∣∣∣∣Yt]
EQ
[
e(1−ρ2)γH(YT )
∣∣∣Yt]
− λ
2
1
2γ (τ2 − T ). (5.50)
We summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3.1. Suppose that the ill-posed (random) parabolic equation
ht +
1
2a
2(y)hyy +
(
b(y)− ρλ1a(y)
)
hy = 0, T < t < τ2,
with h(y, T ;ω) = eγ(1−ρ2)H(y)+ 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−T ) ∈ Fτ1, has a nonnegative classical
solution h(y, t;ω), T ≤ t ≤ τ2, almost surely. Then, conditional on Fτ1, the
relative forward indifference price of the second project given the first project
is
H
2|1
t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ
[
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))
∣∣∣YT ] ∣∣∣∣Yt]
EQ
[
e(1−ρ2)γH(YT )
∣∣∣Yt]
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−λ
2
1
2γ (τ2 − T ),
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , and
H
2|1
t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))
∣∣∣Yt]
EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ2)F (Yτ2 ,τ2)
∣∣∣Yt] ,
for T < t ≤ τ2, where the function F (y, τ2;ω) = 11−ρ2 ln h(y, τ2;ω), for y ∈ R.
5.3.3 Decomposition of risk under relative forward indifference val-
uation
In this section, we demonstrate the decomposition for the relative indif-
ference price, the residual optimal wealth process and the residual risk process.
The discussion is carried out for the case of the relative forward indifference
valuation of the second project given the first project. To this end, we first
introduce
Zτ2 :=
1
γ
(
F (Yτ2 , τ2)−
λ21
2 (τ2 − T )
)
, (5.51)
where F (y, τ2) ∈ Fτ1 , for y ∈ R, is given by (5.45). Then the forward consis-
tency equation (5.39) can rewrite as
− e−γ(x−H(y)) = esssupE
[
−e−γ(Xτ2−Zτ2 )+
λ21
2 (τ2−T )
∣∣∣Fτ1 , XT = x, YT = y
]
, a.s..
(5.52)
We can now regard the quantity Zτ2 as the future reincarnation of the first
project after its expiry t = T , in the sense that the optimality of the per-
formance of the investor who only holds the first project can be maintained
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through [T, τ2], if she pays the virtual payoff Zτ2 at t = τ2 instead of paying
the actual payoff H(YT ) at expiry t = T . Note that the payoff Zτ2 in equa-
tion (5.52) is evaluated under the forward criterion U0(x, τ2) = −e−γx+
λ21
2 (τ2−T )
which is consistent with the criterion U0(x, T ) = −e−γx at t = T . In fact, it is
easy to recognize that the criterion U0(x, τ2) is the extended forward criterion
from U0(x, T ) for an investor who only invests in the stock and Bond markets
without taking any liability from the first and the second projects (i.e., the
genuine plain investor). We can also rewrite the relative forward indifference
pricing formula in Proposition 5.3.1 using the introduced virtual payoff Zτ2 ,
i.e., conditional on Fτ1 ,
H
2|1
t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ
[
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(Yτ2 )+Zτ2)
∣∣∣YT ] ∣∣∣∣Yt]
EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ2)H(YT )
∣∣∣Yt] ,
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T , and
H
2|1
t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(Yτ2 )+Zτ2)
∣∣∣ Yt]
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ2)Zτ2
∣∣∣ Yt] ,
for T < t ≤ τ2.
We next define the optimal wealth processes for the writer who values
the second project in relation to the first project, and the benchmark investor
who holds only the first project. Let Π2|1,W ∗ and Π2|1,∗ be their respective op-
timal control processes by following the relative forward indifference valuation
procedure. Then, conditional on Fτ1 , the writer’s optimal wealth satisfies
dX2|1,W
∗
s = µsΠ2|1,W
∗
s ds+ σsΠ2|1,W
∗
s dW
1
s , t ≤ s ≤ τ2, (5.53)
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with initial condition X2|1,W
∗
t = x+h2|1(y, t;ω), for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2. Similarly, the
optimal wealth for the benchmark investor follows
dX2|1,∗s = µsΠ2|1,∗s ds+ σsΠ2|1,∗s dW 1s , t ≤ s ≤ τ2, (5.54)
with initial condition X2|1,∗t = x, for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2. Here, µs = µ, σs = σ for
τ1 ≤ s ≤ T and µs = µ1 ∈ Fτ1 , σs = σ1 ∈ Fτ1 for T < s ≤ τ2. The random
function h(y, t;ω), conditional on Fτ2 , is the relative indifference price
h2|1(y, t;ω) = 1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ
[
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(Yτ2 )+Zτ2)
∣∣∣YT ] ∣∣∣∣Yt = y]
EQ
[
eγ(1−ρ2)H(YT )
∣∣∣Yt = y] , (5.55)
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ T and
h2|1(y, t;ω) = 1
γ(1− ρ2) ln
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(Yτ2 )+Zτ2)
∣∣∣ Yt = y]
EQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ2)Zτ2
∣∣∣ Yt = y] , (5.56)
for T < t ≤ τ2. Motivated by the similar definition for the single project
indifference valuation in [43], we then introduce the residual optimal wealth
process and the residual risk process associated to the relative forward indif-
ference valuation of the second project given the first project
Definition 5.3.1. Let the relative forward indifference price be given by H2|1t
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2, and the optimal wealth processes for the writer and the
benchmark investor be, respectively, (5.53) and (5.54). We define the residual
optimal wealth process for the relative indifference valuation of the second
project given the first as
L2|1s = X2|1,W
∗
s −X2|1,∗s , t ≤ s ≤ τ2, L2|1t = h(y, t;ω),
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for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2, and the residual risk process as
R2|1s = L2|1s −H2|1s , t ≤ s ≤ τ2, R2|1t = 0,
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2.
We can similarly define the processes L1,2 and R1,2 for the total payoff
G(Yτ2) + Zτ2 , under the classical forward criterion U0(x, τ2) = −e−γ+
λ21
2 (τ2−T ),
and regard this problem as the problem for determining the (non-relative) in-
difference price of the two projects together, with the payoff of the first project
being replaced by its future reincarnation Zτ2 at t = τ2. Also, under the same
extended forward criterion U0(x, τ2), we define the processes L1 and R1 asso-
ciated to the problem of pricing only the first project under its future virtual
payoff Zτ2 , without the liability of the second project. Then the following
proposition claims that a desirable decomposition among the risks processes
exists. Simply speaking, the residual risk due to the hedging for both projects
under the (non-relative) criterion U0(x, τ2) can be decomposed into the risk
due to the hedging for only the first project under U0(x, τ2) and the risk due
to the hedging for the second project in relation to the first project under the
relative forward criterion U(x, τ2).
Proposition 5.3.2. Let the incremental optimal hedging strategy for the rel-
ative indifference valuation under the forward criterion U(x, τ2) be
∆Π2|1,∗t = Π
2|1,W ∗
t − Π2|1,∗t , τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2,
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and similarly define ∆Π1,2,∗, ∆Π1,∗ for the problems under the (non-relative)
forward criterion U0(x, τ2), respectively. Let also the associated indifference
prices be given by H2|1, H1,2 and H1. Then, conditional on Fτ1,
∆Π1,2,∗t = ∆Π1,∗t + ∆Π
2|1,∗
t , a.s.,
H1,2t = H1t +H
2|1
t , a.s.,
L1,2t = L1t + L
2|1
t , a.s.,
R1,2t = R1t +R
2|1
t , a.s.,
for τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2.
Proof. We first focus on the valuation problems over [T, τ2]. Recall that the
value function of the writer under the relative forward criterion U(x, τ2) is
V W (x, t) given by (5.48). Conditional on Fτ1 , the associated HJB equation
yields the optimal control policy
pi2|1,W
∗(x, y, t;ω) = ρa(y)
σ1
1
γ(1− ρ2)
∂
∂y
(
ln v1,2,W ∗(y, t;ω)
)
+ µ1
γσ21
= ρa(y)
σ1
h1,2y (y, t;ω) +
µ1
γσ21
,
for T ≤ t ≤ τ2, where
v1,2,W
∗(y, t;ω) := EQ˜
[
e(1−ρ
2)(γG(Yτ2 )+F (Yτ2 ,τ2))− 12 (1−ρ2)λ21(τ2−t)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y]
and
h1,2(y, t;ω) := 1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(Yτ2 )+Zτ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y] .
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We also have the benchmark investor’s value function given by (5.46) with the
associated optimal control policy given by
pi2|1,∗(x, y, t;ω) = ρa(y)
σ1
h1y(y, t;ω) +
µ1
γσ21
,
and
h1(y, t;ω) := 1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)Zτ2
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt = y] ,
for T ≤ t ≤ τ2. It hence follows that
∆Π2|1,∗t = ρ
a(Yt)
σ1
(
h1,2y (Yt, t;ω)− h1y(Yt, t;ω)
)
.
On the other hand, the (non-relative) indifference valuation of the two projects
with the payoff G(Yτ2)+Zτ2 under the (non-relative) forward criterion U0(x, τ2)
can be solved following the standard argument, and we obtain
H1,2t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(G(Yτ2 )+Zτ2)
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt] ,
as well as the hedging policy pi1,2,W ∗ = pi2|1,W ∗ for the writer with both projects
under U0(x, τ2). The benchmark Merton investor under the criterion U0(x, τ2)
has the optimal policy given by pi1,2,∗(x, y, t;ω) = µ1
γσ21
, for T ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2. It
hence yields
∆Π1,2,∗t = ρ
a(Yt)
σ1
h1,2y (Yt, t;ω).
Finally, we can compute the (non-relative) indifference price of the first project
under the extended forward criterion U0(x, τ2), again, following the standard
argument to get
H1t =
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnEQ˜
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)Zτ2
∣∣∣Fτ1 , Yt] ,
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and the incremental hedging strategy
∆Π1∗t = ρ
a(Yt)
σ1
h1y(Yt, t;ω).
It hence follows directly that ∆Π1,2,∗t = ∆Π1,∗t + ∆Π
2|1,∗
t , a.s., and H1,2t =
H1t + H
2|1
t , a.s., in regard of (5.56). By the definition of the residual optimal
wealth processes L2|1, L1,2, L1, the linearity of the wealth dynamics and the
additive property ∆Π1,2,∗t = ∆Π1,∗t + ∆Π
2|1,∗
t , we have dL1,2s = dL1s + dL2|1s , for
t ≤ s ≤ τ2, with the initial condition L1,2t = L1t + L2|1t , due to the additive
property h1,2(y, t) = h1(y, t) + h2|1(y, t). This proves that L1,2t = L1t + L
2|1
t ,
a.s., for T ≤ t ≤ τ2. The additivity of the residual risk processes follows from
that of the residual optimal wealth processes and that of the indifference price
processes. The analysis over the interval [τ1, T ] is similar.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 3
A.1 Properties of functions F,G
If m ∈ (0, 1) , then
G
√2λ ln
√
1 +m
1−m ;m,λ
 = cosh
ln
√
1 +m
1−m
− 1
m
sinh
ln
√
1 +m
1−m

= 12
√1 +m
1−m +
√
1−m
1 +m
− 12m
√1 +m
1−m −
√
1−m
1 +m
 = 0.
Similarly, F
(√
2λ ln
√
1+m
1−m ;m,λ
)
= cosh
√
2λ ln
√
1+m
1−m√
2λ − m sinh
√
2λ ln
√
1+m
1−m√
2λ =
cosh
(
ln
√
1+m
1−m
)
−m sinh
(
ln
√
1+m
1−m
)
= 12
√1 +m
1−m +
√
1−m
1 +m
− m2
√1 +m
1−m −
√
1−m
1 +m
 ,
= 12
1−m2√
1−m2 =
1
2
√
1−m2 > 0.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 4
B.1 Proposition B.1.1
Proposition B.1.1. Assume that the function g satisfies the assumption in
Theorem 4.3.1. Then, for any ε > 0
sup
x>0
g′(x)
x+ ε <∞. (B.1)
Proof. We first show that under the assumption in Theorem 4.3.1, g(0) =
limx↓0 g(x) = infx>0 g(x) > −∞. Since infx>0 g′(x)x = b > 0, then g′(x) ≥ bx >
0, ∀x > 0 implies g(0) = limx↓0 g(x) = infx>0 g(x) < ∞ exists. Also, since
supx>0 g′′(x) ≤ a, then for 0 < s < t,
−∞ < g(t) ≤ g(s) + g′(s)(t− s) + a2(t− s)
2.
Under the fact 0 ≤ g′(0) < ∞, we obtain g(0) > −∞ as s → 0. We can
now, without loss of generality, assume g(0) = 0 (the initial criterion U(x, r, 0)
and the forward problem do not change except for a positive multiplicative
constant). To show (B.1), we consider three non-overlapping cases as follows.
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1. −∞ < g′′(0) ≤ a and g′(0) = 0.
It is easy to see g′(x) ≤ g′(0) + ax = ax for x > 0, and hence for any
ε > 0,
sup
x>0
g′(x)
x+ ε ≤ supx>0
g′(x)
x
≤ a,
giving dε = a in (4.17) and (4.18) in Theorem 4.3.1, for any ε > 0.
2. 0 < g′′(0) ≤ a and 0 < g′(0) <∞.
For this case, we consider the following extension of the current function
g(x) ∈ C2(R+) to a nonnegative C2(R) function with bounded second
order derivative. Define the constant c0 = − (g′(0))22g′′(0) and the function
g˜(x) := g(x) − c0 for x ≥ 0 and g˜(x) = g′(0)x + g′′(0)2 x2 − c0 for x < 0.
Then it is easy to see that 0 ≤ g˜(x) ∈ C2(R), and g˜′′(x) ≤ a,∀ x ∈ R.
It then follows from [27] that g˜′(x) ≤ √2ag˜(x), ∀ x ∈ R. In particular,
we have
g′(x) ≤ √2a
√
g(x)− c0, ∀ x > 0. (B.2)
Moreover, condition (4.7) yields g(x)− c0 ≤ g′(0)x+ a2x2 − c0. We next
want to find K > 0, such that g′(0)x + a2x
2 − c0 ≤ K(x + ε)2, ∀x > 0.
Direct computation shows
K(x+ ε)2 −
(
g′(0)x+ a2x
2 − c0
)
=
(
K − a2
)
x2 + (2Kε− g′(0))x+Kε2 + c0.
Therefore, if K > max{a2 , g
′(0)
2ε ,− c0ε2}, then the above quadratic function
is strictly increasing for x > 0, with an initial value Kε2 + c0 > 0 at
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x = 0. Combining this result with (B.2), we obtain the desired result
g′(x) ≤ √2a
√
g(x)− c0 ≤
√
2aK(x+ ε), ∀ x > 0.
3. −∞ < g′′(0) ≤ 0 and 0 < g′(0) <∞.
In this case, we also aim to give an extension of the function g(x) ∈
C2(R), maintaining the nonnegative property and the property that the
second order derivative is bounded by a > 0, to yield a similar result as
(B.2). First we consider the scenario −a ≤ g′′(0) ≤ 0 and introduce the
function g˜(x) = A arctan(Bx+ θ) + C, ∀x ≤ 0 with constants A, B, C
and θ to be determined. Direct computation yields
g˜′(x) = AB
(Bx+ θ)2 + 1
, and g˜′′(x) = −2AB
2 (Bx+ θ)(
(Bx+ θ)2 + 1
)2 .
Then the continuity condition of the first and second order derivatives
at 0 imply g˜′(0) = g′(0) > 0 and g˜′′(0) = g′′(0), i.e.,
g′(0) = AB
θ2 + 1 > 0, and g
′′(0) = − 2θAB
2
(θ2 + 1)2 ,
respectively. Moreover, one can show the second order derivative g˜′′(x) ≤
3
√
3
8 AB
2, ∀x ∈ R, if AB2 > 0. Therefore, to have the extended function
g˜′′(x) ≤ a, we impose a third condition on the parameters 0 < 3
√
3
8 AB
2 ≤
a. The last step is to show the three conditions
g′(0) = AB
θ2 + 1 > 0, g
′′(0) = − 2θAB
2
(θ2 + 1)2 , and 0 <
3
√
3
8 AB
2 ≤ a
(B.3)
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are indeed compatible and lead to solutions. Precisely, since −3
√
3
8 ≤
− 2θ(θ2+1)2 ≤ 3
√
3
8 , and 0 <
3
√
3
8 AB
2 ≤ a, it is then clear that
−a ≤ − 2θAB
2
(θ2 + 1)2 ≤ a,
indicating that the second condition of (B.3) compatible, due to the fact
−a ≤ g′′(0) ≤ 0. This shows there exist properly selected constants AB2
and θ such that the last two conditions of (B.3) are satisfied. Once these
two constants are given, we can use the first condition to completely
determine A, B, and θ. The constant C is simply determined by g˜(0) =
g(0) = 0. Hence, we have a function g˜(x) = A arctan(Bx + θ) + C,
∀x ≤ 0, that is a C2 extension of the original function g(x) to negative
real line with g˜′′(x) ≤ a, and bounded from below by a finite constant
c0 := infx≤0 g˜(x). Since g˜(0) = g(0) = 0 and g˜′(0) = g′(0) > 0, we have
c0 < 0. Then similar to the second case, we shift both g(x), ∀x ≥ 0 and
g˜(x), ∀x < 0 upwards by −c0, and hence arrive at the same result as
(B.2) together with the same estimate following it as in the second case.
Next, for the other scenario −∞ < g′′(0) < −a, before the concatenation
with the arctan function as depicted above, it is necessary to shift the
second order derivative g′′(0) back to the region [−a, 0]. Precisely, we
achieve this by introducing
g˜(x) = −a+ 2g
′′(0)
24 x
4 + 12g
′′(0)x2 + g′(0)x, ∀x ∈ [−1, 0].
It is then easy to verify that g˜(x), ∀x ∈ [−1, 0] is a C2 extension of
the original function g(x), ∀x ≥ 0 with g˜′′(x) = −
(
a
2 + g
′′(0)
)
x2 +
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g′′(0) ≤ −a2 , ∀x ∈ [−1, 0]. Now at x = −1, we are back in the scenario
discussed above, since g˜′′(−1) = −a2 ∈ [−a, 0]. Moreover, g˜′(−1) =
a
6 − 23g′′(0) + g′(0) > 0. Hence, we can construct the function g˜(x) =
A arctan(B(x+1)+θ)+C, ∀x ≤ −1 exactly as in the previous scenario,
after replacing g′(0) and g′′(0) by g˜′(−1) and g˜′′(−1), respectively in
conditions (B.3). It then yields the extended function g˜(x) that is defined
for all x ≤ 0 with desired properties.
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